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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is concerned with comparing the views 
of Martin Luther and James Arminius on the problem of human 
freedom and bondage. Since the former is taken to be a moner-
gist and the latter is taken to be a synergist, and yet in 
many respects they hold similar positions, it is hoped that 
. 
their writings, when viewed together, will help us gain deeper 
insight into the problem. In this study we plan to examine 
primarily God's omnipotence and the sovereignty of His grace, 
man's free will and bondage in sin, and the interrelationship 
of God and man in these concepts as they are found in the 
writings of Luther and Arminius. 
To explore this problem adequately we pose the following 
questions: What does the term free will mean in the context 
of Christian salvation? Does Luther's emphasis upon salvation 
by the grace of God alone and the bondage of the human will in 
sin preclude the freedom of man's will? Does man possess the 
power to choose to cooperate with God in his salvation, or is 
man so bound in sin that he can do nothing and actually can-
not make any contribution whatever toward his salvation? Are 
the sovereignty of God's grace and man's free will incompat-
1 
2 
ible? Does monergism accurately describe the Christian con-
cept of salvation by the grace of God alone? Does the free 
will of man preclude the omnicompetence, omnipotence, omni-
science and sovereignty of God? Does salvation actually come 
by the grace of God alone, the free will of man alone, or is 
salvation a corporate and cooperating venture whic h involves 
both God's g race and man's free will as agents affecting man's 
destiny? 
It is the chief task of this dissertation to examine the 
writings of Luther and Arminius in the light of the above 
questions to see whether the former's "monergistic emphasis" 
or the latter's "synergistic emphasis" affords the best so-
lution ~o the problem of human freeuom and bondage in man's 
relation to God; or whether the best solution is to be found 
in some combination of these views, or in neither one of them. 
2. Definitions 
At the outset, it is well to note that there is often 
disagreement as to what precisely we mean by the word freedom. 
In fact, as Adler points out: 
It is a familiar fact that the literature of this 
subject abounds in divergent and conflicting defi-
nitions and that the word 'freedom' is used in a 
multiplicity of senses. • • • Fortunately, • • • 
there is a way of identifying a subject of discus-
sion without defining it, so that, with the same 
subject commonly in mind, two men can disagree about 
how it should be defined.l 
1M.J. Adler, The Idea of Freedom (New York: Doubleday and Com-
pany, 1958), p. 18. 
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Freedom is perhaps most concisely defined by Brightman, 
who writes: 
Freedom is always relative. Absolute freedom, unre-
stricted by facts or laws of any sort, is a fiction. 
Real freedom is freedom within limits. Freedom is 
essentially a power to choose and carry out what the 
individual prefers under the circumstances.l 
Such a definition is valuable as a working definition 
for what we shall call man's natural freedom or essential 
freedom of choice between alternative courses of action. Such 
freedom is essential to true humanity whether it be in the 
bodily sphere of satisfying basic physical needs or in the 
spiritual sphere of satisfying the basic moral needs of man. 
However, it does not make adequate provision for the religious 
problem raised by Luther and Arminius concerning bondage in 
sin and subsequent religiously acquired Christian liberty 
whic h we shall call spiritual freedom. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, there are chiefly 
two different kinds of freedom which must always be borne in 
mind, although other definitions will be expounded in the 
course of this study as the need arises. 
First, there is natural freedom: 
which is {i) inherent in all men, (ii) regardless of 
the circumstances under which they live, and (iii) 
without regard to any state of mind or character they 
may or may not acquire in the course of their lives.B 
1E.S. Brightman, "Autonomy and IJ'heonomy," Journal of Reli-
sious Thought, (1951-52), pp. 6-12. 
2M.J. Adler, op. cit., p. 149. 
Second, there is acquired (spiritual) freedom, which 
refers to that the possession of which depends upon 
a change or development in human beings whereby thel 
have a state of mina, or character, or personality 
which differentiates them from other men.l 
4 
Natural freedom in this dissertation is defined as a God-
given capacity to make a choice between alternative courses of 
action and the power to carry out what one wills under a given 
set of circumstances. It is freedom from complete aeterminism 
of any kind. 
Ethical or moral freedom is defined as: 
The ability of an individual to make decisions and 
to act according to standards of value in conduct o~ 
principles of justice and fairness accepted by him. 
Psychological freedom is defined as: 
The subjective feeling of an agent either at the moment 
of decision or in retrospect that his decision is free 
and that he might, if he had chosen, have decided dif-
ferently .3 
On the other hand, psychological determinism is defined as: 
"The doctrine that the will is not free but determined by psy-
chical or physical conditions."4 
The belief that everyone is, for any reason, unable to 
will or act as one chooses when two or more alternative courses 
1~., p. 135 . 
2Howard c. Warren, Dictionart of Psychologl (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1934), p. lO. 
3nagobert Runes, The Dictionar! of Philosophy (New York: Phi lo-
sophical Library, 1942), p. 1 ~. 
4~., p. 78. 
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of action are present as live options is what we shall call 
determinism in this dissertation . 
Determinism is the doctrine that all acts of the 
will result from causes which determine them. De-
terminism characteristically denies the reality of 
alternative modes of action but may maintain that 1 the will is free in the sense of being uncompelled. 
In contrast to determinism, when we speak of free will 
we mean: 
The power asserted of moral beings of willing or choos-
ing within certain limitations or with respect to cer-
tain matters, without the restraints of physically or 
divinely imposed necessity; ability to choose between 
alternative possibilities of action in such a way that 
the choice and action are not completely predetermined, 
but are to some extent creatively determined by the 
conscious subject at the time.2 
Sin is defined as man's use of his God-given natural free-
dom in such a way that he refuses to ac~nowledge God as God, 
trust Him alone, and so rejects what God wills and seeks to do 
in and for man. Such refusal to seek out and do God's will 
effectively separates man from God and automatically leads 
him to do the will of Satan . This state or condition of sin 
or separation from God which leads man to serve Satan, we call 
bondage in sin. 
1 
When we speak of grace in this dissertation, we mean: 
The unmerited and freely given redeeming action of 
God throu6h Christ by which sin is forgiven and its 
power broken, and believers are upheld and strengthened 
"Determinism," Webster's New International Dictionary of the 
English Language (2nd Ld ., unabridged; Springfield, Massa-
chusetts: G. and G. Merriam Company, 1960). 
2
"Free Will" , _!lli. 
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in their Christian life. 1 
When we speak of spiritual freedom, we mean freedom from 
sin and its bonuage which can only be acquired by sinful man 
when he accepts and appropriates the grace of God, and with 
God's help, continues to live under the guidance of God's 
Spirit. Life under the Spirit brings the true freedom for 
which man was created, viz., attaining unto the stature of 
Christ and becoming a son of God. 
When we speak of the prevenient grace of God, we mean 
that God always takes the initiative in giving His grace to 
man. Such grace prepares sinful man for the recep tion of the 
Gospel, in order that man may escape bondage in sin and come 
to a saving relationship with God. 
Monergism is defined as: "the doctrine of some Augustin-
ians who affirmed that regeneration is the work of the Holy 
Spirit alone, the human will being passive and having no 
part . "2 On the other hand, synergism in this dissertation 
means: "to work with. [It] refers specifically to the view 
that the gift of Divine grace does not mean the absence but 
the cooperation of man's will in the matter of conversion and 
salvation."3 
l~w~e~s~t=m~i~n~s~t~e~r~~~-=~~~~~~~~H~o=l~=B~i~b=l~e (Philadelphia: 
Westm nster Concordance); see also, 
2 Cor. 8:9; 
2vergilius F'erm, An Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 503. 
3verg1lius Ferm, A Protestant Dictionary (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, l95l), p. 249. 
\ . 
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For the purposes of this study, it is important to re-
member that Luther defines freedom primarily from a religious 
point of view. It is from this viewpoint that Luther argues 
strenuously a gainst free will, and suggests that it would have 
been better if the term had never been invented.l 
With regard to God and all that bears on salvation 
or damnation, he (man] has no 'free-will', but is 
a captive, prisoner, or bondslave eit~er to the 
will of God, or to the will of Satan. 
In this religious context, Luther defines free will as the 
power of man to choose and accomplish anything he wills to 
do. According to Luther, such freedom should only be ascribed 
to God.3 Man truly enjoys a free will only in relation to 
things that are under his dominion, even as God enjoys freedom 
over all things under Him. Such freedom implies a wholly 
arbitrary power to do whatever one chooses to do.4 
Luther also speaks of free will as the power or poten-
tiality in man of being "caught up by the Spirit and touched 
by God's grace, as creatures made for eternal life or eternal 
death."5 In this context, free will is the capacity which 
1Martin Luther, Works of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg 
Press, 1930), III, llO . 
2Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, trans. by o. R. 
Johnston and J. I . Packer (Westwood, New Jersey: Fleming H. 
Revell, 1957), p. 106; cf., Luther, Works (Philadelphia), 
I I I, lOB. 
3Ibid., p. 137. 
4Martin Luther, Works (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1958), I, 84. 
5Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 105. 
makes man distinctively human and qualitatively different 
from animals. 
According to Adler, Luther allows for two basically 
different kinds of freedom, viz., the natural freedom of 
8 
self determination and the acquired freedom of self perfection. 
Concerning the former, God gave man a free will "to milk kine, 
to build houses, etc.," but concerning the latter, man has no 
real freedom except when God's grace empowers him. 1 
For Arminius, however, assertion of belief in free will 
means that man always enjoys "freedom from necessity, whether 
this proceeds from an external cause compelling, or a nature 
inwardly determining to absolutely one thing. 112 He argues 
that such freedom from necessity always applies to man, 
"because it exists naturally in the will, as its proper attri-
bute, so that there ca~not be any will if it be not free."3 
Arminius 1 aim, then, is to avoid any view of man that 
leads to determinism. It is his contention that man as a 
volitional creature always has a free will and pos sesses 
power to express that will as he chooses. Thus, even sinful 
man r e tains the power to accept or reject what God does or 
1M. J. Adler, op . cit., p. 416 f.; cf., Martin Luther, Table 
Talk of Martin Luther, ed. T.S. Kepler (New York: The World 
Puolishing Compa r.y, I952), pp. 159, 160, 165. 
2James Arminius, The Nritings of James Arminius, trans. by 
James Nichols and v~ . R. Bagnall (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Baker Book House, 1956), I, 524. 
3Ibid. 
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gives, but can acquire spiritual freedom only when the grace 
of God alas man in his choice. 
3. Limitations 
Only the theological implications of human freedom and 
oondage will be treated in this aissertation. We shall, how-
ever, seeA to define and explore human freedom primarily in 
two basically different ways. First ,we shall deal with man's 
God-given gift of freedom of choice and action, which man has 
cy virtue of his creation in God's image, as a volitional 
creature. 1his we call natural freedom. Second, we shall deal 
with the freedom that comes to sinful man as a gift of God 's 
grace, which frees man from his bonaage to sin, enables him 
to live under the guidance of Goa 's Spirit, and empowers him 
to a ttain the perfection for whic h he was created. This we 
call spiritual freedom. 
Our discussion will center around Luther's writings On 
the Bondage of the Will1 and the Treatise on Christian 
Liberty,2 because it is in these two worAs that Luther develops 
his ideas of man's freedom and bondage in a systematic and 
lMartin Luther, On the Bonaage of the Will, trans. J.I. Packer 
and O.R. Johnston (Westwood, ~ew Jersey: Fleming H. Revell 
Company, 1947). Hereafter this will be referred to as: 
Luther, Bondage of the Will. 
2Martin Luther , "Treatise on Christian Liberty," VlorKs of 
Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1943), II, 
297-348. Hereafter this will be referred to as: Luther, 
Works (Philadelphia). The other English edition of Luther's 
collected works will be referred to as: Luther, Works (St. 
Louis). 
lO 
extensive way. Concerning the teachings of James Arminius, 
we will draw all of our information about his views on human 
freedom and bondage from the three-volume edition of his 
writings.l When relevant and helpful, we shall draw upon 
other primary sources as well as interpretations of the 
writings of Luther and Arminius. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
There has been no significant work done in the area of 
study which this dissertation covers that is available in 
English. There are two Swedish works which interpret Luther's 
concept of bondage and freedom, but they have not been trans-
lated into English, and are, therefore, inaccessible to this 
writer except where portions of them have been incorporated 
into books on Luther's theology writ cen by English authors 
or translated into German. They are books by Ragnar Bring, 
Dualisman hos Luther (Stockholm, 1929), and Arvia Runestam, 
Den Kristliga Friheten hos Luther och Melanchthon (Stockholm, 
1917). 
In German, there are two books known to this writer that 
deal directly with Luther's concept of bondage of the will. 
They are: Ferdinand Kattenbusch, Luthers Lehre vom unfreien 
~illen und von der PrHdestination (Gottingen, 1875), and 
1James Arminius, The Writings of James Arminius , trans. James 
Nichols and W. R. Bagnall (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book 
House, 1956). Hereafter this will be referred to as: 
Arminius, Writings. 
11 
Eauard Schweingruber, Luther's ~rlebnis des unfreien Willens 
(Zurich, 1947) . iwo articles fo und in German perioaicals are 
of particula r interest . They are: H. J. I wand, "Studien zum 
Problem des unfreien Willens," 
II 
Zeitschrift fur systematische 
Theologie, 8(1931-32), 216-250, and L. Pinomaa, "Unfreier Wille 
una Pr Mdestination bei Luther," Theologische Zeitschrift, 13 
(1957), 339- 49. 
Four dissertations which are of interest, but which do not 
parallel the research of this aissertation are: Carl Bangs, 
11Arminius and Reformed ~ heology," (University of Chicago, 
1958 ), Karl Schmidt, "Toward the Rediscovery of the Natural 
in Lutheran Theology" (State University of I owa, 1959), Vernon 
L. Strempke, 11The Concepts of Personality Held by Luther and 
Some Recent Pa s t oral Psychologists," (Boston Univers i ty, 1954) , 
a nd Rodney B. Nolfard, "The Concept of Freedom in the Ethical 
Teachings of Paul," (Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary , 
1953}. 
To this writer's knowledge, there have been no disserta-
tions written nor any monographs published in English on 
either Luther's or Arminius' concept of human freedom and bon-
dage . Fur thermore, to the knowledge of t his writer, there has 
been no previous work done in comparing the thinking of Luther 
and Armi nius with respect to the problem of human freedom and 
bondage -- the task to which t his dissertation addresses itself. 
12 
5. The Method of the Dissertation 
After an historical survey of the problem of human free-
dom and bondage in Scriptures and Christian thought, we shall 
turn first to the theological ins ights of Luther, and then to 
those of Arminius. Then an attempt will be made to correlate 
God's grace with man's freedom by comparing Luther's teaching 
with that of Arminius. A further examination will be made of 
the interrelationship of God's grace and man's free will via 
monergism and the paradox of grace, and synergism and man's 
free will . 
Throughout the dissertation an attempt will be made to 
apply Scriptural insights and human reason to the problem of 
human freedom and bondage. It is hoped that the conclusions 
reached in this study will provide a coherent, comprehensive 
and meaningful understanding of man's existentia l estrange-
ment from Goa in sin, bondage in sin, and the liberating power 
of God's grace, as we explore critically the thoughts of 
Luther and Arminius. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE PROBLE.th OF 
HUMAN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 
It will be helpful to begin this study with an historical 
survey of the controversy concerning God's grace and human 
freedom as agents in man's salvation. We shall trace the 
problem of human freedom and bondage in Christian thought 
from biblical times to the present by highlighting those por-
tions of historical development which seem most important to 
the understanding of this problem. Everything said here will 
doubtless have been said before, but it is hoped that an his-
torical survey will enable us to see the problem in a proper 
perspective . 
To accomplish this, the chapter will begin with a study 
of Scriptures, and then move on to review the controversy 
between Augustine and Pelagius, Luther and Erasmus. Following 
this, the Formula of Concord, the teachings of John Calvin, 
Arminianism, and finally, some modern contributions to the 
problem of human freedom and bonaage will be pursued. 
1. Biblical Evidence 
Most theologians look to the Bible for their sedes 
doctrinae . Certainly the biblical witness cannot be ignored. 
However, since. this dissertation is not primarily a biblical 
13 
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study, we shall not attempt to be exhaustive. Ra ther, we 
shall highlight selected portions of scripture which deal 
with the problem. 
In the Old Testament, human freedom is neither asserted 
nor denied. 1 Man's natural freedom is usually assumed in the 
Old Testament, though some passages lend themselves to argu-
ments which t end to deny such freedom. The biblical writers, 
not concerned with philosophical and theologica l subtleties, 
assume that man is a responsible creature before God. Such an 
assumption implies that man is capable of making free choices. 2 
Howev er, except for occasional insights on the freedom of man 
under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, when the law of God 
will be written on man's heart ,3 the majority of the Old Testa-
ment writers base their ethical teachings on a moral and 
legalistic foundation. They assume that man can fulfill the 
whole will and law of God, and thus please God . Jesus seems 
to upset this assumption when he attacks the Pharisees and 
addresses his fellow countrymen as though they are captives of 
1Rodney Nolfard, "The Conception of Freedom in the Ethical 
Teachings of Paul" {unpublished Ph .D. dissertation, South-
wes tern Ba9tist, 1954), p . 23; cf. Josh. 24:15; I Kings 18:21. 
2neut. 30:15, 19; cf. Otto Baab, Theology of the Old Testament 
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1949), p. 75; Albert c. 
Knudson, The Religious Teachinss of the Old Testament (New 
York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 19!8), p. 258. Here Knudson 
explains that the philosophical question of determinism did 
not exist tor the Hebrew mind. 
3Ezek. 11:19; 36:26f.; Jer. 31:31; Joel 2:28; Zech. 4:6. 
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the law and bound in sin,l and therefore unable to fulfill the 
whole will and law of God. 
Rodney Wolfard points out that "like the Hebrews, • • • 
Jesus took for granted that man was a free moral agent with 
power to choose between good and evil, and while he did not 
speculate about it, he did argue with the Jews over it ."2 Yet, 
Jesus made it clear that only he could free men from bondage 
to sin and death. 3 While this seems like a contradiction, it 
is not. It simply points up the fact that Jesus is speaking 
about two different kinds of freedom. Jesus, as interpreted 
by the writer of the Fourth Gospel, teaches that whoever sins 
is the servant of sin (John 8:34) . 4 
Commenting on John 8:3lff ., Wolfard writes: 
The freedom Jesus set 
inward in its nature, 
which all other types 
meanin~less to man as 
image. 
forth here is spiritual ana 
that type of freedom without 
of liberty are valueless and 
an immortal creature in God's 
lJohn 8:34-36; Luke 4:18. 
2Rodney Wolfard, op. cit., p. 27. Wolfard points out that this 
passage (John 8:34ff.) uses eleutheros not in the sense of 
freedom of moral choice, but as freedom from bondage or what 
might be called spiritual freedom. 
3 John 8:34; cf. John ll:25ff.; Rom. 8:21. 
4This view is supported by Paul and the writer of the Second 
Epistle of Pete r (Rom. 6:12ff.; II Peter 2:19), cf. Jesus 
teaching in the synoptics where he argues that a man cannot 
serve two masters (Matt. 6:24) and sees his mission as set-
ting sin's captives free (Luke 4:18). 
5Roaney Wolfard , op. cit., p . 29. 
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~olfard continues to argue for the aistinction between other 
kinds of freedom and the biblical concept of spiritual free-
dom. 
This spiritual freedom was totally unknown to the 
Greeks ana the Romans, and was experienced only in 
a very limited sense by the saints of the Old Testa-
ment era, and was for the first time brought into 
its full light by the very Son of1God who alone can bestow it upon repentant sinners. 
Throughout his life Jesus makes demands of his followers 
and assumes they have power to obey. Yet at the same time he 
makes it clear that the Jews have chosen to act contrary to 
the will of God and are , therefore, the captives of sin. 
Furthermore, they re main the bondsmen of sin until they re-
ceive Jesus Christ as the embodiment of God's forgiveness , 
and like him submit t hemselves to the will of God under the 
direction of the Spirit of God which truly frees man from 
sin, death, and the curse of the law. 2 Furthermore, Jesus 
was sent by Goa to save all men who will believe. 3 This idea 
of Jesus being sent as the savior of all men is important 
because it shows that God is willing to offer free forgiveness 
to everyone who will receive it and does notreserve his gifts 
only for a chosen few. God grants his gr ace to all who will 
accept it. Thus, it woula seem that the burden of choice is 
lRodney Wolfard, op. cit., p. 3lf. 
2John 8:34ffl; see also Rom. 6:14; 18,22; 8:2; Gal. 5:1. 
3John 3:16-18; cf. Matt . 28:18-20; ~ark 16:15-16. 
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put upon man, who, while he cannot without God's grace obtain 
his lost righteousness, must choose to cooperate with God's 
grace or reject it. It is equally obvious that God withdraws 
his grace from him who spurns it, because he will not save 
man a r ainst his will (Luke 13:34-35). 
It is interesting to note that J esus chose a text from 
Isaiah (6l:lff.) for his message to his own people gathered 
in synagogue at Nazareth (Luke 4:18). It seems apparent from 
this choice of text that Jesus thought of his Jewish audience 
as captives - bondsmen of sin and the law - and that be alone 
could free them, since he made it clear to t hem that in him 
Isaiah's Scriptures were fulfilled. 1 
It seems, then, that Jesus implies that man has freedom 
to choose between following him and the will of God who sent 
him, or following the way of sin. There is no third choice. 
To choose the former is to choose rightly and to find freedom 
from the condemnation of the law, freedom from sin and death, 
and freedom to become an eternal son of God. The parable of 
the Prodigal Son is a good illustration of this (Luke 15:llff.). 
To choose the latter, is to choose to sin and become the bondsman 
of sin. Thus, both the writers of the Old Testament and Jesus 
seem to affirm that man has the capacity to make a choice to 
follow God's will, or to refuse to do so. 2 Yet, the assumption 
1Luke 4:18-23; see also Alan Richardson, A Theological Word 
Book of the Bible (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), p.87; 
cf. John 8:36; Gal. 5:1,13; Rom. 6:18,22. 
2see for example: Josh. 24:15; I Kings 18:21; Matt. 11:28; 
John 5:6; Rom. ll:22f.; Rev. 3:8-ll, 20-22. 
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always is that the choice to follow Jesus, and so do God's 
will alone, grants freedom -- the only kind of true freedom 
there is for man, namely, freedom to do the will of God and 
become what he potentially is, and was created to be -- a son 
of God. Of course, a corollary of this is that man always 
has freedom to refuse to do God's will, but when he chooses 
to rebel against God, he is from the biblical point of view 
a sinner bound in his sin until God forgives him. 
Kittel argues: 
Christ ' s coming is "crisis" forcing decision upon 
men and dividing them (John 9:41). If a man rejects 
Christ, refusing to believe his "I am'' (viii, 24), 
he remains in his sin and dies1in his sin, missing all that Christ came to bring. 
He continues to point out that sin is basically a matter of 
relation to God. 2 Whoever abides in God and does his will 
is not guilty of sin, but he who resists or rejects God's 
will is of the devil . Again, there is no third position open 
to man . Submission to God's will is freedom, while refusal 
to submit to the will of God is sin and leads to bondage in 
sin . 3 
!Gerhard Kittel , ed., Bible Key Words (New York: Harper Bro-
thers, 1951), I, 3, p . 73 . 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. , I, 3, p . 76 . Here Bultmann is quoted as saying: 
11Man's determination to manage by himse~f" is really striv-
ing against God's will. R. Bultmann,"Romer vii und die 
Anthropologie der Paulus,» in Ima~o Dei, Festschrift, 
F.G . Kruger, 1932, 53ff.; 60f . :Sin is man's determination 
to be master of his fate, to assert himself, to be like God." 
See also Kittel, I, 3, p . 72. 
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Now let us turn our attention to the writin6 s of Paul. 
Paul is faithful to the message of Jesus when he assumes 
freedom of choice on the part of all men; even though he 
proves to his satisfaction that all men are bound in sin, 
he insists that they are still responsible before God.l 
Paul speaks repeatedly of unregenerate man as the slave of 
sin,2 and believes that Christ alone can set men free from 
this bondage. 3 But Christian freedom is never to be con-
strued as libertinism or absolute autonomy. It is rather 
bondage of the human will to God's will through the guidance 
of the Holy Spirit, and this Spirit is expressed as love 
towards the neighbor.4 
Paul believes that sin "came into the world through Adam 
who freely chose to act against God." 5 Sin is universal (Rom. 
3:9, 23; 5:9f.; 8:7; Gal. 3:22) . Sin comes as a result of one 
man's disobedience, and redemption also comes by one man Jesus 
Cbrist (Rom. 5:12,15) . There is no doubt about the fact that 
Paul sees man as a slave of sin as a result of Adam's fall, 
and delivered from that bondage by God's grace given to man 
lRom. 3:9ff.; 2:lff. 
2Rom. 6:6, 17-21; 7:14, 24; Gal. 4:3-8; II Tim. 2:26; Titus 
1:15; 3:3; cf . John 8:34. 
~om. 6:18, 22; 8:2; Gal. 2:4 . 
4Gal. 5:13-26 . 
5Gerhard Kittel, op. cit., I, 3, p. 77; cf. Rom. 5:12ff. 
in Jesus Chr ist . 
It may be argued, however, that Paul does speak of a 
paradox of human freedom and human bonda ge in sin whe n he 
suggests that he does not approve of the things which he 
does , and then l a ter turns around and says t hat it is sin 
- -
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which dwells in him that does the evil which he do es not ~­
prove (hom. 7:15, 17) . Then i n vers e 18 he argues that man 
still possesses a will, but does not know how to do the good. 
Thus, it would seem that while the essential f reedom of man 
is diminished by man's bondage i n sin, it is never wholly 
lost. 
The Scriptural teaching of bondage in sin does not seek 
to reduce man to some s ubhuman level of existence . It only 
makes clear that man cannot save hims elf from sin and its 
demonic destructiveness by the sheer exertion of his will 
power without the g r ace of God transforming and assist i ng 
him. Yet, as Kittel points out, in Paul's thinking "Adam's 
fall, human mortality, and the universal propensity toward 
sin are inseparably bound together."l 
Richardson argues that in Paul's thinking (Rom. 6:15-23 ) , 
man who has surrendered himself to wrong doing is an a gent of 
evil bound in sin. But when man is freed from this bondage 
by God, he becomes a slave of God and His righteousness and 
1 Gerhard Kittel, op . cit . , I, 3, p . 77. 
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finds perfect freedom by glaaly doing the will of God. 1 
Christian freedom is a present possession (Gal. 5:1,13; 
Rom. 6:18, 22; cf. I Pet . 2:16), and it is yet to be per-
fected and extended to all God's Kingdom {Rom. 8:21) . Freedom 
is to be enjoyed wherever the Spirit of the Lord is (II Cor. 
3:17). God's liberty is a present , but partial possession 
of Christian believers (Rom. 8:23- 25; II Cor . 1:22; 5:5; 
Epn. 1:14). 2 In Paul's teaching, as in Luther's, we find 
that every Christian is a mixture of flesh and spirit, and 
therefore, is never wholly free from the Old Adam and sin. 
~ut the Christian is free from the fear of condemnation (Rom. 
8:1); freed from the fear of death (Rom. 8:2); and now lives 
as a f ree son (Rom. 8:14-17); and as a free son, he serves 
God gladly (Rom. 7:6). 3 
This is why we argue that Christian freedom is freedom 
which man acquires through faith in the good news of tbe gospel . 
Here he enjoys freedom from fear of death, from sin, and from 
condemnation which the non-believer does not enjoy. Such 
freedom, however, is not autonomy or libertinism, but free 
and glad submission to the will of God, not in fear or in an 
1Alan Ricnardson, A leal Word Book of the Bible , p. 37; 
2 
cf. Gal. 5:1; John 8:3 -32; Rom. 8:2; II Cor. 3: 7; as. 1:25. 
"Slave is an inadequate term so it is exchanged for friend 
(John 15:llff.)" --F.J. Taylor. 
Ibid., p . 87. 
3Ibid. 
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effort to attain righteousness and merit before God, but in 
a kind of spirit possession that gives man new life and new 
direction under the g uidance of God (Rom. 8:9-ll). Here Paul 
sees the Spirit of God and the Christ as the embodiment of 
that Spirit, as interchangable terms. Jesus is always 
obedient and submissive to the will of God, ye t he ca lls 
himself a son of God, not a slave. This is why J ohn ex-
changes the word friend for slave (15:11). Love never en-
slaves, it befriends . Love never coerces, it attracts (John 
12:32}. This is why submission to the will of God never 
enslaves, but frees, becaus e it gives man freedom to become 
what he potentially is and was created to be, namely, a son 
of God. 1 
This freedo m is acqui red only when God's Spirit enters a 
man and leads him to fulfill the whole will and law of God, 
which may be s ummed up in the revelation of God in Christ as 
gracious and forgiving love. That is why J esus, who perfectly 
did the whole will a nd law of God, enjoyed perfect freedom 
under the guidaLce of God's Spirit which enabled him to become 
the Son of God. 
Roaney Wolfard sug3ests in his study of Paul's thinking 
on the matter of human freedom and bondage t ha t, "every man 
is completely and absolutely responsible for the exercise ot 
l See for example, J ohn 4:34; 5:30; 6:38 ; 17:4. It was Jesus' 
submission to the will of God that enabled him to fulfill his 
mission as the Christ. 
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his choice either to accept or reject Goa's grace."l Paul 
though he asserted man's bondage in sin, nevertheless en-
courages men to use their own wills to accept God's gift of 
forgiveness through Christ . 2 
Though there are passages in Scripture which seem to deny 
free will and s peak of man's bondage in sin, it would seem 
from our study that many Old Testament writers, and likewise 
Jesus and Paul, seem to assume that man is a responsible 
creature who bas a God- given capacity to choose to cooperate 
with God's will or to resist and reject it. Yet, credit for 
man's salvation is never ascribed to man's correct choice, 
but to God, who gives his grace and forgiveness to anyone who 
will accep t it.3 The only way of salvation open to sinners 
is that of harmony and submission to the will of God, even as 
Jesus submitted his will to God . 4 
It is in line with Biblical thinking that even Jesus 
refused to claim any credit for his own accomplishments and 
asserted that only God is good (Luke 18 :19). If Jesus is the 
example of perfect manhood whom all Christians are to follow, 
then it would seem that all Christians should take their clue 
1Rodney Wolfard, OE · cit., p. 65 . 
2!£!£. , p . 69. 
3see for example: Deut. 30:15-20; Mark 16:16; John 3:16-21; 
Rom. 8:14-17; Rom. 11:15, 20-23; c f . II Pet. 3:9. 
4see for example: John 4:34; 5:30; 6:38; 17:4. 
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from him and give credit and glory to God who by His Spirit 
guides us into all truth and goodness. 
Before moving on to an historical survey of the problem 
of human freedom and bondage, it will be necessary for us to 
consider the biblical concept of predestination and election 
which involves God's omnipotence and omniscience. It seems 
evident from a reading of Scriptures that God elects men and 
nations not for privilege, but for service.l There is no 
doubt about the fact that Jesus was believed to be the Messiah, 
the chosen and anointed of God, yet his was a life, not of 
privilege, but of suffering and service. The same Paul who 
argues that God uses both Pharoah and Moses to accomplish his 
purposes and seems to imply in his analogy of the potter that 
God uses men as things,2 also argues that the elect may fall 
away from God and that he himself might become a cast-a-way.3 
Thus, Paul is appealed to by those who seek to affirm man's 
free will, as well as by those who seek to deny it. John sug-
gests that even the elect may be re jected if they fall from 
faith . 4 
However, the writer of the Gospel of John, who is probably 
the same person who wrote the First Epistle of John, suggests 
2Rom. 9:14-21. 
cf. Alan Richardson, An 
of the New Testament (New York: 
75. 
3I Cor. 9:23-27; II Cor . 13:5-8; cf. Heb . 6:4-8. 
4r John 5:16. 
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that Jesus should not lose anyone whom God gives to him.l 
Some interpret this as meaning that the elect of God cannot 
fall from grace . Thus, g race is irresistible ana ma n has no 
free will in divine matters . While the Bible frequently speaks 
of election, nowhere in Scriptures do we fina any mention made 
of those elected by God for reprobation.2 The implication of 
some passages is that even the elect of God play some part in 
their salvation. Thus, even though sinful man is utterly de-
pendent upon the mercy and f or giveness of Goa to attain salva-
tion, we must ask: Does not this sinful man still retain 
freedom to reject God's proffered grace and be condemned by 
his own action? 
Another problem which Scriptures pose is God's foreknow-
ledge, which seems to deny men their natural freedom. For 
example, almost everything that happens in the life of Christ 
seems to have been the preordained plan of God. Especially, 
Herod, Pilate , Judas, and the Jews all seemed to have acted 
in precisely the way God foreordained them to act.3 
Furthermore, Jesus himself fore Knew what was to befall 
him. 4 How can we account for this unless we argue that every-
thing was predetermined by God, and all the actors in the 
1John 6:39. 
2Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New 
Testament, p . 275. 
3see, Acts 2:23; cf. Luke 22: 22 ; Acts 3:18; 4: 27 ; 13:27. 
4see, John l2:32f.; 13:19; 18:32. 
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passion of the Christ were completely determined by God. This, 
of course, can be and has been maintained by some scholars. 
However, Richardson argues: 
••• they are not puppets who have no choice. But 
human flesh being what it is, it was inevitable that 
Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, should suffer and die 
at the hands of wicked men •••• 
It is a characteristically Hebraic way of stating 
this truth to assert that God foreordained all the 
details of the drama in advance, like a playwright 
working out the fate of his dramatis personae. 
Richardson continues to argue that the New Testament writers 
never raise the question of whether or not free will and divine 
foreknowledge are compatible. He contends that even though it 
was inevitable that Jesus should suffer and die at the hanas 
of evil men, it was still possible that Pilate, Herod, Judas 
and others could have acted otherwise.2 
In the light of Jesus' own words that it was necessary that 
he should be betrayed, Jesus seems to indicate that it was Judas 
who would betray him. Then be says that it will be just too 
bad for the one who actually does betray him (Matt. 26:21-25). 
This raises the question: Why did Jesus impute moral guilt to 
his betrayer, if that person could not have acted other than he 
did? Furthermore, only Matthew suggests in his record that Judas 
himself asks if it was he who was to betray Christ and Jesus 
replies in the affirmative. Mark and Luke simply say that one 
1Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New 
Testament, p. 276. 
2Ibid.; see also, John 19:22; Ma tt. 27:25; 27:3f. 
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of the twelve will betray him and let it go at that. Even if 
Jesus did know tha~ it was Juaas who would betray him, we must 
ask: Does his foreknowledge necessarily imply determinism? 
Allport puts it this way. Psychologists who can predict 
human behavior are somewhat like an observer on a hill over-
looking a river who sees rapias ahead which the occupant of a 
boat around the bend cannot see . The observer may predict with 
a high degree of accuracy what the man in the boat will do when 
he sees tne rapias . But for the man in the boat, even when he 
aoes what he is expected to do by the observer, the decision 
he makes is a free and existential one. 1 
In the same way, it might be argued that Jesus could read 
the signs of the t imes and even be able to predict what was 
going to happen with a greater degree of accuracy than other 
men, but this does not need to imply that he or God , or anyone 
else, has determined the action of the men who fulfill the pre-
aictions. 
There is no suggestion {anywhere] in the New Testament 
that some individuals are predestined to a mechanical 
salva tion irrespective of their own decision for Christ. 
It is stressed that, though God calls us, we must 
respond. There are no elect automatons in the Kingdom 
of God. God worAs in us, but we have work to do (Phil . 
2:12f.) . The mystery of the paradox of grace is that 
grace does not do away with our free will or our respon-
sibility for our decisions; our will is never more truly 
free and never more completely our will t~an when it is 
wholly surrendered to God (I cor:-15:10). 
1Gordon W. Allport, The Individual and His Religion (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 83f . 
2Alan Richardson, Introduction to the Theology of the New 
Testament, p. 279; cf. D.M. Baillie , God Was in Christ (New 
York: Scribner's, 1948), pp. 114-118. 
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In summary, then, the Scriptures make clear the following 
assertions concerning human freedom and bondage: 
First, Scriptures do not concern themselves in any direct 
way with the problem of free will and determinism. 
Second, cou~ands and admonitions in Scriptures seem to 
imply , however, that man, towards whom they are directed, has 
power to choose between alternative courses of action. 
Third, all men since Adam seem to commit sin because they 
seek freedo m from God, rebel against His will and fail to obtain 
the goal of perfection which He demands. 
Fourth, all men who sin are the slaves of sin whom Jesus 
came to set free by God's grac i ous offer of forgiveness freely 
given to all who will accept it. 
Fifth, the Biblical witness seems to imply that God's offer 
of forgiveness in Christ may be acceptea or rejected, i.e., the 
work of the Holy Spir: t may be resisted or man may choose to 
cooperate with the work of the Spirit; though some scholars 
believe that man is wholly passive and redemption is the sole 
work of the Holy Spirit . 
Sixth, when a man is saved from sin 's bondage by God's grace 
there is no room for man to claim merit, in his salvation, 
because it is God's gracious act in Christ and the work of His 
Spirit tha t brings him salvation and frees him from sin, death 
and the power of Satan. 
Seventh, spiritual freedom which comes to sinners forgiven 
by God's grace and leads to salvation is not libertinism, but 
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free submis sion to the will of God under the guidance of God's 
Spirit. Such submission enables man to become an obedient 
child of God who will obtain the destiny for which God created 
him, viz., to live with God in His kingdom forever. Anyone who 
refuses to submit to and do the will of God becomes the ser-
vant of Satan. ~here is no third or neutral ground upon which 
man can stand. 
Eighth, election by God is not for privilege, but for ser-
vice, and even the elect of God may f all from faith and become 
reprobate, though some passages seem to imply that the elect 
cannot fall from grace. But no one is elected for reprobation. 
Ninth, God wills that all men be saved, but some are con-
demned. Whether they are condemned by their refusal to accept 
what God gives f or their salvation, or because God refuses to 
give them his saving grace is a question about which authorities 
differ. 
Tenth, the foreknowledge of God does not necessarily imply 
that future events are determined in such a way that man's 
natural freedom is precluded. However, some authorities believe 
that God's fore knowledge precludes man's free will. 
Conclusions: Freedom of the will, when that is defined as 
man's God-given freedom of choice and not as a wholly autonomous 
will, does not seem to be denied by Scriptures which affirm 
that the grace of God is necessary for the salvation of all 
sinners. The Bible affirms that all men sin and become bound 
in sin and that it is God's gracious forgiveness demonstrated 
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in Christ which makes freedom from bondage in sin and subse-
quent salvation possible. However, whether salvat i on or 
condemnation is a ttained by man's accepta nce or rejection of 
God's grace, or by God's eternal decree to elect some men to 
salvation and others to reprobat_ion, or whether man's destiny 
is an impenetrable mystery Known only to God are matters which 
are open to debate. Precisely how God's grace and man's will 
interact in salvation is not made clear in Scriptures, but is 
a theological problem which this dissertation seeks to explore 
through the insights of Luther and Arminius. 
2. Augustine and Pelagius 
The controversy between the free will of man being able 
to attain righteousness without the aid of God's grace, and 
the insistence that a man can only be made righteous by the 
grace of God alone were not unique with Augustine and Pelagius. 
Certainly, a type of Pelagianism had been expressed before in 
the teachings of the Greek Apologists and salvation by grace 
alone had been expressed by Clement of Rome and especially by 
Irenaeus. 1 But in the quarrel between Augustine and Pelagius, 
it did receive its first full treatment. 
In essence, Pelagius' argument for freedom of the will i s 
based upon the rebellion against the traditional doctrine of 
original sin. He held a moralistic and atomistic conception of 
1J.L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg ~ress, 1946), I, 80; cf. I, 143. 
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sin. Therefore, he argues that God would never impute Adam's 
guilt to any other man and still be a j~st and good God. While 
he does not deny that man is a s l nful creature, he does insist 
that, in theory at least, man can avoid sin and become sinless 
even without God's grace. But he never suggests that he knows 
of a particular man who is sinless. Of course, for Pelagius, 
Go u's grace facilitates the attainment of righteousness, but it 
is not absolutely essential to such attainment. He points to 
the many pagans who attained a high degree of virtue as proof 
of his argument that man is able not to sin. If this statement 
is not true, then there is no point in God giving us His laws 
to obey, because if we are not able not to sin, we cannot obey 
them anyway. What is worse for Pelagius is, if we cannot avoid 
sinning, then God must be responsible for our sinningt To say 
that God is responsible for sin in the world is blasphemy1 
This is the core of Pelagius' argument -- to preserve the 
essential goodness of God and His creation by putting all the 
blamef<br sin and evil on the free will of man. Augustine 
quotes him as say ing: 
'I once more repeat my position: I say that it is 
possible for a man to be without sin. What do you 
say? That it is impossible for a man to be without 
sin? But I do not say • • • that there is a man 
without sin . Our contention is about what is possible; 
not about what is and what is not.•l 
Sin is constr~ed by Pelagius as an immoral and unethical act. 
lAugustine, "On Nature and Grace," Basic Writings of Saint 
Augustine, ed. Whitney J . Oates (New York: Random House, 
1948}, I, 525. 
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It is not, as Augustine contends, a condition or state of sin-
fulness in which man finds himself from the time of Adam to the 
present. If we allow Pelagius 1 definition of sin as an isolated 
wrong act, then it would seem that Pelagius has found a weak 
spot in Augusti ne's position . Yet , we find that Pelagius 1 
teachings are condemned as heretical at the General Synod in 
Carthage (418), and at the third Ecumenical Council at Ephesus 
(431} . 1 
To understand this action of the church, we need to look 
into the teachings of Augustine -- that indefatigable defender 
of God's grace . It seemed to him that what Pelagius taught 
undermined the free gift of salvation offered by God's grace 
in Jesus Christ. He writes: 
But observe how, by specious arguments, he [Pelagius] 
continues to oppose the truth of Holy Scriptures. The 
Lord Jesus • • • is called Jesus because he saves His 
people from their sins. • •• But these men gainsay such 
grace, and, as if they had deeper insight into the 
creature than ever He possesses wbo made the creature 
they pronounce so~nd with an assertion which is anything 
but sound itself% 
According to Augustine, all men, including infants, are 
infected by Adam's sin. Therefore, all men stand in need of 
the foegiving and merciful grace of God revealed in Jesus 
Christ, who came precisely for the purpose of saving sinners. 
To allow even the possibility that man is able not to sin is to 
lJ.L . Neve , op. cit . , I, 148. 
2Augustine, "On Nature and Grace," op. cit., I, 535. 
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assert that God did not need to send Christ, and that He did 
not have to die on the cross. There is nothing man would like 
more than being able to be sinless, which Pelagius says all men 
may attain. But Augustine suggests that this is contrary to 
the facts of human experience. If Pelagius wants to end the 
argument, Augustine suggests that he show how it is possible to 
attain this state of sinlessness. Actually, there is only one 
way to do this, according to Augustine, and that is by God's 
grace in Jesus Christ our Lord.l 
In his defence of salvation by grace alone, Augustine does 
not deny freedom of the will. In fact, he condemns all who deny 
such freedom. 2 Stealing Pelagius' own thunder, he argues that 
God, by giving us commands and laws to obey, has also given man 
a free choice of will to respond to His precepts. 3 For God 
woula not command us to obey His laws, if He did not expect us 
to obey them. 4 
But, Augustine argues, we ought not, in spite of our free-
dom of the will, teach as the Pelagians do and ascribe our 
obedience and goodness to our own good will and works. To do 
so would deny salvation by the grace of God alone. 
libid. , I, 567. 
2 Augustine, "On Grace and Free Will," op. cit., I, 735. 
3 Ibid., I, 734. 
4~., I, 735f. 
Therefore, my dearly beloved, as we have now proved 
by our former testimonies from Holy Scriptures that 
there is in man a free determination of the will for 
living rightly and acting rightly; so now let us see 
what are the divine testimonies concerning the grace 
of Godi wittout which we are not able to do any good 
thing . 
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Augustine, unlike Pelagius, insists that we have both a 
free choice of will, and yet must ascribe all our goodness to 
the grace of God. He explains this seeming contradiction by 
the Pauline idea of the paradox of grace. 2 In this way he can 
say we are responsible before God for all our sin because we 
have a freedom of contrary choice; yet, when we choose rightly, 
it is to be ascribed to God's grace and not to man's power of 
free choice. 
Under the Augustinian system of thought, human merit is not 
the basis for a right relationship with God, as the Pelagian 
system would have us believe. It is based on God's free gift 
of grace offered in our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, eternal 
life is a reward for obedience to God's law, and yet , it is a 
free gift of God. This seeming contradiction is: 
by no means capable of solution, unless we understand 
that even those good works of ours which are recompensed 
with eternal life belong to the grace of God, because 
of what is said by the Lgrd Jesus: "Without me ye can 
do nothing" (John 15:5). 
lAugustine, "On Grace and Free Will ," op. cit., I, 739. 
2~., I, 734; cf. I, 749; I Cor. l5:9f; Eph. 2:8f. 
3~., I, 748. 
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Augustine then goes on to state that the freedom of which he 
speaks is, in reality, only freedom to serve God or sin. 
There is, however, always within us a free will --
but it is not always good; for it is either free from 
righteousness when it serves sin -- and then it is 
evil -- or else it is free from sin !hen it serves 
righteousness-- and then it is good. 
Furthermore, "It is certain that it is we that will when we will, 
but it is He who makes us will what is good."2 Augustine at-
tempts to make it clear that God does not work in us without us. 
He attempts to escape the charge of determinism by affirming 
that man has a free will. When he suggests, however, that it 
is God alone who makes us do good, it would seem that we are but 
puppets hanging on the end of a string which God manipulates. 
Augustine wishes to make clear the idea that man is never wholly 
autonomous. Rather, by our good choices we serve God and by our 
evil choices we are serving Satan. To avoid the danger of 
determinism Augustine affirms a paradox of grace.3 
Augustine attempts to refute the argument of Pelagius by 
allowing for both the freedom of the will and salvation by the 
grace of God alone. What meaning freedom of the will has, when 
it is determined since the fall of Adam to do nothing but sin, 
and since God's grace alone saves man from his sin, is hard to 
understand. 
1Augustine, "On Grace and Free Will," op. cit., I, 758. 
2 ~., I, 759. 
3~., I, 734; cf. I, 749; I Cor. 15:10. 
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If man since the fall is not able not to sin, then it 
seems that Augustine is arguing that man from Adam's time to 
the present is bound to sin. If man is bound to sin, Augustine 
is arguing for a deterministic concept which contradicts his 
notion that man has a free will. By definition, to have a free 
will means that man possesses power to choose between alterna-
tive courses of action . Therefore, if man has a free will as 
Augustine suggests, does it not follow that man has power to 
choose either to sin or not to sin? 
Pelagius seeks to avoid Augustine's deterministic position 
by at least allowing for the possibility that man is able not to 
sin. Such a possibility must be allowed, at least theoretically, 
if man's natural freedom is to be preserved and determinism 
avoided. It must be emphasized that Pelagius argues only for 
the possibility of sinlessness in man. He does not say that 
there is actually a man who is without sin. In his quarrel with 
Augustine, Pelagius tries to make it clear that the moment we 
fail to make provision for the possibility that man can choose 
not to sin, we fall into the trap of theological determinism and 
destroy man's God-given freedom. 
The historical debate between Augustine ana Pelagius raises 
an all-important point to which this dissertation addresses 
itself. Does salvation by the grace of God preclude the freedom 
of man's will? Pelagius, by his argument that man is able not 
to sin , attempts to preserve man's God-given freedom of choice. 
Augustine, by his argument that man is not able not to sin, 
37 
attempts to preserve the Biblical teaching tha t the salvation 
of sinners comes by the grace of God alone. 
Augustine, in his later wri t ings, goes on to expound the 
will of God in such a way that God's grace clearly becomes 
irresistible and wholly deterministic. It is in his teaching 
of double predestination that Augustine most clearly opens him-
self to the charge of determinism. But, according to Neve, this 
extreme position in his doctrine of predestination did not occur 
until after he had finished with the Pelagian controversy.l 
Even in the midst of Augustine's teaching that God carries 
out his will in ~an and in the world with unfailing success, he 
clings tenaciously to the idea of the freedom of the human will. 
This indicates to this writer that he recognizes the basic human 
need for freedom in spite of the fact that God's will seems to 
preclude it. He suggests that God is not responsible for re-
jecting those who are not elected by Him, because "they fall ot 
their own will, and God simply passes them by."2 
Augustine strives valiantly to preserve the goodness of God 
and the freedom of man's will. In his argument with Pelagius 
be partially succeeds by resorting to a paradox of grace. But 
even this breaks down when he teaches that from all eternity 
God preaestines some to be saved, while others were predestined 
to be punished. The number of each group is fixed and it cannot 
l J.L. Neve, op. cit., I, 146. 
2 Ibid., I, 147. 
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be changed. The elect may flounder or fall for a time, but 
in the end they will submit to God's infallible will and be 
saved. Those destined for punishment may rise and do good for 
a time, but they will ultimately fall and be damned. With this 
teaching of double predestination, Augustine seals his fate as 
a rigid determinist. It was this teaching of Augustine, more 
than any other, that opened the door of theological speculation 
wide for the semi-Pelagian teachings that followed . 
His teaching, that God absolutely predestines from all 
eternity those to be saved and those to be damned, stirred up a 
"hornet's nest" of controversy. Finally, at the Synod of Orange 
(529), Augustine's doctrine of predestination was restated, and 
his teaching that some persons from all eternity were predes-
tined for eternal punishment was rejected. 1 While a kind of 
semi-Augustinianism won the day, semi-Pelagianism remained 
strong during the middle ages, and gained favor among the 
Scholastic theologians. One such adherent was Erasmus of Rot-
terdam, with whom Luther quarreled violently. We turn now to 
this argument. 
1J . L . Neve, op. cit., I, 151. Here we see the human need to 
defend the natural freedom of man from theological extinction. 
If God predestines some persons to condemnation, then all free-
dom for man seems swallowed up, and with the loss of that free-
dom, man's humanity is lost. Yet the fact that semi-Augustin-
ianism won out in the church over Pelagianism indicates that 
any doctrine which belittles the terribly real power sin has 
over man, and the vital need for God's g race to escape sin's 
clutches, tends to distort the Biblical understanding of man 
as a sinner ana the absolute need for grace, if sinful man is 
to obtain salvation. 
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3. Erasmus and His Relation to Luther 
Erasmus, like the Italian humanists -- Valla, Pico, and 
Ficino -- was a reformer who stayed well within the limits of 
the orthodox teachings of the Roman Church. While he did not 
cease to heap criticism and even scorn upon the lax morals of 
the corrupt Medieval Church, he never really attacked the theo-
logical teachings of the Church. For example, like Luther, he 
ridiculed monasticism and the indolent life of many of the monks 
and their orders; but, unlike Luther, he never attacked the 
theological foundation upon which the structure of monasticism 
rested.l He also poked fun at the bishops and prelates of the 
Church, but never would condone a radical teaching like the 
"priesthood of all believers." 
There were, however, many ways in which Erasmus paved the 
way for Luther's reform. Chief among them was the publication 
of his critical edition of the Greek New Testament. It was 
this above all else, for which Luther praised and admired 
Erasmus. It must also be pointed out that Erasmus did go out 
of his way to defend Luther from the violent attacks of over-
zealous Romanists. He personally endorsed Luther as a man of 
good moral character. He felt that all should respect him for 
his willingness to be taught by learned men, if he were in error.2 
lJames Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation (London: Longmans, 
Green, 1929), III, 226. 
2 Ibid., III, 234f. 
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In fact, to some Erasmus seemed so sympathetic and friendly 
toward Luther that the friends of Luther tried to force him 
into the reform camp, and Luther's enemies accused him of being 
in league with the mad Saxon monk. 
But all thoughts of collusion and alliance between Erasmus 
and Luther were dashed to the ground, when, in August or Sep-
tember of 1524, Frobus of Basle published Erasmus' small book 
De Libero Arbitrio . Here it became clear that not only did 
Erasmus despise Luther's radical teachings which were dividing 
the Church, but also he made it clear that theologically he was 
not to be allied with Luther. "The specific point [of differ-
ence] is whether and how far the will contributes to the attain-
ment of eternal life."l Luther argued that it contributed 
absolutely nothing, while Erasmus argued for a middle or semi-
Pelagian way of a little bit. 
Up to the time of the printing of his book on the freedom 
of the will, Erasmus had defended Luther as a man worthy of a 
hearing by a group of learned scholars. He certainly ought not 
be condemned and burned as an heretic, unheard and untried. 
Repeatedly, however, Erasmus pleaded ignorance of Luther's 
teachings. He had tried to play "Gamaliel" in the conflict, 
but failed. Now he was forced to show that he approved neither 
Luther's uncouth tactics in dividing the beloved Church, nor 
1~., III , 242. 
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his theological position. 1 
But with his usual philosophical detachment, even here, 
in his book on the freedom of the will, he treated his subject 
lightly as one of no ultimate importance. It was his conten-
tion that it would be better for Christians to leave such mat-
ters to "hair-splittingu theologians, and everyone else should 
try to return to the simple gospel and moral law of Christ. 2 
Arguments of this sort were simply academic matters. 3 It is 
obvious that Erasmus did not think of himself as such a "hair-
splitting" theologian. But the same cannot be said of Luther. 
His attitude is almost the complete reverse of Erasmus. 
I am not concerned with the life but with doctrines. 
Evil life does no great harm, except to itself, but 
evil teaching is the greatest evil in the world, for 
it leads hosts of souls to hell. It does not concern 
me whether you are good or evil, but I will attack 
your poisonous and lying teaching that contradicts 
God's word, and with God's help, I will oppose it 
vigorously. 4 
While this particular quotation was directed against Emser, 
"The Leipzig Goat," it reflects Luther's attitude toward Eras-
mua also. Like most Romanists, Erasmus attacked the life and 
morals of the Church, but not its doctrines. For Luther, this 
was unforgivable ar.d it infuriated him. Therefore, he suggested 
that Erasmus keep to his work in the classical languages where 
lJ.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston, "Historical and Theological 
Introauction," Bondage of the Will, p. 37. 
2 Packer and Johnston, "Historical and Theological Introduction," 
op. cit., p. 43f. 
4Luther, Works (Philadelphia), III, 299. 
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his real talents lie, and leave theological debate alone. Yet, 
even Luther cannot deny that Erasmus, whether by chance or by 
deliberation, attacked his teaching at a very vital point. In 
the closing pages of his De Servo Arbitrio, he says: 
I give you (Erasmus] hearty praise ••• that you alone, 
in contrast with all others, have attacked the real 
thing, that is, the essential issue. You have not 
wearied me with those extraneous issues about the pa-
pacy, indulgences and such like -- trifles rather than 
issues [which are real] •••• You, and you alone, 
have seen the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for 
the vital spot.l 
It is on this issue of freedom of the will that the core 
of Luther's teaching, namely, salvation by the grace of God 
alone, seems to stand or fall. It seemed to Luther that Eras-
mus and others in the semi-Pelagian camp of thought were more 
interested in preserving human freedom to protect the goodness 
of God and the humanity of man than in preserving the grace, 
glory and power of God. 
Turnstall raises the problem of theodicy and attempts to 
preserve God's goodness when he says in a letter to Erasmus of 
June 5, 1523: 
1But, you say, I have a bad reputation with Luther 
and the Lutherans. But no worse than God himself, 
whom that fellow [Luther] makes the author of all 
wickedness, inasmuch as he takes away free-will from 
man, and roundly maintains that all things come to 
pass by fixed laws of necessity, so that there is no 
freedom for anyone if he wishes to do well.•2 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will, p. 319. 
2cited by Packer and Johnston, "Historical and Theological 
Introduction", op. cit., p. 38. 
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The real issue between Erasmus and Luther seems to be: 
Are God's grace and man 's free will mutually exclusive? Is it 
possible for God's grace alone to effect man's salvation from 
beginning to end without reducing man to a puppet? Erasmus 
points to this difficulty when he writes: 
'The freedom of the will is a thorny question which 
it profits little to debate; let us leave it to pro· 
fessed theologians. But we can agree that man of his 
own power can do nothing and is wholly dependent upon 
the mercy of God; that faith is of great value, a gift 
of the Holy Spirit, though we may have differences of 
opinion as to the precise mode of its operation.•l 
4. The Formula of Concord 
Following the death of Martin Luther in 1546, there was a 
felt need to collect into one volume an authoritative digest of 
all his teachings. This was accomplished about the year 1580 
with the publication of the Book of Concord . 2 One of the most 
important writings contained in that compilation, aside from 
Luther's own writings and the "Augsburg Confession," was the 
11Formula of Concord. n3 It was a specific attempt to establish 
an authorative norm of Luther's theology. It also attempted 
to reconcile the many different Lutheran factions; particularly 
the "Gnesio Lutherans" and the "Philipists . "4 
The other reason for examining this portion of the Lutheran 
!Allen, Erasmus (Oxford, 1934), p. 90; cited by Packer and 
Johnston, Bondage of the Will, p. 39f. 
2Martin Luther and Others, Book of Concord (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950). 
3Jacob Andreae and Martin Chemnitz, "The Formula of Concord, " 
Book of Concord, pp. 216-296. 
4J.L. Neve, op. cit., I, 291 fn. 
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Confessions is that it deals explicitly with the problem of 
free will. This teaching on free will is integrally connected 
with the whole Lutheran position of salvation by the grace of 
God alone. 
We know of Melanchthon's disagreement with the strict 
Lutherans in regard "to the condition of man's will 
in the experience of conversion." In his Loci of 1535, 
he emphasized the point that original sin has not de-
prived man of the faculty to make right decisions when 
incited by the influence of grace •••• Lutheranism is 
very sensitive when it Iomes to Augustinian monergism 
of grace in conversion. 
Melanchthon saw the danger in Luther's position that man 
is entirely passive in his conversion. This seemed to reduce 
man to the level of a puppet in God's hands. Melanchthon 
argued that, while "there is no faculty in man's will capable 
of proaucing something new",2 man, nevertheless, must be able 
to give his assent to the proffered grace of God. Melanchthon 
did not wish to reject the doctrine of "sola gratia," yet he 
did want to avoid the other alternative of mere passivity, 
which seemed to reduce man to the sub-human level of an auto-
maton. Though it did not seem to be Luther's intention to 
assert a determinism in the God-man relationship, nevertheless, 
as Melanohthon saw it, Luther was extremely ambiguous at this 
point . Thus, it was Melanchthon's desire to remove this ambi-
guity and escape the charge of determinism which Luther's view 
l ~., I, 288f. 
2 ~., I, 298. 
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seemed to invite.l 
The "Formula of Concord" is an effort to resolve this 
difference of opinion. It suggests that even after the fall, 
man is still man. Yet, man before the fall and man after the 
fall are distinctly different beings. 2 Jesus took on this same 
sinful flesh, but he was without sin. Man is tainted with the 
infection of original sin which is somehow passed on from Adam 
to all men. The extreme depth of man's corruption in sin after 
the fall cannot be discerned by reason, but only from God's 
Word. It is God alone who can restore man's nature corrupted 
by the fall to its original wholeness, when he raises man from 
death to eternal life. 3 But original sin inheres in the nature 
of man from the time of the fall, and all actual sins, i.e., 
acts of sin produced from this state of original sin.4 
however, there is no thought here of God creating man with 
anything but an essentially good nature. Original sin is the 
phrase used to explain man's state of sin and to pave the way 
lA.W. Harrison, The Beginnings of Arminianism (London: Univer-
sity of London Press, 1926}, p. ll. Harrison quotes kelanchthon 
as saying: "Three causes unite in producing good action: the 
Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will giving its 
assent and not resisting the Word of God, for it can repel it. 
God goes before us, calls, moves, helps, but we will see that 
we do not fight against Him. Erasmus says, Free will is the 
ability to give ourselves up to Grace. (Loci Communes, Opera 
XXI, P• 658.) 
2sook of Concord, p. 216f. 
3 Ibid., P• 217. 
4Ibid., P• 218. 
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for the concept of the bondage of the human will in sin. It 
is pointed out that this state of bondage in sin applies only 
to man since "the fall of our first parents and before regene-
ration, 111 and the subsequent fall of every man into sin before 
he is regenerated by God's Spirit. 
In this state of sin, it is contended that man is depraved 
and without spiritual or rational enlightenment. Furthermore, 
the unregenerate will of man has, through sin, become the enemy 
of God and desires only evil things which are contrary to God's 
will . Not until the Holy Spirit grasps this unregenerate man 
through the preaching of God's Word, and God wills that man 
should hear His Word, is man converted. But without God's 
grace, unregenerate man can do nothing to free himself from 
sin . Thus, it is clear, according to the confessions, that man 
bas no free will . 2 
The Formula of Concord also rules out stoic fatalism that 
compels man to do evil, as well as any form of Pelagianism that 
asserts that unregenerate man is able to do good. It even 
l Book of Concord, p. 218. 
2Ibid., p . 218. The term free will as it is used here in the 
"Formula" teaches that sinful man without the grace of God 
cannot get himself into a right relationship with God by the 
efforts of his own will . Here we also see an absolute moner-
gism asserted in the notion that God must first will that man 
hears the Word if man is to understand it, believe it, and 
come to faith and salvation. If man's hearing and understand-
ing of the Word are wholly dependent upon God first willing it, 
can those wbo fail to hear, understand and believe be held 
responsible and condemned for their lack of faith? Or is the 
fault God's for not giving them His Spirit to enable them to 
hear, understand and believe? 
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rejects the possibility that man can, even after the Holy 
Spirit has begun His redeeming work, by his "own natural 
powers ••• add something, though little and feeble, to 
••• help and cooperate ••• and believe the Gospel . 111 For 
even after conversion, man needs God's grace to continue to 
live righteously. Furthermore, and this is decisive to this 
concept, the Formula of Concord rejects any mention of syner-
gism in respect to the act of conversion, although, after his 
conversion, man does cooperate with God's Spirit in doing God's 
will. 
Dr. Luther has written ••• that man's will in his con-
version is pure passive, (sic] that is, that it does 
nothing whatever, is to be understood respectu divinae 
gratiae in ascendendis novis motibus, that is, when 
God's Spirit, through the Word heard or the use of the 
Holy Sacraments, lays hold upon man's will, and works 
(in man] the new birth and conversion. For when [after] 
the Holy Ghost has wrought and accomplished this, and 
man's will has been changed and renewed by His divine 
power and working alone, then the new will of man is an 
instrument and organ of God the Holy Ghost, so that he 
not only accepts grace, but also cooperates with the 
Holy Ghost in the works which follow. 
Therefore, before the conversion of man there are 
only two efficient causes, namely, the Holy Ghost and 
the Nord of God, as the instrument of the Holy Ghost, 
by which He works conversion. This Word man is (indeed] 
to hear; however, it is not by his own powers, but only 
through the grace and working of the Holy Ghost that he 
can yield faith to it and accept it.2 
This long quotation makes the orthodox Lutheran position 
quite clear. It condemns any mention of free will because that 
term carries with it the idea that man is able in some way by 
1Ibid., p . 219. 
2Book of Concord, p. 219. 
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his own powers to prepare himself for the reception of God's 
grace, and thus, make a small or large contribution to his own 
conversion and subsequent salvation. On the contrary, the 
Formula of Concord makes it clear that this is God's work alone 
from beginning to end. It does not rule out the possibility 
that sinful man can hear God's Word and, in fact, must hear i t 
to be converted. I t only rules out the possibi l ity that we can 
understand it and be converted by any ability of our own. 1 Only 
God's Spirit can give us the spiritual understanding we need to 
comprehend God's Word and this the Formula of Concord calls 
faith, which is also the gift of God and the work of the Holy 
Spirit. We can and do cooperate with God, but only after He 
has taken the initiative in our conversion. 
The questions which the ''Formula" rais e s in this writer's 
mind are: Is sinful man totally depraved in the sense that he 
cannot reason or understand anything at all of a spiritual na-
ture? Or does total depravity mean tha t sinful man is unable to 
1Does not God by creating man in His image give man t he innate 
capacity to understand wo~ds? Does sin destroy this God-given 
capacity? If we have no ability of our own are we not reduced 
to animals, and is not God's image wholly lost? I f so, we as 
sinners are no longer men. Does not this position still re-
tain elements of the error of Flacius, who argued that sin 
changed the essential nature of man? {See Hastings, Encyclo-
pedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, 161.) 
Does not this failure to come to grips with man's natural 
freedom lead to a distortion of the real na ture of man created 
in God's image? The major issue which the Formula of Concord 
raises is: Does natural man who has fallen into sin have the 
power and capacity to make any contribution whatever to his 
conversion and salvation? When we explore the teachings of 
Luther and Arminius, we shall seek to define more precisely 
what part man's will and God's grace play in salvation. 
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get himself into a right relationship with God without God's 
grace? Does sinful man have the power e i ther to accept what 
God gives in His gracious act in Christ, or does he have power 
to reject that gift? If man does accept the grace of God does 
he claim merit or suggest that his free choice of will saved 
him? Does man ascribe his salvation to the grace of God which 
be simply appropriates by his willing to accept it? On the 
other band, if he rejects what God gives, does this not make 
man, rather than God, responsible for his own subsequent con-
damnation? 
As we shall see in Chapter IV these are precisely the 
questions to which James Arminius, who is considered to be a 
synergist, addresses himself. The important thing to bear in 
mind is that Lutherans and Synergists define freedom of the will 
differently. The reason for this difference is that Lutherans 
see free will only as a Pelagian term, and therefore, as a 
return to the pre-Reformation errors of the Roman Church.l 
For the Lutheran, freedom of the will seems to mean the ability 
of man without the grace of God to attain righteousness even in 
his fallen state and so earn salvation. The Synergists must 
not be confused with Pelagians. Pelagians tend to give priority 
to man's free will in the matter of salvation. Synergists 
usually give God's grace priority in salvation. They mean by 
freedom of the will, the essential freedom of choice between 
1 
"Synergism", Encyclopedia of Re~igion and Ethics, ed. James 
Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), XII, 159. 
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alternative courses of action, or what we call natural freedom, 
which God has given to all men. Thus, it is freedom to accept 
or reject the proffered grace of God. Free will is not con-
strued by Synergists as the power of man alone to do good and 
merit salvation as Lutherans were wont to define it. 
5. 'l'he Teachings of John Calvin 
In the writings of John Calvin (1509-1564), a l ater con-
temporary of Luther, we find an articulate and precise defender 
of the Reformation doctrine of salvation by grace alone, which 
seems to preclude man's free will. 
Calvin's mind was formulative rather than creative. 
Without Luther's antecedent labors his work could 
not have been done. It is Luther's conception of justification by faith, and the sacraments as seals 
of God's promises that he presents. Much he derived 
from Butzer, notably his emphasis upon the glory of 
God as that for which all things are created, on 
election as a doctrine of Christian confidence, and 
on the consequences of election as a strenous en-
deavor after a life of conformity to the will of 
God. But all is systematized and clarified with a 
skill that was Calvin's own.l 
According to Hunter, Calvin's doctrine of predestination, 
which some authorities believe is central to his theology, 
rests on the assumption "that the whole human race, untouched 
by grace, is without exception in a state of moral corruption."2 
This means that sinful man is unable to play any significant 
l Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (revised 
edition; New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1959), p. 350. 
2A.M. Hunter, The Teaching of Calvin (Second edition, Westwood, 
New Jersey: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1950), p. l03f. 
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part in bis salvation because his will is in bondage to sin. 
It was true that Adam had a free will to choose good or 
evil and fell into sin by his o~n choice to disobey God; but 
in reality since the Fall was decreed by God from all eternity, 
even Adam's free will was illusory.l Since the fall, all men 
sin by necessity but not by compulsion. Men freely and spontan-
eously choose to sin because their nature since the fall is sin-
ful. Yet, they are responsible for their sin, because their 
wills are bent on doing evil and they spontaneously choose to 
sin. 2 
Calvin's position is made clear, when he writes: 
Man is not possessed of free will for good works, unless 
he be assisted by grace, and that special grace which 
is bestowed on the elect alone in regeneration •••• 
Then man will be said to possess free will in this sense, 
not that he has an equally free election of good and 
evil, but bgcause he does evil voluntarily, and not by 
constraint. 
Like Luther, Calvin opposes the notion that sinful man has 
a free will. For with Adam's fall into sin, even the possibili-
ty of man enjoying a free will was lost. Free will implies that 
man could, if be would, choose the good and as a result of his 
1~., p. 121. 
2calvin's view is that of a theological determinist who argues 
that man sins by necessity because his nature is corrupted, yet 
his will is free in the sense that it is not outwardly compelled 
to sin, but sins voluntarily. 
3John Calvin, A Compend of the Institutes of the Christian Reli-
gion, ed. H. T. Kerr (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of 
Christian Education, 1939), p. 46. 
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choice merit salvation without grace . 1 Calvin goes on to 
point out that the term free will is too pretentious because 
it implies man bas sovereignty over his mind and will and can 
do whatever he pleases. Therefore, it would be better to cease 
using the term altogether. 
Calvin's views concerning the total corruption of man's 
nature in the fall and his subsequent bondage in sin are but a 
prelude to the more important doctrine of election. As he sees 
it, all that is good is ascribed to God and His grace. There-
fore, any talk of man's will being free to choose the good or to 
cooperate with God in salvation bas a Pelagian tinge to it. 
Therefore he writes: 
But there may be some, who will concede that the will, 
being of its own spontaneous inclination, averse to 
what is good, is converted solely by the power of the 
Lord; yet in such a manner, that being previously pre-
pared, it has also its share in the work; that grace, 
as Augustine teaches, precedes every good work, the 
will following grace, not leading it, being its com-
panion, not its guide • • •• As it is preceded by grace, 
I allow you to style it an attendant; but since its 
reformation is the work of the Lord, it is wrong to 
attribute to man a voluntary obedience in following 
the guidance of grace •••• Nor was it the intention 
of Augustine, when he called the human will the com-
panion of grace, to assign to it any secondary office 
next to grace in the good work; but with a view to 
refute the nefarious dogma broached by Pelagius, who 
made the prime cause of salvation to consist in human 
merit, he contends, what was sufficient for2his present argument, that grace is prior to all merit . 
lA.M . Hunter, op. cit., p . 121. 
2John Calvin, OE• cit., p. 50f. 
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It seems, then, that the primary concern of Calvin is that 
the salvation of sinful man be ascribed to God's free gift of 
grace which comes in the election of sinners for salvation 
without regard to the merit of man. All talk of free will, 
cooperation, acceptance or rejection of God's grace and the 
like, which seem to convey notions of man doing something to 
merit God's free gift of grace, is to be rejected. Thus does 
Calvin seek to preserve the Biblical concept ot salvation by 
grace alone. 
Calvin holds fast to the belief that man's salvation is 
wholly dependent upon God's election, and that the cause of 
this election must not be found in man or anything man does.l 
Furthermore, when God determines to give his free gift of sal-
vation to man he cannot reject or resist God by means of his 
will. If salvation is not the result of anything man does, 
then it should be quite evident that man's destiny is wholly 
subject to God's decrees, which predestine some to salvation 
and others to condemnation.e It is true that God's gospel is 
addressed to all, but faith is given only to few.~ Thus, only 
the elect are given faith; and, because God has elected them, 
they cannot fall from faith . 
1Ibid., p . 51. 
2Ibid., p . 129. 
3~., p . 131 . 
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It is a notion commonly entertained, that God, foresee-
ing what would be the respective me r its of every indi-
vidual, makes a correspondent distinction between dif-
ferent persons; that he adopts as his children such as 
he fore knows will be deserving of his grace, and devotes 
to the damnation of death others, whose disposition he 
sees will be i nclined to wickedness and impiety •••• 
Now, it is of importance to attend to what the Scripture 
declares respecting every individual. Paul's assertion, 
that we were "chosen in Christ before the f oundation of 
the world," certainly precludes any consideration of 
merit in us; for it is as though he had said, our hea-
venly Father, finding nothing worthy of his choice in 
all the posterity of Adam, turned his views towards his 
Christ, to choose members from his body whom he would 
admit to the fellowship of life. Let believers, then, 
be satisfied with this reason, that we were adopted in 
Christ to the heavenly inheritance, because in ourselves 
we were incapable of such high dignity.l 
Again the practical concern of Ca lvin is that sinful man 
cannot do anything to merit the gift of salvation; therefore, 
God alone is the savior of men and to him alone belongs all the 
glory. Some complain that it is unjust that God should choose 
from among all sinners, some to be savea and some to be con-
demned. But, according to Calvi n, whatever God wills is just 
and right because God wills it. 2 Furthermore, all men by vir-
tue of their sin deserve death. Yet, God out of sheer mercy 
chooses to save s ome and those not chosen, who are condemned, 
deserve their condemnation . 3 
With respect to God's calling men to salvation or repro-
bation: 
1John Calvin, op . cit. , p . l29f. 
2~. , p. 132. 
3Ibid., p . 133 . 
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Here two errors are to be avoided . For some suppose 
man to be a cooperator with God, so that the validity 
of election depends on his consent; thus, according 
to them, the will of man is superior to the counsel 
of God. As though the Scripture taught, that we are 
only given the ability to believe, and not faith itself. 
Others, not thus enervating the grace of the Holy Spirit, 
yet induced by I know not what mode of reasoning, sus-
pend election on that which is subsequent to it; as 
though it were doubtful and ineffectual till it is con-
firmed by faith. That this is its confirmation to ~ 
is very clear; that it is the manifestation of God's 
secret counsel before c oncealed, we have already seen; 
but all that we are to understand by this, is that 
what was before unknown is verified, and as it were 
ratified with a seal.l 
Thus, does Calvin seek to secure an absolute monergism in 
sinful man's salvation. Faith is a subjective reaction to God's 
election and gift of grace, but man is powerless to contravene 
the worK of God and His Spirit. God is the sole active agent; 
ana, at most, man is the passive recipient of God 's work in and 
through man. Therefore, any talk of fre~ will which seems to 
imply that man takes a band in determining bis spiritual des-
tiny is out of order and mistaken. 
In reality, man is either the servant of God when God 's 
will controls man or else man is the servant of the aevil, when 
Satan controls man . Therefore, "those whom the Lord does not 
favor with the government of His Spirit, he abandons, in 
righteous judgment, to the influences of Satan. 112 However, 
since God is the absolute sovereign of all and nothing happens 
1John Ca lvin, op. cit., p . 135. 
2 Ibid., p . 51. 
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without his willing it to happen, this means that in the Fall, 
sin and evil occur because God wills them. It becomes appar-
ent then, that God has two wills. On the one hand, he wills 
and accomplishes salvation in some sinners and g ives them 
grace and faith necessary to salvation. On the other hand, 
he wills and accomplishes reprobation in others, withholds 
his grace and they are justly condemned. Calvin does not 
seek to deny this apparent inconsistency in the nature of Goa. 
While this may not be explained in any satisfactory way to 
the mind of man, Calvin believes that God acts in a way that 
is consistent with himself and his will. 1 
Yet , there is no doubt that Calvin's doctrine of the 
providence of God and predestination leaves nothing to chance 
or fortune. Both good and evil events occur because they are 
willed by God. Furthermore, Calvin refuses to dodge the issue 
by su_gesting that God does not will evil, but permits it to 
happen. Whatever God permits, be actually wills; and whatever 
he wills infallibly comes to pass. Therefore, it seems from 
the human perspective that the two wills of God are openly in 
conflict with one another. 
Hunter asks, does this not imply that God aecrees by his 
secret counsel that which he expressly forbids by hi s law? Can 
God, who wills the death of an old man who is killed by his 
son, command us not to kill and then cause the son to murder 
1 ~., p. 139. 
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his father? Calvin was aware of the problem, but it did not 
trouble him. He simply suggested that we cannot know God's 
secret will, and it is fruitless to try to understand it. 
However, as Hunter points out: 
It is one thing to say God takes advantage of an evil 
act freely done, quite another to say that He prompts 
it to ensure the fulfillment of His purposes, decree-
ing it to be a link in the chain of events which leads 
to this issue.l 
The real problem posed by Calvin's theology seems to be: 
Can the absolute sovereigntj of Goa be maintained without de-
stroying man's wil! entirely and, consequently, man's responsi-
bility for sin? Is salvation wholly of Goa, or does man's will 
play some part too? If God is truly sovereign as Calvin claims, 
and nothing happens without his willing it, then is not God the 
author of sin ana evil in the world? Does not God's absolute 
and eternal decree of election of some to salvation and others 
to reprobation, wbich disregards entirely anything man may do, 
undermine all concepts of human morality? These and other 
questions posed by Calvin's theology were taken up by the Dutch 
Calvinists and became the issues raised by the Arminians . It 
is to this Arminian protest that we now turn. 
6. Arminianism 
In the Arminian controversy, we find essentially the same 
protest against Calvin's doctrine of double predestination in 
lA.M. Hunter, op. cit., p. 148. 
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the 16th and 17th centuries that we found in the semi-Augus-
tinian protest against Augustine's teaching of it in the 5th 
and 6th centuries. While Augustine's view of predestination 
was definitely an infralapsarian one; it cannot be said whether 
Calvin's view was a supralapsarian or infralapsarian one, since 
his teachings support both views.l But this particular con-
troversy needs to be discussed in an historical survey, because, 
though similar to the Pelagian and the later Jansenist centro-
versies in the Roman Church, Arminianism remains as one of the 
most important statements of the problem of divine sovereignty 
and human responsibility made in the Protestant churches.2 
The rigor of Calvinism produced a reaction, especially 
in Holland, where humanistic traditions had never died 
out and where Anabaptism was widely spread. It mani-
fested itself in an emphasis on the more practical as-
pects of religion, a disinclination toward sharp creedal 
definitions, and a more tolerant attitude. Such a 
thinker was the Dutch scholar Dirck Coornhert (1522-1590); 
but it came to its fullest expression in the wosk of 
Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609) and his disciples. 
According to John Guthrie, 4 this protest against Calvin's 
views was bound to come. It began in Holland in 1589, when the 
Dutch theologian Coornhert attacked the Calvinistic teaching of 
an absolute decree of Divine election and reprobation, on the 
lJ.L. Neve, op. cit., II, 16. 
2Ibid., II, 17. 
3williston Walker, op. cit., p. 399. 
4
"Translator's Introduction" in Caspar Brandt, The Life of 
James Arminius, trans. John Guthrie (Nashville, Tennessee: 
Publishing House of the M.E. Church, South, 1903), p. xxii. 
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grounds that the Divine decree of reprobation made the fall 
into sin necessary and so made God the author of sin.l Fur-
thermore, the ministers of Delft, who discussed the issues 
with Coornhert, published their criticisms on the supralap-
sarian view in a little work entitled: "An Answer to certain 
Arguments of Beza and Calvin, from a Treatise on Predestina-
tion as taught in the Ninth Chapter of Romans.'*2 
Arminius, then a pastor of a C ~urch in Amsterdam, was 
asked by the ecclesiastical senate of Amsterdam to refute the 
errors of Coornhert and the ministers of Delft by defending the 
supralapsarian views of Calvin and Beza. 3 At first, Arminius 
was led to favor the infralapsarian views of the Delft minis-
ters; but on closer examination of the problem in the light of 
Scriptures, he began to see difficulties and faults in both 
views. Thus, it became necessary for him to begin to formulate 
his own position more accurately. 
However, because he did not comply with the wishes of some 
ultra-Calvinists, such as Peter Plancius, to condemn the Delft 
ministers and Coornhert as heretics, a "hornet's nest" of con-
troversy was stirred up. With the passing of time, it became 
more and more evident that the controversy was to divide along 
confessional lines. The more conservative seeking to interpret 
1caspar Brandt, op. cit., p . 62. 
2 ~·, p. 62!. 
3Arminius, WritinS!, I , 12. 
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Scriptures in the light of the confessions, and the more 
liberal seeking to make Scriptures alone the sole arbiter in 
matters of faith. 
Finally, on May 27, 1589, at a meeting of the Ecclesi-
astical Senate, Peter Plancius summed up his accusations 
against Arminius as follows: 
I. Arminius, when expounding the ninth chapter of 
Romans, had taught "that no one is condemned except 
on account of sin" -- thereby excluding all infants 
from condemnation. 
II. He had also declared "that too much could not 
be ascribed to good works, nor could they be suffici-
ently commended, provided no merit were attributed to 
them." 
III. He had affirmed that "Angels are not immortal."l 
Arminius also was accused of interpreting the seventh 
chapter of Romans in a Pelagian way. It was the feeling of 
many of his opponents that he ascribed too much goodness to 
unregenerate man. Actually, one finds in the Arminian posi-
tion arguments for free will which parallel those found in 
the teachings of humanists like Erasmus and Melanchthon. Ac-
cording to Nichols, however, Arminius• interpretation of 
Romans 7, which was constantly under attack, is the view most 
widely accepted today.2 Thus, the real meaning of original 
sin, total depravity, man's free will, and the like, were the 
central issues in the dispute. 
But one of the thorniest issues raised by the Arminian 
protest against confessional Calvinism centered around the 
lcaspar Brandt, op. cit., p. 96. 2Arminius, Writings,I, 13. 
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problem of predestination and the interrelationship of grace 
and free will. Brandt tells us that Arminius wa$ overjoyed 
to discover that his views concerning the ninth chapter of 
Romans were also expressed by Gallius Snecanus, who argued 
that Romans 9 "did little or nothing to confirm that decree 
of absolute election and reprobation which very many men de-
duced from it."l 
The sovereignty of God taught in the "orthodox" view of 
predestination seemed to make Adam's fall into sin necessary 
and God the author of sin because it did not seem to make room 
for the voluntary fall of man into sin. Concerning the Ar-
minian teaching of man's free will, some asked: Was it pos-
sible that God's eternal decree of salvation and reprobation 
was made contingent upon something man did or did not do? 
The Arminians who argued for justification by faith seemed 
to make man's personal response of faith too important when 
they suggested that God gave his saving grace only to those 
whom he fore knew would believe. 
Since Armioius was being considered as a replacement 
for Junius, the deceased professor of theology at Leyden, 
Gomarus, a professor at the University of Leyden, urged on 
by Arminius• old foe Plancius, reopened an attack on the ques-
tionable orthodoxy of Arminius. He contended that the doctrine 
of the Church, and Calvin's horrible decree must not be opposed 
lcaspar Brandt, op. cit . , p. 102. 
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on threat of heresy. 1 Yet, in spite of the charges of heresy 
and Arminius' continued opposition to the . "orthodox" doctrine 
of predestination, he was elected to the chair of theology at 
Leyden over the protest of Gomarus and other ultra-conservative 
Calvinists. 
These opponents of Arminius argued that to make God's de-
crees contingent upon man in any way was a reversion to the 
Pelagian heresy. On the other hand, Arminius· pointed out that 
to ignore man's part in faith and obedience leads to the notion 
that Adam and all men sin by necessity, and God becomes the 
author of sin. 
The real issue raised by the Arminian controversy was: 
Can the sovereignty of God, as it was taught by some Calvinists, 
be reconciled with the freedom of willnan needs to be a respon-
sible human being before God? Viewed from the Divine perspective 
all things seem to come to pass by necessity; but, viewed from 
the human perspective, God's decrees seem to be contingent 
upon man and his free will. Can these two points of view be 
reconciled? Arminius and his followers felt that they could. 
How this is worked out will be developed in Chapter Four. 
Suffice it to say at this point that Arminius and his 
teachings gave rise to continued controversy in the life and 
teachings of the Church. 
lcaspar Brandt, op . cit., p . 155. 
After Arminius' death, in 1609 ••• (his followers] 
opposed the current emphasis on minutiae of doctrine, 
viewing Christianity primarily as a force for moral 
transformation. In 1610, they and other sympathizers 
to the number of forty-one, at the insistence of the 
eminent Dutch statesman, Johan van Oldenbarnveldt 
{1547-1619), a lover of religious toleration, drew up, 
a statement of their faith called the "Remonstrance, 1 
from which the party gained the name "Remonstrants." 
Over acainst the Calvinistic doctrine of absolute 
predestination, it taught a predestination based on 
divine foreknowledge of the use men would make of the 
means of grace . Against the doctrine that Christ 
died for the elect only, it asserted that He died for 
all, though none receive the benefits of His death 
except believers . It was one with Ca lvinism in deny-
ing the ability of men to do anything really good in 
themselves -- all is of divine grace. Hence the 
Arminians were not Pelagians. In opposition to the 
Calvinistic doctrine of irresistible grace, they 
taught that grace may be rejected, and they declared 
uncertainty regarding the Calvinistic teaching of 
perseverance, holdin~ it possible that men may lose 
grace once received. 
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In opposition to this position, the "Contra-Remonstrants" 
continued to oppose Arminian views and the Synod of Dort (No-
vember 13, 1618 - May 9, 1619), condemned Arminianism, and 
establisheu the Heidelberg Catechism and the Belgic Confession 
as the doctrinal basis of the Dutch Church. 2 
At the Synod of Dort the following teachings were expli-
citly condemned: That original sin is not sufficient to condemn 
man to temporal or eternal punishment. That virtue has its 
seat in the will. r hat the will is not corrupted by the fall. 
That unregenerate man is not totally in sin nor destitute of 
lwilliston Walker, op. cit., p. 399f. 
2Ib1d., p . 400. 
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all power, but can hunger and thirst after righteousness. That 
corrup~ man still possesses light of nature ana can obtain 
grace via works which leads to salvation. That faith is solely 
man's response and activity and God does not enable man to come 
to faith . That grace can be resisted.l 
In this way, the Synod of Dort sought to adopt a strict 
Calvinistic interpretation of the Christian faith and argued 
that man cannot frustrate the will of God in any way. But 
whatever God wills infallibly comes to pass. Man's free will 
is labeled as being essentially Pelagian, merit-seeking, and 
destructive of God's sovereignty . 
Arminianism continued to have some influence in the Low 
Countries, though it was severely persecuted until aft er the 
death of Stadtbolder Maurice, who ruled the Netherlands until 
1625. But actually, Arminianism was ~o find a more hospitable 
reception in the person of John Wesley, whose warmth and piety 
influences a wide segment of Protestant Christianity today. 
7. Recent Controversy 
Current books and articles show that the problem of grace 
and free will is not dead and that many are vitally interested 
in man's freedom and bondage in his relation to God. In much 
theology there is a struggle between freedom and determinism. 
There are some like D.M. Baillie, who may be called monergista, 
1
see A.W. Harrison, The Beginnin~s of Arminianism, (London: 
University of London Press, 192 ), p. 86f. 
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who insist that salvation comes by the grace of God alone and 
take that word alone quite seriously. So seriously, in fact, 
that like Luther, they see no place for talk about man's free 
will at all in spiritual matters. Others, who may be called 
synergists, like L. H. DeWolf believe that the doctrine of 
salvation by grace alone denies man his natural freedom of 
choice between alternative courses of action. They also in-
sist like Arminius that man must be free to accept or reject 
God's proffered grace. Only by affirming the freedom of 
man's will can a false deterministic view be avoided and 
man's responsibility for sin before God be affirmed. Let us 
turn to the teachings of D.M. Baillie and L.H. DeWolf as 
able, recent, and contemporary representatives of the two 
classic expressions of the problem of man's freedom and bond-
age. 
D.M. Baillie is one modern theologian who sympathizes 
with the monergist's lament that God's grace suffers at the 
bands of those who argue for freedom of the will. In a recent 
artic!e, 1 Bail!ie deals with the problem posed in salvation by 
the grace of God alone, as opposed to arguments for the free-
dom of the will. In his view arguments for free will seem to 
deny the traditional Christian idea of salvation by the grace 
of God. 
!"Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will," 
Scottish Journal of Theology, 4(1951), 113-22. 
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He states that philosophers following Kant have constantly 
argued for freedom of the will. According to Kant, an act 
must be the free choice of man's will in order to be a moral 
one. But this, argues Baillie, is precisely what Augustine 
condemned in Pelagius. Pelagius said that man must be able 
to choose the good, while Augustine claimed that man is not 
able to choose anything but sin. The fact that man ought to 
choose the good does not imply that he can. He points out 
that Brunner goes even farther in suggesting "ought" implies 
"cannot." 
Baillie goes on to point out that he is not arguing for 
mechanical determinism. On the contrary, man always acts as 
he wills and chooses to act. But unregenerate man does not 
have the ability to do anything but sin in the sight of God.l 
When the will of man is wrong, it cannot put itself right, 
because it does not will to be right. The root of all sin 
is self-centeredness. Man ought to will to be less self-
centered, but he cannot, precisely because the more he con-
centrates on being less self-centered, the more self-centered 
he becomes. This Baillie calls the "paradox of moralism." 
The quest for morality is self defeating, just as the quest 
for happiness is self defeating. The only escape from this 
1the implication of this view is that while man is not out-
wardly coerced to do anything against his will and in this 
sense enjoys free will; nevertheless, after his fall into 
sin, he is inwardly determined to do nothing but sin. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, this is precisely the position 
of Luther in his Bondage of the Will. 
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self-conscious self-centeredness is God-centeredness. When we 
become more conscious of God than we are of ourselves, and do 
his will and not our own, then we become truly free from self 
and sin. But we can never become truly free unless we depend 
wholly upon God's grace. 
Baillie does not wish to give the impression that salva-
tion by the grace of God alone means that man is determined 
by God or that he does not possess a natural, God-given free-
dom of choice. In fact, he insists on affirming a paradox of 
grace. Thus, he avoids the charge of making man morally irre-
sponsible. He agrees that Pelagius was right in affirming 
man's freedom of choice against a ~ealous Augustine who seemed 
to deny it by his doctrine of salvation by grace alone. Man 
always possesses such freedom of choice and is certainly 
responsible for the wrong choices he makes. 
And yet (here is the paradox) when I maKe the right 
choice, my conscience does not applaud or congratu-
late me. I do not feel meritorious or glow with 
self-esteem -- if and in so far as I am Christian. 
Instead I say: "Not I, but the grace of God.' Thus 
while there is a human side to every good action, 
so that it is genuinely the free choice of a person 
with a will, yet somehow the Christian feels that 
the other side of it, the Divine side, is logically 
prior. The grace of God is 1prevenient. The good was His before it was ours. 
In this way Baillie "the monergist" defends human freedom 
and preserves the claim that salvation comes by the grace of 
God and not by the striving or merit of man's will. From his 
1D.M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1948), p. 116. 
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point of view, the only freedom the Christian man has or seeks 
is conformity to the will of God, and this occurs when God's 
Spirit possesses and controls man. Such a view protects man's 
natural freedom of choice and avoids the erroneous notion that 
man's free choices rightly oriented to ana in agreement with 
God's will are meritorious and earn salvation for man . 
L. Harold DeWolf argues for the freedom of the will on 
the basis of Scriptural evidence. In one of his books,l he 
points to many passages which are used to argue a5ainst free-
dom of the will, but he is not willing to allow these portions 
of Scripture to have the last word in the matter of human 
freedom and bondage . He suggests that the first eleven chap-
ters of Romans are not so much concerned with "the freedom or 
bondage ••• of the individual, but rather [with] the meaning 
of the contemporary role of Jews and Gentiles relative to 
hearing, obeying and transmitting the gos pel . "2 Paul, ac-
cording to DeWolf, is, in these passages, more concerned with 
the destinies of nations than he is with individuals. Fur-
thermore, Paul's own experience of conversion on the Damascus 
road would have been quite impossible if he bad been so bound 
in sin that he could do nothing to prepare himself for his 
vision of the risen Lord . 
lL. Harold DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church (New York: 
Harpers, 1953). 
2 ~. , p. 164; cf . Rom. 11:13-24 . 
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Then DeWolf turns to the whole Bible, and finds in the 
Old and New Testaments many commands and admonitions of the 
Lord which certainly appeal to the free will of man, and not 
to a puppet determined by God.l All such passages of Scrip-
ture, and there are many of them, seem to imply the ability 
of man to make a free response to God's commands. 
It is this free response to God's commands, and especially 
to God's grace, that DeWolf insists upon as an explicit teach-
ing of the Bible. He makes it clear, however, that he is not 
a Pelagian. Man cannot save hi~self by his own free will. 
What is vital for DeWolf is that man must be free to accept 
or reject the grace which God offers for man's salvation. 2 
He sees three things which argue for freedom of the will 
more strongly than all Paul's passages to the contrary: 
First, the exhortations and appeals to choose right-
eously which appear in the teachings of our Lord are 
very numerous • • • • 
Second, one of the most emphatic passages favor-
able to free will appears in the very midst of one 
of those few discourses which seem to throw human 
freedom of the will seriously in doubt. • • • {Rom. 
11:1-23; see esp. vv. 22-23.] 
Third, since the pleas for righteousness, calls 
to repentance, numerous promises and warnings con-
ditioned on human choice [e.g., Rom. 11:22-23; John 
3:16; Matt. 5:3-11; 11:28; Rev. 3:8-11] are in the 
central stream of the entire biblical message and 
are constantly recurrent from beginning to end, 
they must be given precedent consideration.3 
1Ibid., p. 165; see e.g., Josh. 25:15; I Kings 18:21; Jas. 
4:17; I Cor. 10:12-13. 
2~ •• p. 166. 
3~. 
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All of this, coupled with a firm rejection of Calvinis-
tic predestination and later scientific determinism as seen 
in Jonathan Edwards, leads DeWolf to affirm freedom of the 
will on the basis of wider, more inclusive empirical evidence. 
He calls to his aid arguments for human freedom found in many 
natural scientists, in moral law, in the demands for consis-
tency in the use of reason and in practical Christian experi-
ence, in order to buttress his argument for a free will, as 
opposed to any kind of determinism, especially religious de-
terminism. 
8. Summary 
Through the ages the controversy has raged between those 
who advocate salvation by the grace of God alone and those 
who emphasize the part man's free will plays in salvation. 
First, monergists argue that sinful man has no power to 
do the good in the eyes of God, that the sinful will of man 
is not free to ao gooa but bound to sin, and that only God's 
grace can free sinful man from his bondage in sin. Thus, to 
say that sinful man has a free will is erroneous because it 
implies that man can, by the exertion of his will, do good, 
make reparations for his sin, and so earn his salvation by 
obtaining merit in the eyes of God. 
Second, advocates of free will, who are often called 
Synergists, are sometimes confused with Pelagians who seem 
to preclude the necessity for God's grace in salvation. 
Actually, many Synergists do not seek to exclude God's grace 
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as the primary factor in man's salvation. They do argue, 
however, that man must be allowed freedom at least to accept 
and cooperate with the will of God and His grace, or to 
reject the same. Without this power of the will, man is no 
longer man, and we cannot in any way speak about him being 
responsible for his sin, but tend to make God responsible 
for man's sin. 
Third, the Scriptures have been appealed to by Monergist 
and Synergist alike and support for both views has been un-
covered. 
Fourth, there appear to be two major factors that play 
a part in man's salvation, namely, God's grace and man's 
natural freedom of choice . These two factors are expressed 
by St . Paul who writes: "Work out your own salvation with 
fear and trembling; for God is at work in you, both to will 
and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil . 2:12-13); and 
"Working together with him [God], then, we entreat you not 
to receive the grace of God in vain" (II Cor. 6:11). 
Fifth, Augustine, one of the first prominent theologians, 
describes the part God's grace and man's will play in salva-
tion. Seeking to show the absolute necessity for grace in 
salvation, he argues that, since Adam's fall, man is not 
able not to sin. Thus, the absolute need for grace is 
assured, but man's natural freedom and responsibility seem 
to be precluded by his teaching of salvation by grace alone . 
Sixth, Pelagius sees this danger in Augustine's view 
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and argues strenuously for free will. In his argument for 
man's natural freedom, he conveys to Augustine the idea that 
there are some men without sin who do not need grace for sal-
vation. 
Seventh, the real issue for Pelagius concerns what is 
possible. According to his view it is possible for man not 
t o sin. If this were not so then we could not speak of man 
as possessing the God-given capacity to make a choice between 
alternative courses of action. Rather, we could only affirm 
that man does not possess a truly free will, because, accord-
ing ~o Augustine, man is not able not to sin. If this were 
the case, then we would have to admit that all men are pre-
determined to do nothing but sin since the fall of Adam to 
the present. 
Eighth, later Luther and Erasmus pick up the same argu-
ment. The former seems to emphasize the grace of God to the 
neglect of man's natural freedom, though he does not assert 
double predestination as Augustine does. The latter seems 
to emphasize man's natural freedom to the exclusion of God's 
grace . Erasmus, however, insists that salvation is the co-
operative work of two agents, while Luther, in his debate 
with Erasmus , claims that salvation comes by grace alone 
whiah seems to preclude free will. 
Ninth, the Formula of Concord is an attempt to heal the 
breach between Gnesio-Lutherans and Phillipists . The former 
found in Luther an emphasis upon the passive nature of man in 
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his salvation. They argued that salvation comes by the grace 
of God alone; and, therefore, only sinners to whom God chooses 
to give His Spirit are enabled to understand and believe God's 
word and accept His grace for salvation. 
Tenth, Melanchthon and his followers saw such denial of 
free will as destructive of man's natural freedom and human 
morality. Melanchthon insisted that three factors play an 
important part in man's salvation, viz., God's Spirit, God's 
Word and Man's will. 
Eleventh, Calvin taught the sovereignty of God in such a 
way that nothing is contingent or happens by chance. Both 
good and evil events occur only because God wills them to 
happen. Thus, even the Fall was willed by God and Adam's free 
will was illusory. Since the Fall, all men are so corrupted 
by sin and held in its bondage that they are incapable of 
doing any good thing in God's eyes which will merit salvation. 
Therefore, the salvation of sinful man is wholly dependent 
upon God's choosing to elect from among all sinners some to 
be saved. The others are chosen for reprobation, and God 
justly condemns them because they freely and spontaneously 
choose to sin, though, since Adam's fall, man's nature is so 
corrupted and bent by sin that it can do nothing but sin. 
Therefore, any talk of man's will being free to choose the 
good or to cooperate with God in salvation is Pelagian in 
nature and to be rejected because it seems to imply that man 
does something to merit his salvation. 
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Twelfth, Arminianism was the movement among Dutch Calvin-
ists which reacted against Calvin's teaching of double predes-
tination. They opposed the concept of a divine decree of 
reprobation because it seemed to make the Fall and subsequent 
sin necessary and led to the conviction that God was the 
author of sin and evil. They believed that Christ died for 
all, not just the elect. However, the benefits of Christ's 
death and divine grace necessary for the salvation of sinners 
was given only to those who believed. While man without grace 
cannot do the kind of good that will bring salvation, man has 
God-given power to reject God's grace when it is offered to 
him. Thus, man, and not God, is responsible for sin and 
evil; and God justly condemns sinners who reject his grace. 
Thirteenth, recently Baillie points up the impos.sibili ty 
of sinful man getting himself i nto a right relationship with 
God by the exertion of his own will power . But he does not 
seek to deny man's natural freedom of choice. Though man has 
power to choose between good and evil and is res ponsible f or 
his choice to God who alone is good, when he chooses evil he 
must claim full responsibility for his wrong choice. This 
Baillie calls the paradox of grace. It is his attempt to 
preserve the absolute necessity for God's grace in salvation 
without robbing man of his natural freedom. 
Fourteenth, DeWolf defends man's free will as a Biblical 
view in order to avoid the error of theological determinism. 
Man, he argues, always has power to choose to do or not to 
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do what God commands and to accept or reject God's grace for 
salvation. But at no time does he suggest that man saves 
himself by the effort of his will. As a modern synergist, 
he sees salvation as a corporate and cooperating venture 
between God ana man. 
Some monergists like Baillie and synergists like DeWolf 
seek to preserve the initiative and priority of God's grace 
in the salvation of man without robbing man of his natural 
freedom. 
In the thinking of Martin Luther and James Arminius , we 
find monergistic and synergistic approaches to the problem 
of the Divine-human encounter well articulated. We shall, 
therefore, first turn to the writings of Luther and his 
monergistic approach, and then to Arminius and his synergistic 
solution to the problem of human freedom and bondage. It is 
hoped that in comparing and contrasting their respective views 
we may gain a deeper understanding of this problem. 
CHAPTER III 
LUTHER'S TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 
The writings of Luther are so vast and varied that it 
is impossible to uncover everything he has said on this 
subject. Heinrich Boehmer has this to say of the Weimar 
Edition of Luther's writings: 
So immense is the mass of documentary material ••• 
brought to light, that the scholar must needs have 
the digestive faculty of an ostrich to be able to 
take in all this fresh matter and to separate the 
historically valuable portion without feelin~ too 
much oppressed by the indigestible residium. 
In this chapter, however, we shall attempt to systematize 
Luther's writings on the subject of human bondage and free-
dom. We do not presume to have uncovered, let alone to have 
recorded in this chapter, all that Luther has said on the 
subject. The task before us is to explore Luther's teachings 
and fit them into a meaningful anthropology. 
Luther's study of man can only be understood when we 
see man as a creature of God . His teaching on sin, bondage 
in sin, and Christian liberty become meaningful only when we 
see man in his relationship with God. Luther is not pri-
marily concerned with man's study of man, or what we call 
scientific anthropology. Instead, he sees and explains man 
lHeinrich Boehmer, Luther in the Light of Recent Research, 
trans. C.E. Huth, Jr. (New York: The Christian Herald, 1916), 
p. 32. 
76 
77 
as he stands before God (coram deo). 1 Thus, Luther's concept 
of human freedom and bondage is primarily a theological one. 
1. Man as a Creature of God 
Luther interpreted the Genesis account of creation as a 
special historical act of God . He accepted the biblical 
record as literally true. The possibility of man evolving 
along with lower animals was not a live option for him. He 
emphasizes the fact that God took special pains when He came 
to his creation of man as a creature capable of spiritual, 
rational and eternal fellowship with God . 2 It was these 
attributes that constituted the image of God in man and made 
man distinctive from all other animals. To be sure, man has 
an animal nature, but he is more than an animal because God 
created him to be immortal.3 
They (the animals] do not know their Creator, 
their origin, and their end; they do not know 
out of what and why they were created. Therefore , 
they certainly lack that similitude of God •• 
• • Thus, even if this image has been almost 
completely lost (through Adam's sin], there is 
still a great difference bet~een human beings 
and the rest of the animals. 
We see here that Luther tries to maintain the essential 
goodness of man as he came from the hand of God . At times, 
1Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1953), p. 167. 
2 Luther, ~works (St. Louis) , I, 56. 
3Ibid., I, 84 . 
4~., I, 67. 
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however, "Luther suffers from a lack of consistency in main-
taining a clear distinction between the essential nature of 
man [as good] and his existential predicament [in sin]. "1 
Before the fall, Adam enjoyed a perfect knowledge of 
God. There was a union of heart and will between God and 
man. Man perfectly loved God and hi s neighbor. 2 Adam ac-
cepted his life from God as a trust and gave it back to Him 
in glad and willing obedience . Here the essential goodness 
of man as he came from the hand of God is clearly affirmed. 
When Luther speaks about man after the fall, or man the sin-
ner, be tends to submerge the essential goodness of man and 
called man a sinner E.z nature . Thus, he writes: "the evil 
is planted in human hearts by nature . "3 Or, "Now [after 
the fall of Adam into sin], man is mortal and a sinner. 114 
The implication of such a view is that after the fall 
into sin, man's nature is essentially changed. We must ask: 
Is such a view supported by Scripture? Is not man, sinner 
1Karl Schmidt, "Toward a Rediscovery of the Natural in Lutheran 
'I'heology" (unpublished Ph . D. Dissertation, School of Reli-
gion, Iowa State University, 1959), p. 44f . 
2Luther, Works (St. Louis), I, 56 . 
3Luther, What Luther Says, ed. E. M. Plass (St. Louis: Concor-
dia Publishing House, 1959), II, 604; cf. Luther, Works (St. 
Louis} I, 73, 273. 
4Ibid., I, 604; cf. Luther, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, 
~William Hazlitt (London: George Bell and Sons, 1878), 
p . 118. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: Luther, 
Table Talk. 
or not, still man? 1 Does man created in the image of God 
ever wholly lose that image? 
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While there is no doubt that Luther thought of all God's 
creation as essentially good as it came from the hand of God 
and before the fall, Luther sometimes speaks of man since 
the fall as totally corrupt, perverted and spoiled both 
outwardly and inwardly, in body and sou1. 2 Statements such 
as these lead some to conclude that Luther disparages human 
nature itself. In some instances Luther does, but at other 
times he does not. We shall treat this more fully a little 
later. Suffice it to say at this point that we agree with 
Schmidt when he suggests that we must not confuse natural 
man, who is essentially good, with sinful man, who is exis-
tentially estranged from God . To suggest as Luther and some 
Lutherans do, that man is by nature a sinner, is dangerous 
because it may be interpreted to mean that God made us sin-
ners; and lead many to assert ambiguous teachings concerning 
man's true nature.3 
There also seems to be ambiguity in Luther's thinking 
on the subject of human reason. He often disparages human 
reason because he is convinced that a man cannot come into 
a saving relationship with God by reason alone. 
1see, "Synergism," Encyclopedia 6r Religion and Ethics, ed. 
James Hastings, XII, l60f. 
2Luther, Table Talk , p . 123. 
~arl Schmidt, op. cit., p. 42ff. 
The darts Luther aimed at Aristotle stemmed pri-
marily from his fear that Aristotle's ethics would 
permit the concept of salvation by human effort 
and merit to enter on the ground floor of man's 
quest for salvation and destroy the article of 
salvation by faith which was so central to Lu-
ther's religious experience.l 
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On the other hand, Luther spoke highly of human reason 
as a good creation of God.2 His attitude toward human reason 
can be found in his explanation to the first and third arti-
cles of the Apostles• Creed. In the first he asserts the 
essential goodness of reason because God created it. In the 
third, however, he argues: "I believe that I cannot by my own 
reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ or come to Him. "3 
He, therefore, criticised the humanists, and especially Eras-
mus, because he felt that they did not recognise and acknow-
ledge how much original sin had corrupted man's reason and 
judgment. 4 
Ragnar Bring5 argues that both reason and free will in 
the thought of Luther have no authority or meaning coram deo. 
But, coram homnibus, both reason and freedom of the will are 
1Luther, Werke (Weimar Ausgabe) 48, 76; cited by Karl Schmidt, 
op cit., p. 91; cf. Luther, Werke (Weimar Ausbage) 10, 207. 
Here Luther argues that man's reason makes man distinct from 
the animals. 
2Luther, "The Small Catechism, 11 Book of Concord, p. 160. 
3Ibid., p. 161. 
4Luther, Conversations with Luther, ed. Preserved Smith and 
H.P. Gallinger (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1915), p. 111. 
5 
"Coram Deo --Coram Homnibus," Svensk Theolo~isk Kvartal-
schrift, IV (1930), 179, cited by Nels Ferre; Swedish Con-
tributions to Modern Theologr (New York: Harpers, l939), 
p. 103. 
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relevant. Thus, what appears to be an ambiguity in Luther's 
thought, is in reality the result of Luther expressing him-
self on ~wo different levels, namely, the theological, which 
thinks of man as be stands before God, and the human, which 
thinks of man as he stands before his fellow men. As we 
shall see, this double level of thinking must be borne in 
mind constantly in our study of Luther's anthropology. 
Luther argues strongly for the essential goodness of all 
God's creation in his teaching on the Orders of Creation . Here 
Luther sees men as members of God's created orders, such as 
the family, state, etc. Like man himself, these orders were 
created by God, and, therefore, are good. They are part of 
God's plan for preserving peace and harmony in a sinful world. 
These orders give directionto man's natural powers in order 
that they may be used in a constructive, rather than in a 
destructive way.l 
These divine callings and orders are instituted by 
God to assure a lasting, orderly, peaceful life of 
the world and to maintain law . For this reason, he 
(the Psalmist] calls this righteousness God's which 
lasts and endures forever. This is what the jurist 
calls natural law. For if God had not established 
these callings Himself and if He did not preserve 
them day by day as His own work, not one spark of 
law would remain even for an instant. Every servant 
would want to be master, every maid would want to be 
mistress, the peasant would want to be prince, and 
the son would want to be above father and mother. In 
short, life among men would be worse than life among 
the wild animals, where one eats the other.2 
lKarl Schmidt, op. cit., p. 48. 
2Luther, Werke (Weimar Ausgabe ), 31, I, 407; cited by Karl 
Schmidt, ~P· cit., p. 48. 
We agree with Schmidt when he says: 
According to Luther, the secular world is also 
God's world, even before it is the Christian 
world, i.e., a world that has effectively experi· 
enoed the redeeming • •• power of God's agape in 
Chrift and [is] ••• consciously oriented toward 
God. 
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Luther always sees man as a creature of God who is de-
pendent upon God for all things necessary to life, both 
physical and spiritual. Furthermore, nothing ever happens 
without God both willing and knowing it. God is the Creator, 
man is His creature, and the sovereignty of God over man is 
never to be disputed as far as Luther is concerned. Thus, 
he writes: 
Man before he is created to be man, does ••• no-
thing towards his being made a creature, and when 
he is made and created he does and endeavors no-
thing towards his continuance as a creature; both 
his creation and continuance come to pass by the 
sole will of the omnipotent power and goodness of 
God, who creates us and preserves us without our-
selves. Yet God does not work in us without us, 
for He created us for this very purpose, that He 
might work in us, and we might cooperate with Him. 2 
This passage is typical of Luther. It appear s that 
Luther makes adequate provision for what we call man's 
natural freedom by suggesting that "God does notwork in us 
without us 11 and "we might cooperate with Him." When we in-
quire, however, into what Luther means by cooperation between 
1Karl Schmidt, op. cit., p. 49. 
2Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 268. 
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God and man, we learn that God empowers both good and evil 
men. When one man acts in a good fashion it is because he 
is carried along by the Holy Spirit and made to act by Him. 1 
When another man acts in a bad way, it is because he is sin-
ful by virtue of his nature which he receives from Adam, and 
God is left holding a faulty tool like a carpenter who tries 
to saw a board straight with a crooked saw.2 
Thus, when Luther speaks about man as a dependent crea-
ture of God, he means utterly dependent even in matters of 
choice and action. Man has free choice, but he always 
chooses to sin and resist God's Spirit . 3 Once we grant the 
premise which Luther affirms, viz., that God is omnipotent 
and works all in all, and man is utterly dependent upon God 
for everything, then according to Luther we have a proper 
perspective from which we can rightly understand both God 
and man. 
The difficulty arises when man will not let it be this 
way. Thus this utterly dependent creature is always striving 
after and seeking independence from God. Such striving after 
independence sets the stage for man's fall into sin. 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 267. 
2Ibid., p . 206; cf. pp . 186, 189. 
3!£!£., pp . 188-189. 
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2. The Dependent Creature Seeks Independence 
For Luther, it is obvious that man is a creature who is 
wholly dependent upon God for his existence. Man lives solely 
by the creative and sustaining power of God.l He brought man 
forth out of nothing and sustains him minute by minute from 
falling back into the nothingness out of which he came. Thus, 
man is wholly dependent upon God for everything both physical 
and spiritual in this earthly existence, not to mention man's 
utter dependence upon God for life eternal. 
This is why Luther insists that the First Commandment is 
the cornerstone of all God's commandments . It is the founda-
tion of man's relationship with God. When a man "fears, loves, 
ana trusts in God above all things,"2 he acknowledges God as 
the only true God and source of all things spiritual and tem-
poral. A person who looks to anyone but God for everything 
he needs is sinful, breaks the first commandment, and is 
guilty of breaking all God's commandments . 3 
On the other hand, the man who accepts his life and his 
te~poral and spiritual blessings from God as a gift, and 
thanks, serves, and trusts Him alone for them, fulfills the 
first and all the commandments, and is in a right relation 
lLutt.er, "The Small Catechism," Book of Concord, p. 160. 
2 Luther, "The Sa: all Catechism," Book of Concord, p. 159. 
3Lutber, "'I't-.e Large Catechism," Book of Concord, p . 191. 
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with God . Such a man will reverence God's name and keep the 
sabbath by gladly hearing God's Word as often as it is pro-
claimed . Furthermore, this right attitude and relationship 
with God will spill over into a right relationship with the 
neighbor. He will honor father and mother. He will love, 
help and protect his neighbor's interests because he truly 
loves God and wants to serve and please Him.l 
When a man separates himself from God and refuses to 
acknowledge God as God because he wants to be his own god or 
worship some other idol, then man becomes the slave of sin 
because he serves the creature rather than the Creator. Thus, 
according to Luther, did Adam fall into sin, and thus does 
every man fall into sin and its bondage. In other words, the 
autonomous will of man being free to do as it pleases is a 
fiction for Luther. Freedom of the will as the expression 
of the will of a completely autonomous man doing only what 
he wants to do, enjoying an utterly free will, is an 1mpos-
sibility . 2 Man either serves God or Satan, for the moment 
he chooses to perform what he wills in opposition to God's 
will, he has already become the servant of Satan and an enemy 
of God. It cannot be otherwise in Luther's thinking. 
"If God's grace is wanting •• • what can it (free 
will] do? It is ineffective • • • and can do nothing 
~. of the Will, p. 102f.; cf . Luther, Table wLu ~b~~, ~c~Q~a~d~a~g~e~~~~~~ 
~~ P• 120 . 
gooa. So it will not do what God or His grace 
wills. Why? Because we have now taken God's 
grace away from it, and what the grace of God 
does not do iS not good. Hence it follows that 
'free-will' without God's grace is not free at 
all, but is the permanent prisoner and bondslave 
of evil, since it cannot turn itself to good."l 
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Here, then, is the core of Luther's anthropology. Man 
is the dependent creature of God, who seeks independence and 
freedom from God . But when he rebels against God's will and 
hopes for freedom and self-fulfillment, he is completely 
frustrated by God and becomes bound in sin. Only submission 
to the will of God fulfills the first commandment and leads 
to freedom, fulfillment and salvation. 
3. Man the Rebel 
Almost the very first, if not the very first conscious 
act of Adam and Eve, was the one of rebellion against God 
(Gen. 3:18}. But for Luther, the real sin was not the dis-
obedient act of eating the forbidden fruit; it was doubting 
God's word and promises and accepting instead the word of a 
finite creature, namely, the serpent.2 The wora of the ser-
pent (Satan in disguise) was deemed more truthful than God's 
word. Thus, unbelief, not a disobedient act, is at the root 
of all sin in Luther's mind. The eating of the fruit comes 
as a result of the great sin of unbelief. The disposition of 
lrbid., p. 104. 
2Luther, Works (St . Louis), I, 162. 
the heart is prior to all acts, and for God, who sees the 
hearts of men, the motive of the heart is all important. 
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Faith in the heart of man is the source of all gpod acts, 
and unbelief is the source of all evil acts. Luther agrees 
with Paul , who sees sin, not as wrong moral acts, but as 
unbelief. 1 Sinful acts proceed out of an untrusting heart, 
and righteous acts proceed out of a trusting heart. For 
Luther, man's righteousness or unrighteousness depends pri-
marily on man's vertical relationship with God (faith), and 
not upon a horizontal or human view of sin as wrong moral 
acts. 
This means that all sin is the result of man's original 
sin and it is not to be thought of in forensic terms. Sin 
is not primarily to be thought of as God's will conceived as 
law, but rather a dynamic self-will that stands opposed to 
God's will.2 
Before the fall, as we have previously stated, Luther 
posited a perfection in Adam and the whole creation as it 
came from the hands of God . Kostlin agrees with Schmidt in 
suggesting that Luther asserted an essential goodness in man 
prior to the fall, but that since the fall every man is a 
lRodney Wolfard, op. cit., p . 52. 
2 Edgar Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1948), p. 202. 
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sinner by nature. 1 
As we pointed out above, 2 when we call man a sinner by 
nature, we tend to confuse natural man, who is essentially 
good, with sinful man, who is existentially estranged from 
God by sin. Such an idea implies that the very nature of 
man himself is changed in some essential way. This tends to 
make man before the fall and man after the fall two qualita-
tively different kinds of creatures. 
This apparent inconsistency as to what Luther means by 
natural man and sinful man seems hard to reconcile until we 
note that Luther often equates the two. He does this because, 
for him, natural man is defined as man alone, i . e., man who 
is in sinful rebellion against God, rejects and resists His 
grace. Thus, -he is actually allied with Satan and serving 
the forces of evil which oppose God.3 
According to Luther, original righteousness was the 
state man enjoyed before the fall . Then man was upright, 
honest, knew God, and enjoyed open fellowship with Him, 
obeying Him with utmost joy. Then man lived in peace with 
no fear of death or anxiety, and his body was without lust 
lJulius Kostlin, Theology of Luther, trans. Charles E. Hay 
(Philadelphia: Lutheran Publishing Society, 1897), I, 14~; 
cf. Karl Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 42-48, ~6, l34ff. 
2 See above, p . 7B . 
3Luther, Bondage of the Will, pp. 202, 204, 206. 
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and evil inclinations.l Before the fall there were no weeds 
or thistles. The sun shone brighter, the water was purer and 
the earth more fertile.2 But, with the advent of sin, all of 
this was lost. Thus, it seemed logical to Luther to assert 
that, since the fall, all of nature and man himself are sinful 
and filled with evil.3 Once more we see a tendency in Luther 
toward ambiguity over the essential goodness of nature and man, 
and their existential estrangement from God in sin. 
However, Luther is quite clear in stating that all sin 
is primarily original sin because "man seeks his own in every• 
thing, even in God."4 Luther insists that sinful man, who bas 
inherited his sinful tendency from Adam, is not passive. While 
he does inherit his fallen nature from Adam, he himself actively 
wills to rebel against God, even as Adam did. Luther sees man's 
lLuther, Works (St. Louis), I, 108. 
2 ~., I, 64. 
3 Ibid., XII, 348. Here Luther comments on Psalm 51:5: 11The 
human seed, this mass from which I was formed, is totally 
corrupt with faults and sin. The material itself is faulty. 
The clay, so to speak, out of which this vessel began to be 
formed is damnable." But contrast this with his later view . 
"From reason, they Erasmus and the humanists conclude that 
original sin is lust, putting it in the flesh only and in a 
certain base animal function, namely, the reproductive. And 
so, all writers speak of carnal concupiscience as original 
sin, ignoring infidelity and pride of heart -- Luther, Conver-
sations with Luther, ed. Preserved Smith and H. R. Gallinger 
(Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1915), p. lll. 
4 E.M . Carlson, op. cit., p . 51. 
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self-centeredness (incurvatus in !!) as inherited from Adam; 
and it is this that gives man his bent toward ego-centricity, 
which is the root of all sin . Yet, this does not mean that 
man cannot be held responsible for his sinful self-centered-
ness, because it is sinful man himself who actively and spon-
taneously wills to do wha t he wants to do in opposition to 
God, instead of willing to do what God wants him to do. 1 
~ his self-centeredness in man, inherited from Adam, is 
actively opposed to God's will and makes man a sinner in 
God's eyes (coram deo) . Luther indicates that Paul's express-
ion, "We are all under sin," must be taken in a religious or 
spiritual sense. Men are sinners, not in their own eyes, 
nor in the eyes of their fellow men (coram homnibus), but as 
they stand before God (coram deo). 2 God alone can see man's 
self-centeredness, even in man's so-called "good works . " It 
is this that makes man's best works sinful in God's eyes, even 
when they are good in man's eyes . Thus, for Luther, even the 
best of the heathen are evil before God and serve Satan in 
all they do. 3 
Luther seems to be disparaging human nature. The impli-
cation is that man by nature is sinful and thus human effort 
without faith in God can only serve evil. His insight into 
libid. 
2Luther, Commentary on Romans (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publish-
ing House, 1954), p. 53. 
3Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 253; cf . , Luther, Table Talk, 
p . 119. 
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selfish ego-centricity is well taken , but to intimate that 
the heathen are wholly bereft of the grace of God is to go 
farther than the facts seem to allow. We must ask: Is human 
nature -- sinful, heathen, call it what you will -- ever 
wholly bereft of all goodness even in the eyes of God? If it 
is, where is the image of God in which all men are created? 
Where is the witness of God's power and majesty in nature of 
which St. Paul speaks (Rom. 1:19)? How could Paul maintain 
that even the 3entiles are responsible for sin before God, if 
they are incapable of any goodness at all? 
Gordon Rupp suggests that original sin in Luther's thought 
is not meant to convey the idea of the absence of original 
righteousness, but a positive bent toward evil . It is the 
orientation of the whole man, flesh and spirit, toward egotism 
and rebellion against God. Augustine called it curvatus, 
that sinful man was bent or crooked; but Luther called it 
incurvatus in ~· that sinful man was bent or curved in upon 
himself. Such sin cannot be remedied without the grace of 
God . 1 
The reason for Luther's ambiguity on this point seems to 
be that he assumes that all men since the fall of Adam are so 
perverted by sin that wheP they follow their own sinful wills 
they inevitably choose to sin. One must ask, however, if 
laordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God (London: Hoaaer and 
Stoughton, 1953), p. l64f. 
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something a man suffers fromtbe previous action of another 
man can rightly oe called sin? Is sin a state or condition 
into which man is born, or is it something he does, or is it 
both? 
Luther did make an important distinction between original 
and actual sin, and he claims that the former is not charged 
to men as actual sin.l Original sin is the state of self-
centeredness which all men inherit from Adam. Yet, sinful 
man is guilty in God's eyes primarily because he wills to do 
evil. He is not conaemned because of Adam's sin, but because 
he chooses to express his own will in rebellion against Goa's 
will . So too, it is man's own sin, and not that of Adam's, 
that leads God to condemn the sinner.2 
It seems to Luther that "man selfishly seeks only what 
is to his advantage: he can love only himself above all things; 
and that is the sum and substance of all transgression."3 He 
also speaks of the total depravity of man in sin. By this he 
means that the whole man and all his powers are pervaded by 
sin, and thus, perverted. This doctrine emphasizes the fact 
that man cannot free hi~self from the demonic power of sin 
which pervades the whole man. In this context Luther does not 
1Luther, Commentary on Romans, p. 53. 
2Ibid., p. 54. Elsewhere, Luther argues that man by his own 
free will does nothing but sin. (See Luther, Table Talk, 
p. 118; cf. Luther, Bondage of the Will, pp. l37ff. !! Eassim. 
3Ibid., p. 54. 
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mean that man is no longer man, or that the image of God is 
completely lost, or that man is incapable of doing any good 
from the human point of view . He simply emphasizes that the 
sin of self- will is so deeply embedded in man since his fall, 
that he cannot understand sin, let alone conquer it, i . e., 
without divine grace . l 
The whole man, body and mind, flesh and spirit, is con-
trolled by man's will, and as a sinner he wills what is to his 
own benefit in all he thinks, says, and does in opposition to 
what God wills, says ana does . If he wills what is benefi-
cial to himself at all times, it is obvious that he does not 
always will what is in accord with God's will, and what is 
beneficial to his fellow man . This is what Luther means when 
he asserts that the flesh of man battles against the Spirit of 
God . 
This term "flesh" involves the whole man -- body, soul, 
reason and will . The ego, or soul, is that which leads man 
to seek his own in all he thinks, wills, says, or does. In 
this sense the soul is more "fleshly" than the bodily desires 
and lusts of man.2 This means that man's corruption in sin 
cannot be blamed on man's bodily lusts and desires alone, but 
involves the whole man and all of his faculties. This view 
1Luther, Commentary on Romans, p . 53; cf . Rodney Wolfard, £E• 
£!!., p. 5!; Rom. 7:!4-25. Here Luther and Paul agree . 
2Gordon Rupp, op. cit . , p . l66f . 
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also precludes any body-soul dualism in man. The whole men as 
a sinner stands in opposition to the will end Spirit of God 
precisely because the whole man is at war with God. 
But above all, it must be remembered that when Luther 
speaks of total corruption some authorities argue that he is 
not making a derogatory value judgment on man and his world. 
He does not intend to convey a sense of utter worthlessness in 
man. 
It is rather an assertion that man cannot transform 
himself from an ego-centric being into a believer --
one whose life is centered in God. It is a distinctly 
religious idea and cannot be transferred into the 
realm of sociology or of ethics. Sinful man, wholly 
impotent before God, is not therefore impotent in the 
face of social and moral standards.l 
Carlson goes on to warn that the doctrine of depravity 
tends to become a doctrine which deprives the whole of created 
nature and the world of any goodness at all. t his ought not 
be so. The created orders are God's and are good, as is the 
law which is written on man's heart. But neither the created 
order nor the law always brings goodness to man.2 
Be that as it may, Luther teaches that in the eyes of 
God, man, without faith and complete trust in God, failing to 
acknowledge God as God and to thank Him for His gifts, is a 
sinner totally corrupt and bound in sin. But when he believes 
1E.M. Carlson, op. cit., p. 207; cf. Luther, Commentary on 
Romans, p. 29ff. 
2!2!2·· p. 211. 
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and trusts in God and looks to Him for all things spiritual 
as well as temporal, he is called righteous and fulfills the 
whole will and law of God. And most important, when he be-
lieves the Gospel, God's gracious word of forgiveness in Jesus 
Christ, he is accounted righteous, made a saint, and is freed 
to do good wor.ks that are pleasing in God 's eyes. It is to 
these two matters, bondage in sin and Christian freedom, that 
we now turn. 
4. Bondage in Sin 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Paul, Augustine and Luther state 
that, after the fall of man into sin, man's will is no longer 
free to do or accomplish any good thing in the sight of God. 
This, they argue, means that unregenerate man can only sin 
coram deo. Without the redeeming grace of God offered in 
Christ, man remains in bondage to sin. Paul makes no mention 
of free will. Augustine says that free will can do nothing 
but sin, and Luther rejects the term free will entirely. The 
latter speaks instead of the bondage of the will of man in 
sin.l Luther develops this idea fully in his Q! Servo Arbitrio. 
Ne turn now to his ideas concerning human freedom and bondage 
which he discusses there. 
After making clear to Erasmus the importance of theologi-
cal assertions and the perspicuity of Holy Scriptures, Luther 
lLuther, Works (Philadelphia), III, 108; cf. Luther, Bondage 
of the Will, p. 144ff.; See also II Tim. 2:25f. where Paul 
speaks of sinners who are in bondage to Satan. 
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gets at the meat of the argument be tween himself and Erasmus. 
For Luther, the topic of free will is a vital one. Thus, he 
despises Erasmus' casual treatment of such an important sub-
ject in his "Diatribe . " 
Immediately, Luther controverts the idea that the will of 
man has anything to do with matters concerning his salvation. 
~he chief point at issue is: How is man's will related to and 
affected by divine grace? l It is Luther's contention that God, 
by His grace and mercy, accomplishes all things in and through 
man, and man's will accomplishes nothing . Thu~, all credit 
and glory rightfully belong to God alone . 
His primar~ reason for his position is his firm belief 
in the omnicompetence of God. For example, Luther believes 
that nothing happens contingently, but all things come to pass 
by necessity. Thus, God foreknows all that will happen of 
necessity. 
It is , then , fundamentally necessary and wholesome 
for Christians to know that God foreknows nothing 
contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and 
does all things according to2His own immutable, eternal and infallible will. 
If God's nature and promises are sure and certain, then 
does it not follow, argues Luther, that God must foreknow all 
things? If God is to be God, then, in Luther's opinion, His 
nature and will are both changeless and sure. However, one 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will , p . 78. 
2 ~· · p. 80. 
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must ask: What does such a view do to any notions of man hav-
ing a will at all? Does such a position reauce man to a 
thing which is manipulated on the chessboard of life by God? 
Can God's mercy and love be sure and certain, yet contingent 
upon something man, by the God-given power of his will, does 
or does not do? Is Luther's assumption that God's nature and 
will are sure any more valid than the assumption that man, 
who experiences freedom of choice, responsibility and guilt, 
has the God-given power to cooperate with God or oppose Him? 
These are some of the questions which Luther's position raises. 
Luther admits that he does not like the term "necessity." 
I could wish, indeed, that a better term was avail-
able for our discussion than the accepted one, 
necessity, which cannot accurately be used of either 
man's will or God's. Its meaning is too harsh, and 
foreign to the subject; for it suggests some sort 
of compulsion, and something that is against one's 
will, which is no part of the view under debate. 
The will, whether it be God's or man's, does what 
it does, good or bad, under no compulsion, b~t just 
as it wants or pleases, as if totally free . Yet the 
wlll of God, which rules over our mutable will, is 
changeless and sure, • •. and our will, principally
1 because of its corruption, can do no good of itself • 
. 
Luther seems to explain our human experience of freedom 
of choice as an absence of any compulsion. If all that happens, 
however, happens in accord with God's immutable will, is not 
the freedom of choice only an illusion? Does not such a view 
as his imply determinism? In fact, Luther likens his view to 
the Roman idea of fatalism when we say, ' God's will be done.• 
lLuther, ~ondage of the Will, p. 81 ; cf. p. 102f. 
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God's predestining powers were revealed even to the heathen, 
for that is where they got their idea of fatalism.l 
The important point which Luther wishes to make by his 
concept of predestination is: If we do not believe and ac-
cept the fact that everything which happens comes to pass by 
necessity, we do not really know ana accept God as God. 
Unless we learn to know God as He really is, we cannot attain 
salvation.2 If God is not omnipotent, and if all that He 
wills does not come to pass by necessity, then how can we 
believe His promises? How can we know that He will perform 
and carry out what He promises? 
If, then, we are taught and believe that we ought 
to be ignorant of the necessary foreknowledge of God 
and the necessity of events, Christian faith is 
utterly destroyed, ana the promises of God and the 
whole gospel fall to the ground completely; for the 
Christian's chief and only comfort in every adversity 
lies in knowing that God does not lie, but brings all 
things to pass immutably, and that His will cannot be 
resisted, altered or impeded.3 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 83. Yet note above, p. 91, 
where Luther assumes that the heathen are wholly without 
God's grace . Here he suggests that there is a natural 
revelation of God which man's reason can perceive. Actually, 
Luther's view in his De Servo Arbitrio is usually that of a 
determinist who sees irl acts of the will as determined by 
God or Satan, yet, he maintains that man's will is free in 
the sense that it is uncompelled. (See definition of de-
terminism above p. 4f.) 
2 ~., p. 83. 
3Ibid., p. 84. If one starts with the sovereignty of God, 
as-Luther does, must it inevitably follow that God's will 
cannot be resisted? Is it not possible to argue that men 
have power to resi~t God's will? This is the point which 
Arminius raises, which we shall ·treat in the next chapter . 
99 
Thus, does Luther let God be Godl One must ask, however, 
does his view allow man, created in the image of God, to be 
man with any power whatever to choose what he wills? Luther 
argues that man chooses whatever he wills and desires, but 
what man without the grace of God always chooses is to resist 
.~od and do evil. 1 
Luther's position implies that man inevitably chooses 
sin. The prevalence of sin is a terrifying reality and all 
men do sin. Both Scriptures and human experience testify to 
this. One wonders, however, if Luther's deterministic view, 
that man sins by necessity and that whatever God wills comes 
to pass by necessity, makes adequate provision for man's re-
sponsibility for sin? Would it not be better to maintain 
that it is possible for man not to sin if we wish to teach 
that man, not God, is responsible for sin and evil in the 
world? 
Luther maintains -- in contradiction to Erasmus • appeal 
to the Church, the Pope, and the Fathers as authoritative 
that only the Word of God is authoritative for him.2 Let us 
take a look now at Luther's argument aga inst free will from 
Scriptures. 
1Luther, Works (St. Louis), LI, 57f.; cf. XXIII, 399, 407; 
and Luther, Table Talks, pp. 118, 120, 121. The moot ques-
tion here is: Is man ever without the grace of God except 
when he chooses to repudiate it? 
2Luther, Bondage of the Wil~, p. l09ff. 
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Much of Luther's Biblical evidence against free will, 
though by no means all, is drawn from the letters of St. Paul. 
Chief among the passages selected is the one in which Paul 
quotes from the Psalms . "None is righteous, no not one • • 
• • All have turned aside, together they have gone wrong; 
no one does good, not even one" (Rom. 3:9ff.) . Luther com-
menta: 
Where is 'free-will' now? All Jews and Greeks, he 
says are under sinl Are there any 'figures• or 
'knots• here? What can the whole world's explana-
tion avail against this perfectly clear statement? 
By saying 'all' he excepts none. By describing 
them all as 'under sin', that is, slaves of sin, 
he leaves them no goodness.l 
Luther agrees with Paul (Rom. 3:19) that everyone sins, is 
guilty for his sin, is bound in his sin, and under the judg-
ment of God. 
Let him who dares defend 'free-will' against these 
indictments, and I will gladly give way and recant, 
and be a confessor and asserter of 'free-will' my-
self.2 
According to Luther, Paul leaves no doubt in the mind of 
the reader of Romans about free will when he uses the analogy 
of the potter and the clay, and speaks of God hardening 
Pharoah's heart (Rom. 9:10-24). Furthermore, Luther takes 
this section of Scriptures as 'proof' that God foreknows 
everything that will happen. In fact, Luther argues, every-
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 278. 
2 Ibid. , p. 279. 
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thing that takes place happens in accord with God's will. 1 
Then Luther brings forth an interesting piece of Biblical 
evidence for God's foreknowledge. 
If God foreknew that Judas would be a traitor, Judas 
became a traitor of necessity, and it was not in the 
power of Judas or any other creature to act differently. 
It is true that Judas acted willingly, and not under 
compulsion, but his willing was the work of God, 
brought into being by His omnipotence, like everything 
else . 2 
Luther recognises the fact that his view here implies a 
kind of determinism, because he will not deny his firm belief 
that everything which happens takes place in accord with God's 
will, and, therefore, comes to pass by necessity. No inter-
pretation of Scripture may detract one iota from God's omni-
potence and omniscience . Such powers of God surpass human 
understanding, but to limit God in any way seems to put the 
future of man and the world into the hands of sinful man in-
stead of God's hands. 
Luther continues to point out that if we truly believe 
that God does not err or lie in any way, then, it follows 
that God never errs in His foreknowledge . Therefore, what-
ever God foreknows must come to pass by necessity. This means 
that man does not have a free will. Man's will, according to 
Luther, is always bound to God or Satan, yet at no time does 
Luther want to imply by this view that man is a will-less 
1Luther , Bondage of the Will, p . 212. 
2Ibid. , p. 213. 
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automaton who acts by compulsion. 
The Scriptures are filled with commands and exhortations 
which seem to imply that man has the ability to make a choice. 
Certainly, Luther is not blind to this fact when he writes: 
Why does He command, if all things come to pass by 
necessity? He commands in order to instruct and 
admonish men as to their duty, that they may be 
humbled bl knowing their wickedness, and so arrive 
at grace. 
Erasmus also points out that many passages of Scripture 
imply freedom of the will when they speak about rewards and 
punishments. Can we speak about rewards and punishments at 
all, if man does not have a free will to choose good or evil? 
What then is the meaning of all those scriptures 
which promise the Kingdom and threaten hell? Why 
is the word 'reward' repeated so often in the 
scriptures? (II Chron. 15:7 ••• Gen. 15:1 ••• 
Job 34:11 ••• Rom. 2:7 ••• } The answer is 
that what is established by all these passages is 
simply a consequence of reward, not in any way a 
worthiness of merit.z--
This passage of Luther's contradicts the teachings of Eras-
mus who suggests that if a man can earn no merit in God's 
eyes, then we must discard all teachings of Jesus about reward 
and punishment. But Luther turns this argument around to 
show that if we allow any room at all for merit in man's works, 
then we leave no room for God's grace. 
If 'free-will' merits a 'tiny bit', and grace the 
rest, why does 'free-will' receive the total reward? 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 243; cf. p. l59f. 
2Ibid., p. 183. 
Or shall we suppose that it receives only a tiny 
reward? If there may be room for merit so that 
there may be room for reward, the merit ought to 
be as great as the reward . But why do I waste 
words and time on a thing of naught?l 
103 
It is Luther's contention that the Biblical witness sup-
ports the doctrine of justification by grace alone, without 
any merit or worthiness on man's part. If this is the cen-
tral message of the Bible, then all possibility of human 
merit and reward are wiped out entirely . In matters of re-
demption and salvation, Goa's power works all in all . Thus, 
man may not rob God of the glory rightfully due Him. Merits 
and rewards do not prove 'free-will' for Luther. On the con-
trary, all rewards are in reality the long established promises 
of God. Therefore, Luther asks, how can man merit that lhich 
is already his and has been provided for him since the founda-
tion of the world?2 
Another text which Luther uses to buttress his argument 
against free will is John's record of Jesus• statement: "Apart 
from me you can do nothing" (15:5) . 3 When we compare this 
statement with one of Paul's: "I can do all things in him who 
strengthens me" (Phil. 4:13), we see, suggests Luther, that 
it is God who works all goodness in man . Without God and the 
guidance of His Spirit, man can only sin, because being apart 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will , p . 237. 
2 ~., p. 182f.; cf. Matt. 25:34 . 
3Ibid., pp . 259ff . 
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from God presupposes sin and rebellion against the will of 
God. In this state of sin man can do no good thing until 
God converts and transforms man by His grace. Therefore, 
argues Luther, all glory belongs to God. "For by grace you 
have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, 
it is the gift of God, lest anyman should boast" (Eph. 2:8). 
It has been seen from Luther's argument on the basis of 
Scriptures that he interprets the whole Bible in terms of 
what he believes is the core of the Gospel, which has been 
fully revealed in Jesus Christ; viz., that a man is justified 
and made righteous by the grace of God alone, for Christ's 
sake, and the believer accepts this imputed righteousness 
with the open hand of faith. But, argues Luther, even this 
faith is a gift of God.l 
If Luther is correct in this overall interpretation of 
Scriptures, then it follows that he is bound to assert an 
absolute monergism of grace with respect to man's salvation. 
This argument for a monergistic interpretation of man's con-
version and redemption is conditioned in Luther's ~Servo 
Arbitrio only by the assertion that there is no compulsion and 
God does not work in us without us.2 
Erasmus challenges Luther's and Augustine's interprets-
tion of Scriptures and the idea that God works both good and 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 155. 
2 ~·· p. 268. 
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evil in us and rewards his good works in us and punishes the 
evil ones. Such teaching offends Erasmus' practical approach 
to ethics. In Erasmus' thought, such a view as Luther's im-
plies that man is in no way responsible for the evil he does. 
Such a view will throw morality and common decency to the 
winds. Erasmus agrees that the work of God's grace and man's 
free will is inaeed paradoxical, but for the sake of the common 
people, unsophisticated in theology, we must speak of their 
power of choice and their responsibility for sin lest we open 
the floodgates of immorality and iniquity.l 
Luther retorts that Paul faced the issue of Goa's predes-
tinating will in Romans 9:18-22. Jesus also intimated that 
God chooses whomever He will (Matt. 22:14 and John 13:18). 
Therefore, Erasmus dare not throw out this hard teaching just 
because it does not agree with his powers of reason ana logic. 
We must admit, suggests Luther, that there is a mystery which 
surrounds God's predestinating will which we cannot understand 
or fathom. Only the elect of God believe that God has chosen 
them, and they believe that God is just and good. What right 
has any man to contend with God as to whether His will is just 
or not? 2 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 97. In this passage, Erasmus 
may be likened to Dr. Johnson who said: "All arguments show 
that our wills are bound, but we know that we are free and 
that settles the matter." (Preserved Smith, Erasmus, A Study 
of His Life, Ideals and Place in History, New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1923, p. 336.) Needless to say, such logic 
does not settle the matter for Luthert 
2 Ibid., p. 99f.; cf. Rom. 9:20. 
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Luther goes on to point out that only when man is pro-
perly humbled by the majesty and power of God, and 
realizes that his salvation is utterly beyond his 
own powers, counsels, efforts, will and works, and 
depends absolutely on the will, cou~sel, pleasure 
and work of Another -- God alone --
is he properly humbled and ready to receive God's grace and 
the salvation it brings . On the other hand, so long as man 
thinks that he can make ever so small a contribution toward 
his salvation, he remains proud, and thus incapable of re-
ceiving the grace of God. 2 
Furthermore, God Himself is hidden in His majesty and can 
never be seen by any man except as God chooses to reveal Him-
self to man . This is necessary in order that there might be 
such a thing as faith. 
Now the highest degree of faith is to believe that 
He is merciful, though He saves so few and damns 
so many; to believe that He is just, though of His 
own will He makes us perforce proper subjects for 
damnation and seems (in Erasmus' words) 'to delight 
in the torments of poor wretches and to be a fitter 
object for hate than love .' If I could by any means 
unaerstand how this same God, who makes such a show 
of wrath and unrighteousness, can yet be mesciful 
and just, there would be no need for faith. 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 99f.; cf. Rom. 9:20. 
2Ibid. , p . 100 . Note that here Luther thinks of free will as 
the power of man alone to do good and merit salvation as the 
Pelagians teach. Is it possible to argue that man has power 
to accept or reject what God gives and does, without implying 
merit or suggesting that man does good by himself without the 
grace of God? We shall take up this question when we come to 
the views of Arminius . 
3 Ibid., p. 101 . 
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Alone, man can do nothing whatever in obtaining his 
salvation, but when God sets to work in us, He changes our 
wills, which formerly were set only on sinning, and now are 
destined only to do good. The will of righteous men is not 
under any compulsion to do good, but does good spontaneously 
and of its own desire. 1 
Luther appeals to Luke 11:18-22 to buttress his argument 
that man does not really have a free will in spiritual matters. 
Man without the grace of God, is man in bondage to Satan. 
Satan is the strong man who holds all captive in his palace 
until one stronger than he comes and frees man. The stronger 
one who comes is Christ. He alone overwhelms Satan. Then 
Christ makes us his servants. Like Him, we now become the 
servants of God's will. 
In either case, under Satan's domination or God's, man 
cannot be said to have a free will. A free will implies for 
Luther that man has power to choose whom he will serve. 
Actually, man does not have the power necessary to make such 
a choice. Thus, man is not free. His will is bound either 
to God or to Satan. 
So man's will is like a beast standing between two 
riders. If God rides, it wills and goes where God 
wills; as the Psalm says, 'I am become a beast before 
Thee, and am ever with thee' (Ps. 73:22-23). If 
Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan wills. 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 103. Here Luther maintains 
that the will is uncompelled, yet it is not free. Does not 
such a view pose a contradiction? Is spontaneity of the will 
an illusion? Or is it metaphysically real? Or is the word 
'spontaneity' misused? 
Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, or 
which it will seek; but the riders themselves fight 
to decide who shall have and hold it.l 
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This is , to Luther ' s way of thinking, a logical develop-
ment of the centr al Christian belief that man without the 
grace of God can neither will nor a ccomplish any good thing. 
The will of man without grace is not free at all, but in 
bondage to Satan. The will of man with grace is in bondage 
to God and His will . This is why Luther argues that man has 
no free will . To him the term is a meaningless one and ought 
to be removed from our vocabulary. 2 
Such a position, however, i ndicates that man is nothing 
more than a battleground upon which two cosmic figures, God 
and Satan, fight. Is not man in such a view reduced to the 
level of a thing to be batted back and forth like a ball in a 
tennis match? Does Luther 'prove' that man has no free will, 
or does he 'prove' that man is not even human? 
Such a view is extreme, even for Luther . Therefore, we 
must not let this prejudice us against a complete examination 
of Luther's view of human freedom and bondage. On some occa-
sions in his De Servo Arbitrio, and in other contexts, he 
does seem to allow that man has a will of some sort and is not 
just a thing or an animal . In fact, following his famous 
lines above, he writes: 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 103. 
2Luther, Norks (Philadelphia), III, 110. 
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Note, however, that if we mean by 'the power of free-
will' the power which makes human beings fit subjects 
to be caught up by the Spirit and touched by God's 
grace, as creatures made for eternal life or eternal 
death, we should have a proper definition. And I 
certainly acknowledge the existence of this power, 
this fitness, or 'dispositional quality' and 'passive 
aptitude' (as the Sophists call it), which, as every-
one knows, is not given to plants or animals.l 
To be sure, this does not concede much to man and his 
powers, but it at least recognises that man is something more 
than an animal or a thing which God or Satan push around as 
it suits them. While there does not s eem to be much doubt 
that Luther's view in his De Servo Arbitrio seems wholly deter-
ministic end tends to make man's will practically non-existent; 
in other contexts and writings, Luther seems to give a little 
power to man and his will. We cite the following as evidence. 
For what if some did not believe? God did not give 
His promise in such a way ••• that they [the Jews] 
had to obtain the promise whether they wanted it or 
not. Some did not believe and so did not receive 
the promise. The fault was solely theirs who did not 
desire to obtain the fulfillment of the promise. But 
that did not keep God from being true (feithful).2 
Elsewhere, Luther argues that even Christ could not force the 
Jews to believe in his resurrection.3 He does speak about man 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 105. 
2 Luther, Commentary on Romans , trans. J.T. Mueller (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1954), p. 50. 
3 Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 130; cf. Luther, What Luther 
~. ed. E. M. Plass , II, 605, 606f, 608. Here Luther says 
tnat God's grace is given to all and not just the elect. He 
also says man cannot only reject God's grace, but he can also 
abuse it. He also implies that man is responsible for not 
believing and accepting God's grace offered in Christ. 
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cooperating with God. 1 But in the final analysis, one must 
ask: Do such statements really grant man freedom to choose; 
or is it merely the position of many determinists who argue 
that man has freedom to choose, yet all things come to pass 
by necessity as Luther consistently argues in his De Servo 
Arbitrio? We shall, however, for the purposes of this disser-
tation limit our examination of Luther's concept of human 
bondage and freedom primarily to his De Servo Arbitrio . Here 
Luther points out that man is a passive recipient of God's 
grace and makes no active contribution whatever to his con-
version or salvation. Luther makes it clear that man alone, 
i.e., man without the grace of God, has no power to initiate 
good, please Goa, and merit salvation. On this point, both 
he and Erasmus are agreed.2 
Luther does speak of man cooperating with God when he 
says that God does not work in us without us and that He 
created us in order that He might work in us and we might 
cooperate with Him. 3 However, such cooperation of which 
Luther speaks is not the work of two equal partners . Man is 
never the equal of God, but is and remains His dependent 
creature. Thus, Luther qualifies this notion of cooperation 
in the following way: 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will, p . 268. 
2 Ibia., pp. 137, 145. 
3 ~·· p. 268. 
So, too, I say that man, before he is renewed into 
the new creation of the Spirit's Kingdom, does and 
endeavors nothing to prepare himself for that new 
creation and kingdom and when he is recreated he 
does and endeavors nothing towards his perseverance 
in that kingdom; but the Spirit alone works both 
blessings in us, regenerating us, and preserving us 
when regenerate, without ourselves ••• But He does 
not work in us without us, for He re-created and 
preserves us for this very purpose, that He might 
work in us and we might cooperate with Him. Thus, 
he preaches, shows mercy to the poor, and comforts 
the afflicted by means of us. But what is hereby 
attributed to 'free-will'? What, indeed, is left 
it but --nothing! In truth, nothing1l 
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Luther agrees with Erasmus that man can do good, if it 
is done with the help of God's grace. In fact, there is 
nothing man cannot dow hen God's grace assists him. But, why 
call this free will, asks Luther? Why not attribute it to 
God's grace, since it is He who works this good in us. The 
good we do may not be attributed to the power of man's will 
because man's will without God's grace does nothing but sin. 2 
Luther speaks of cooperation and free will, which implies 
that man is more than a will-less automaton. Free will, for 
Luther, implies that man is a creature fit for God's working 
in and through him. Yet, man alone, i.e., sinful man, who 
will not trust God and look to Him alone for all things need-
ful to life, is bound in sin and remains bound in sin until 
God takes the initiative and by His grace works in man in 
order that man may cooperate with Him and obtain salvation. 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. 268. 
2 Ibid., p. 269. 
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Such statements as these seem to give man a good. deal 
of power and responsibility until we remember that Luther 
qualifies the notion of cooperation to mean that both good 
and evil men cooperate with God, since God alone empowers 
them to act . 
Witn His Spirit He converts them and carries them 
alone , so that we are made to act by Him (see Rom. 
8:14) . When John says: 'to them gave He power to 
become the sons of God' {John 1:12) •• • John is 
not speaking of any work of man, great or small, 
but of the actual renewal and transformation of the 
old man, who is a son of the devil, into the new 
man , who is a son of Goa. In this, man is simply 
passive; he does nothing, but the whole of him 
becomes something . John is speaking of this becom-
ing: He says that we become the sons of God, by a 
power divinely given us - - ~ot by any power of 
' free - will ' inherent in us . 
A little later on Luther adds: 
Christians, however, are made to act, not by 'free-
will ' but by the Spirit of God, as Rom. 8 tells us 
(v . 14); and to be made to act is not to act, but to 
be impelled, as a saw or an axe is made to act by a 
carpenter.2 
Thus, does Luther define cooperation in a monergistic 
way. One must ask: wbat meaning does the term cooperation 
have , when it is defined and limited in such a way as Luther 
defines and limits it in his De Servo Arbitrio? 
The real issue for Luther in his debate with ~rasmus is 
the meaning of the term "free will" itself . Erasmus means by 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will, p . 187. 
2 Ibid., p . 189. 
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free will a power of the human will by which a man may apply 
himself to those things whi ch lead to eternal salvation, or 
turn away from the same . l 
Luther defines free will in his De Servo Arbitrio as the 
power of man to choose and accomplish anything he wills to 
do . 2 It seems obvious to Luther that such freedom may only 
be ascribed to God. Therefore, to ascribe it to man is the 
same as ascribing divinity itself to man and that is blas-
phemy. 3 It is true that God gave man the power of free will 
in things that are under his dominion, but with regard to 
spiritual matters, man has no free will, since all depends 
upon God's grace . 4 Man alone, i . e . , man without the grace of 
God, is a sinful man who is bound in sin and can do no good 
thing coram deo . Coram homnibus man has freedom to do what 
he wills with what is his own . 
It is clear that Luther invariably interprets free will 
primarily as the power to do anything one wills . Free will 
is wholly free, arbitrary power, which is unlimited in any 
way . This, Luther believes, is what Pelagius meant by free 
will, i . e., the power of man to do anything he wills without 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will , p . 137. As we shall see, this 
definition is close to the position which Arminius takes 
with regard to free will; cf., our definition of natural 
freedom. See above p . 4 . 
2 Ibid., pp . 105, 137 . 
3Ibid., p. 137. 
4~. , p . 107; cf. p. 265 . 
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God's grace and so merit salvation by means of his own good 
worKs . l As far as he is concerned, this is the kind of free 
will Erasmus is propounding . Thus, he firmly and finally 
repudiates it as contrary to all the Scriptures teach. 2 
Luther aamits that Erasmus may be correct in allowing 
that man has a will of some sort, but to call it free is 
more than Luther will allow . 3 The reason Luther wants to 
get rid of the term free will is primarily a practical one, 
viz . , it deludes people into thinking that they have more 
power than is actually the case . Luther suggests that : 
The term 'free-will' is too gr andiose and comprehen-
sive and fulsome . People think it means what the 
natural force of the phrase would require, namely a 
power of freely turning in any direction, yielding 
to none and subject to none . If they knew that this 
was not so , and that the term signifies only a tiny 
lLuther , Bondage of the Will , p . 154 ff.; of . p . 292 ff . 
2Here is the real root of the controversy between Luther and 
Erasmus . We must ask: ~xactly what power does man's will 
have, and what power does God ' s grace have with respect to 
man's salvation? According to Richter, Luther distorts the 
true teaching of the Church by seeing it as Pelagian in na-
ture . Actually, Pelagianism was condemned by the Church as 
heretical in 418 at the Council of Carthage and again in 529 
at the Council of Orange . (See Fr iedrich Richter, Martin 
Luther and Ignatius Loyola , trans . L.F. Zwinger, Westminster, 
Maryland: The ~ewman Press, 1960, p . 81.) Luther always in-
sists that the interaction of God's ~race and man's will in 
the matter of salvation is an either/or proposition, while 
Erasmus and the semi-Pelagians insist that it is a both/and 
proposition. Precisely what part God's grace and man's will 
play in salvation will be examined in a later chapter. 
3Luther , Bondage of the Will , p . 137 . 
spark of power, and that utterly ineffective, in 1 itself, since it is the devil's prisoner and slave. 
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Luther never spells out what a tiny spark of power we actually 
do have, unless he mi ght mean the power of free will we have 
over things under us. Yet, even here, whatever man wills or 
does, happens only if God wills that it should happen. There 
is no compulsion here, but all things happen of necessity.2 
Man does have free will with regard to money and possessions . 
Yet, even here man's tiny spark of free will is "overruled by 
the free will of God alone, according to His own pleasure."3 
It seems clear, then, that when Luther speaks of free will, 
he means only the experience which man has in spending his 
money for this object rather than that. Man also chooses to 
eat and drink or not, beget children or not, etc.; but, ulti-
mately, even this 'freedom' is subject to God's overruling 
which seems to necessitate all things that happen in both the 
natural and the spiritual realm. Thus, the position which 
Luther assumes in his De Servo Arbitrio, if it is carried out 
to its logical conclusion in a way that Lu ther refuses to do, 
is clearly that of a theological determinist, who argues that 
all things happen by necessity; yet man's will is not compelled 
to act differently than it chooses to act. However, whatever 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 105. 
2 Ibid., p. 265. 
3 Ibid., p. 107. 
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it chooses is predetermined by the will of God . 
Luther and Erasmus agree that once man sins, his will 
is so depraved that it loses its freedom to do good and is 
forced to s erve sin and cannot change itself in any way by 
any power of its own . 1 From this position of Erasmus, which 
Luther always reminds him of, it is clear that Erasmus is 
not a Pelagian who believes that man can, of his own power, 
will and do good and so merit salvation. Man's will without 
the grace of Goa cannot do anything good . Yet, Erasmus will 
not agree with Luther in asserting that man has no free will 
at all . It is for this reason that Luther argues that Eras-
mus' position is worse than that of Pelagius because it 
falsely affirms both salvation by grace and by the free will 
of man . 2 Does this not mean that Erasmus is trying to preserve 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will , p . 145. 
2Ibid. , p . 293. Luther says: "They [Erasmus and the Scholas-
tics] ••• are worse than the Pelagians on two counts . In 
the first place, the Pelagians confess and assert condign 
merit straight forwardly , candidly and honestly, calling a 
spade a spade and teaching what they really hold . But our 
friends here who hold and teach the same view, try to fool 
us with lying words ••• giving out that they disagree with 
the Pelagians, when there is nothing they are further from 
doing! • • • Then , in the second place, this hypocrisy of 
theirs results in their ••• seeking to purchase the grace 
of God at a much cheaper rate than the Pelagians. The latter 
assert • • • we obtain grace • • • by efforts and works that 
are ••• many and mighty; but our friends here tell us that 
it is by something very small, ••• that we merit grace . " 
Luther here makes it clear that grace and free will are 
mutually exclusive . We ask: are grace and free will mutually 
exclusive? Or is it the case that salvation by grace alone 
or by the merit of man are antithe tical to each other? We 
shall treat this problem more fully later . 
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man's essential or natural freedom to accept or reject God's 
proffered grace? Or does it mean that man is capable of 
saving hir self by the power of his own will? Is a middle 
position of God's grace and man's free will as cooperating 
agents in salvation possible t ·o maintain? This is the cen-
tral point at issue between Luther and Erasmus. 
Luther takes seriously the contention that salvation 
comes by the grace of God alone. Erasmus sees that such a 
contention, when taken seriously, reduces man to a puppet; 
and man is left with no real freedom at all. This fact does 
not seem to bother Luther since he contends (Acts 7:51; 13:46 
notwithstanding) that man cannot resist God and His will be-
cause He works all in all in both good and evil men.l 
Yet, there is no doubt in Luther 's mind that the Jews 
on countless occasions resisted the work of the Holy Spirit .2 
He also admits that no one can be forced to believe against 
his will. 
He (Stephen] says that they (the Jews] do resist, 
though they could not resist ••• [Stephen also 
said,] 'They could not resist the spirit and wisdom 
with which he spake' (Acts 6:10). But what did 
they do? Yield? Not Maddened by mortification at 
their being worsted, and by their own ability to 
resist, they shut their ears and eyes and suborned 
false witnesses against him (6:llf . ).3 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will , p. 130; cf. pp. 83ff. and 199. 
2Ibid., p . 129. 
3~., p. l30f. 
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Luther argues on the basis of this evidence from Scrip-
ture that when people actually resist the gospel, it only 
shows their inability to resist . Thus, their resistance is 
a confession that they are wrong, but they will not admit it. 
Such resistance by sinners of the gospel is 'proof' that "we 
are under the dominion of evil spirits and are hardened in 
our very blindness, fast bound in a da rkness that is no more 
human but devilish!"1 
Later, Luther argues that unless God's Spirit comes to 
those who are bound in sin, they are simply lost and condemned 
creatures.2 But we must ask, what good does it do for God's 
Spirit to come to those who resist when apparently it is 
God's will that they resist in order that He may harden their 
heart and condemn them? On the other hand, the godly are 
God's elect; and if they err, it is for the purpose of making 
God's power manifest through their weakness. 3 
The strange thing about Luther's argument here is that 
he admits that Satan can and does effectively resist the 
Word of God. In fact, if he did not, the whole world would 
immediately be converted. 4 If Satan, who is a fallen creature 
of God, has power to resist God, does this mean that Satan is 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p. l3lf. 
2~ •• p . 132. 
3Ibid., p. 133. 
4Ibid., p . 134. 
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not under the dominion of God and so has a free will and is 
equal to God? Furthermore, if one creature has actual power 
to resist God, is it impossible to conceive that other crea-
tures may enjoy the same freedomf Or is it that Satan, who 
is a fallen angel, is qualitatively different from men? 
Actually, we must see here Luther's dualistic view. On 
the one hand, there is the spiritual realm, where God is abso-
lute sovereign Lord of all and man has no free will when it 
comes to getting himself into a right relationship with God. 
In this ~ingdom or realm, man is led by the sole counsel and 
will of God. In the earthly kingdom or realm, however, God 
has given man dominion over the earth and all things on it. 
Here, Luther says, God has not hedged man in with a lot of 
laws and commands. Thus, man enjoys free will, i.e., the 
power to do whatever he wills with all that is under him. 
To be sure, even here, God does not leave man alone, but 
cooperates with him.l 
Thus, does God let Satan and man act as if they had 
perfectly free wills. To all intents and purposes, it really 
seems as if Satan is in actual control of the earth, because 
it is he who controls the wills of sinfulrnen who are without 
the grace of God. But ultimately God is in control and will 
bring Satan's reign to an end when God chooses to bring an 
end to this age and usher in His own eternal Kingdom. 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will, p. 150. 
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Another aspect of this dualistic view of Luther appears 
in the fact that, on the one hand, God wills that all shall 
be saved; but, on the other hand, He also wills that some 
should be conde~~ed. 1 Just why this is so, man cannot under-
stand or explain . In a sense, God is almost two entirely 
different beings. On the one hand, he is merciful and chooses 
to reveal Himself as such in Jesus Christ. This is the ~ 
revelatus. On the other hand, there is the deus absconditus, 
who can never be known by man and ought not be sought out 
because He has willed that He should not be known in His ma-
jesty. The former manifests His grace, mercy and forgiveness 
in Jesus Christ and wills that all should be saved. The latter 
chooses not to reveal His will to us and manifests Himself in 
wrath by bringing to man death and destruction. 
He (God] desired that all men should be saved, in 
that He comes to all by the word of salvation and 
the fault is in the will which does not receive 
Him; as He says in Matt. 23: 'How often would I 
have gathered thy children together, and thou 
wouldest nott (v.37) . But why the Majesty {of God] 
does not remove or change this fault of will in 
every man (for it is not in the power of man's will 
to do it ), or why He lays this fault to the charge 
of the will, when man cannot avoid it, it is not 
lawful to ask; and though you should ask much, you 
would never find out; as Paul says in Rom. : 2 •Who art thou who repliest against God?' (9:20). 
Thus does Luther settle the problem by quoting Scripture . 
Scriptures are the final authority, and if reason cannot agree, 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 202; cf. p . 199. 
2 Ibid. , p . 171; cf . p. 175ff. 
then reason must bow to authority - - the authority of the 
Bible which is the inspired Word of God. 1 
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For Luther, the doing of good works is solely the work 
of God which occurs after unregenerate and sinful man is 
ca~ght up by the Holy Spirit and freed from sin's bondage. 
Willing and doing the good have nothing to do with sinful 
man's justification, but are the fruits of God's work in 
man after regeneration. 
Furthermore, and most important for Luther, is the fact 
that the really good act is one which is not done for the 
sake of reward, merit or self justification. Such actions 
are the height of sinful ego-centricity as far as Luther is 
concerned. Rather, the really good act is one which is done 
to the glory of God and in accord with His will. 2 It is in 
his concept of Christian freedom that Luther develops this 
idea most thoroughly. Therefore, we shall turn to Luther's 
discussion of Christian liberty. 
5 . The Freedom of the Christian Man 
Christian freedom, as Luther sees it, is quite distinct 
from political, social, psychological, or any other kind of 
human freedom. Like bondage in sin, it can only be understood 
coram deo . Thus, human bondage and freedom are framed in 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will, p . l23ff. 
2rbid. , p . 1s2 . 
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theological language by Luther and always oriented around 
God.l A man may be a domestic slave and yet enjoy Christian 
liberty. A man's social, political, economic, or racial 
status has nothing whatever to do with his freedom in Christ. 
Christian freedom comes solely by means of faith and trust 
in God's gracious act in Jesus Christ -- trust in a God who 
freely forgives man's sin. Therefore, unlike other kinds of 
freedom, it cannot be won by human struggle or political 
revolution. It can only be accepted when one ceases to strug-
gle and freely chooses to submit to God in complete faith 
and trust. It is for this reason that Berdyaev says: 
Freedom of the will as an element of mental life by 
which a man chooses good or evil and is thus respon-
sible, is mistaken •••• Man ought to feel free 
when he no longer needs to remain in indecision, but 
has made a choice. Freedom of the will is not crea-
tive; it keeps man in perpetual fear. Luther's idea 
of Christian freedom is correct. True freedom comes 
through grace, not through free will.2 
Once man has chosen to surrender himself to God in free 
and willing obedience to His Spirit, he is as free as he can 
ever be. When a man submits in faith and complete trust in 
the grace of Goa revealed in Jesus Christ, he need no longer 
be concerned about his ultimate destiny, fulfilling the law, 
doing good works, winning God's favor or earning his salvation . 
The Christian msn is free to do as he pleases because he has 
1 Gordon Rupp, op. cit., p . 201 . 
~icholas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (London: Centenary 
Press, 1945), p . 79. 
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already chosen to do what pleases God. Just as life itself 
is a gift which man did not earn or work for, so too eternal 
life is a gift from God . To be forever in doubt about one's 
origin, place, purpose, and destiny in the world leads to 
anxiety and utter purposelessness. Luther's concept of Chris-
tian freedom releases man from anxiety, fear, doubt, and 
purposelessness -- from the nagging problems and doubts which 
surround him in his finitude. Fear of death is dissolved in 
the promise of immortality. Anxiety over a seemingly hostile 
world in whichman is alone, powerless, and friendless is 
removed by faith in a benevolent God revealed in Jesus Christ. 
Despair which comes through utter moral ineptitude in attain-
ing the perfection of which man dreams is alleviated by the 
knowledge that God accepts sinners and redeems them and makes 
them new men who shall attain the perfection about which they 
otherwise can only dream. Does such a sense of security come 
at the price of submission to an authoritarian God who 
destroys man's freedom and integrity? Or does it come as a 
gift from a God who wills only that "we might have life, and 
have it more abundantly" (John 10:10)? These are questions 
which Luther's teachings on man's freedom and bondage pose. 
Luther sets forth his idea of Christian freedom in the 
following way. Man has a two-fold nature; namely, an inner 
or spiritual one, and an outer or bodily one.l The inner man 
1Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 313. 
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is created by faith in God's grace alone. Physical condi-
tions, riches or poverty, imprisonment or freedom, food or 
fasting do not affect tne state of the inner man, or man's 
soul as it is occasionally called. Here only one thing is 
important, and t hat i s the word of God. Without t he word of 
God, the soul loses its freedom, its righteousness, and its 
life. For Luther, the word of God is often equated with 
Christ, who is the resurrection and the life; He is the rave-
lation of God's righteousness which justifies and redeems 
sinners; He is the Man who alone can set men free from bondage 
to sin. 
The Nord is the Gospel of God concerning His Son who 
was made flesh, suffered, rose from the dead. • • • 
To preach Christ means to feed the soul, to make it 
righteous, to set it free and to save it, if it be-
lieve the preaching.l 
Only faith can receive the Word of God. Only faith can 
accept Jesus Christ as Savior, Therefore, only faith can 
justify. Before God (coram~), no one can be called 
righteous save him who believes and accepts God's grace and 
mercy revealed in Jesus Christ. No outward work is capable 
of either condemning or justifying the inner man. 2 Only 
faith can save and unbelief condemn. It is for this reason 
that the law and works of righteousness avail nothing . Such 
1Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 315 . 
2 Ibid., p. 316. 
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a view leads Luther where it led Paul before him, to the con-
clusion that the Christian man is free from the law . 
1 . Freedom from the Law 
For Luther, the scriptures are divided into commands 
and promises, or what are sometimes called Law and Gospel.l 
The commands of God are good because they teach us the will 
of God. Thus, in this sense, the law is good because it 
makes God's will clear. It is, however, the law and commands 
of God which make it plain how impotent man is to fulfill 
God's will and do the good . The law shows man what he ought 
to do, but it does not give him power to carry it out. The 
result is that the law convicts man of sin, and man despairs 
of his ability to fulfill God's will . Luther learned this 
through his own bitter experience in the monastery even as 
Paul had learned it as a Pharisee . For Luther, the law is 
an integral part of God's preparation of the sinner for sal-
vation. Luther calls this God's alien work that drives the 
sinner to despair of himself and his puny efforts to make 
himself righteous and acceptable to a holy God who demands 
perfection. With all his might and power of will Luther 
strived to fulfill the law's demands . However, he failed to 
satisfy the Law's demands . This was God's way of driving 
Luther to despair of ever justifying himself in God's eyes. 
Luther soon discovered that he had to confess spiritual bank-
lLuther, Works, (Philadelphia), II, 317. 
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ruptcy before God. Thus, God had broken Luther's sinful 
pride and ego-centric will and prepared him for the recep-
tion of grace freely offered in the Gospel which is an 
integral part of God's proper work. At the moment of 
despair the Spirit of God came to Luther in the proclamation 
of the Gospel to offer him free and full forgiveness of all 
his sins -- a gift that all his works and efforts of will 
could never earn or merit. 
In this moment of repentance and surrender, God takes 
over and enables man to respond to and accept God's grace 
freely offered in Christ.l All of this is accomplished by 
the prevenient grace of God at work in the l aw. Thus does 
God always take the initiative in redeeming man from sin, 
death, and the power of Satan. 
It is when the promise or Gospel brings release from 
the despair of trying to fulfill the Law that salvation 
begins. If a man cannot fulfill all the commands of God, 
and Luther's experience proved that he could not, then the 
Law becomes man's enemy because it condemns him. Try as he 
might, he cannot save himself by obedience to the Law. He 
is lost and condemned and without hope until he hears the 
Gospel proclaimed and believes God's gracious ~ift of for-
giveness in Jesus Christ, who perfectly fulfills the whole 
will and law of God. For the man who believes and clings to 
lvernon L. Strempke, op. cit., p. 339. 
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Christ's righteousness alone is made righteous by his faith . 
This, then is how through faith alone without works 
the soul is justified by the word of God, sanctified, 
made true, peaceful, and free, filled with every 
blessing and made truly a child of God. 
This means that the law was given for sinful man, and not for 
the man made righteous by his faith in Christ. The Christian 
who is made righteous does not need the law because he does 
spontaneously more than the law demands . 2 
But, because the outer man is recalcitrant, he needs the 
law to prod him into doing the will of God.3 Only those who 
do what the law demands without any prodding whatever are 
truly spiritual . A true Christian is obedient to the law 
not because the law demands it, but because he believes 
God's work and trusts His promises . If he does not believe 
God's word and promises, all his works are wicked because 
they are done for the wrong reason, that is to earn salva-
tion instead of seeking to please and glorify God alone. 
Trust in God's word and promises makes the righteousness 
of Christ the property of the beli ever . By faith, a man is 
1Luther, Works {Philadelphia), II, 318 . 
2Luther, The Sacred and Precious Writings of Martin Luther, 
trans . John ~ . Lenker (Minneapolis: Lutherans in All Lands 
Co . , 1904), IV, 76. 
3Ibid., p . 78 . Note that this idea of Luther's and the one 
immediately preceding it are part of his overall dualistic 
view of God and the world, inner and outer man, Gospel and 
Law, Spirit and flesh, etc. Luther does not attempt to 
harmonize this dualism. He is content simply to recognize 
that this is how things are with God and man. 
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united with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom 
(Eph. 5:3lf.). He therefore takes the bride's imperfections 
upon himself and makes them his own.l Furthermore, he gives 
the bride all that is his own, namely, His righteousness and 
perfection. Then the sinner can boast only in Christ's 
righteousness acquired for him and not in his own. 
The First Commandment demands faith and trust in God 
alone above all things. Thus, only faith and trust in God's 
promises given in His work glorifies him alone. To seek jus-
tification and salvation through the works of the law is an 
abomination unto God, because it does not allow God to be God, 
and therefore, breaks the First Commandment. When a man puts 
his faith and trust for his salvation in his own works, he 
dishonors God and treats Him like a huckster who must be 
bribed into carrying out his gracious promise of forgiveness 
and mercy in Jesus Christ. If righteousness comes by the 
works of the law, then Christ and His work are cast aside. 
Without Christ there can be no righteousness in any man. 2 
"For if righteousness come by the law, then Christ died in 
v a in'' ( Gal. 5: 21 ) • 
As Paul puts it: 
We ••• know that a man is not justified by the works 
of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ •••• We 
have believed in Christ Jesus, in order to be justified 
lLuther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 321. 
2Luther, Commentary on Galatians, p. 279. 
,. 
by faith in Christ, and not by the works of the 
law, because by the works of the law shall no one 
be justified (Gal. 2:15-16). 
Luther comments: 
This is the true meaning of becoming a Christian, 
even to be justified by faith in Jesus Christ, and 
not by the works of the law. Here we must stand, 
not upon the wicked gloss of the schoolmen, which 
say, that faith then justifiefh, when charity and 
good works are joined withal. 
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It is faith in Christ that makes man "a free lord of 
all, subject to none.tt2 Faith in Christ makes the believer 
a co-heir with Him of God's Kingdom and a true son of God 
who may share the riches of God's grace with Christ. We are, 
through Christ's righteousness, sons who are freed from the 
necessity of doing the Father's will in an effort to gain 
his good favor and blessed promises. His promises are rea-
lized by all who accept Jesus Christ, God's Son, as their 
Savior. Freed from the necessity of doing good works in the 
eyes of God to earn His favor, the Christian man is put in 
the position of being really free to do good works out of a 
sense of gratitude to God and in the service of his fellow 
men. 
ii. Freedom to Do Good Works 
Just what is it that constitutes a good work in Luther's 
thought? 
lLuther, Commentary on Galatians, p. 241. 
2Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 312. 
Works and ceremonies are done in faith and love, 
where they are not done from any constraining 
necessity, nor because they are commanded, but 
when they are done in freedom of spirit.l 
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However, according to Luther, man is not, and can never 
be wholly spiritual so long as he is in the body. 2 Thus, man 
still needs the law as a schoolmaster to teach him the will 
of God. Ideally, the Christian man is above the law because 
he is guided by the Spirit . But, because he is still in the 
body, his flesh forever wars with the Spirit of God; and the 
Spirit constantly struggles to win mastery over the flesh . 3 
Man is saint and sinner at one and the same time because he 
is flesh and spirit at one and the same time. 
By doing good works the inner man tries to get the outer 
man to conform to the spirit of Goa. The inner man, who is 
in a right relationship with God through faith, drives the 
outer man to do good works in loving and grateful obedience 
to God. 4 Thus , Christian liberty can never become lis ence 
to do as one pleases, and that is why "the Christian man is 
a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all . "5 
1Gordon Rupp , op . cit . , p. 231 . 
2Luther , Works (Philadelphia), II , 327 . 
3we remind the reader that body to Luther does not mean simply 
body, but includes mind, or what is sometimes called soul, 
as well . See above p . 93ff. 
4Luther, orks (Philadelphia), II , 329 . 
5 Ibid., p . 312. 
Luther emphasizes that "good works do not make a man 
good, but a gooa man does good works."l He continues: 
No good works help an unbeliever, so as to justify 
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or save him. And, on the other hand, no evil works 
make him wicked or damn him, but the unbelief which 
makes the person • • • evil, does the evil and damna-
ble works. 2 
iii . Freedom to serve the Neighbor 
If a man holds to any form of works-righteousness in his 
theology, then loving one's neighbor is reduced to a means of 
working out one's own salvation. In this way the neighbor is 
reduced to a thing, a means to man's own end of earning salva-
tion by doing good to his neighbor. Thus, alms - giving becomes 
good because it makes the giver good. Helping the neighbor 
is good, because it wins God's favor and earns God's grace. 
The Christian man, however, is freed from the necessity of 
making himself look good in the eyes of God; thus he can con-
centrate on loving the neighbor for the neighbor's sake in-
stead of making the neighbor a means to earning his own sal-
vation. Loving and serving the neighbor for himself makes 
the neighbor an end in himself . Luther's doctrine of justi-
fication by the grace of God through faith frees him to serve 
his neighbor in love for the neighbor's own sake. 
Therefore, in all his works, he [the Christian man] 
should be guided by this thought and look to this 
one thing alone, that he may benefit others in all 
1Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 331. 
2 Ibid., p. 332. 
that he does, having regard to nothing except the 
need and aavantage of his neighbor. 
132 
If love is geared only to the neighbor's welfare, what 
place does self-love play in Luther's view? Ac cording to 
Luther, duties toward self can only be justified in keeping 
the self fit to serve the neighbor's needs. All self-love 
and duties to the self for the sake of the self are r uled 
out . 2 Such a view seems to reduce the Christian to a thing, 
a means to the neighbor ' s end. 
Yet in fairness to Luther's view, we must point out that 
he does not advocate self-annihilation any more than Jesus 
did. Here the example of J esus is apropos. He had every 
right to claim honor and glory for himself because he was 
chosen to be the Christ, the Son of the living God. Yet, he 
chose, in accora with the will of God, to become the perfect 
1Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II , 335. It is at this point 
that a very controversial point in ethics is raised. Luther, 
who identifies self-love with sinful ego-centricity seems to 
leave no room for any kind of self-love . For a full discussion 
of this problem see Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. 
Philips. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press , 1953}, pp. 
709-716; George W. Forell, Faith Action in Love (New York: 
The American Press, 1954), p . 93ff . ; Paul Tillich, Love, 
Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press;-1954}, 
p . 34ff . ; Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, l952), p . 99ff . ; Karl Schmidt, £E· 
cit., p . 50ff . ; and Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1956) , p . 6lff . Let it suffice at this 
point to state that Luther tends to define self-love as self-
centered ego-centricity incurvatus in se which is the essence 
of sin, i.e . , the opposite of thee-centrism which faith in 
God demands. 
2Gordon Rupp, op . cit., p . 203f . 
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servant of all. He stooped to serve sinners and redeem the 
outcasts -- those unworthy to loosen his sandal straps. He 
did this because this was the will of God and what the love 
and Spirit of God demanded of him. He did not think of him-
self first, or even worry about how much he should love him-
self. He sought first and foremost to do the will of God 
(John 4:34) . And it was God's will that he should serve the 
neighbor in love. 1 Like Christ, Christians freely choose to 
do the will of God, humble themselves, forget about them-
selves and become the servant of the neighbor in need. Yet, 
this in no wise annihilates the self. On the contrary, it 
fulfills the self (John 10:10). And this is what it means to 
find one's life by losing it (Matt . 10:39). If Jesus had not 
so humbled himself, he would never have been exalted as Lord 
above all {Phil. 2:5-ll). Therefore, since Christ Jesus is 
the ideal man, it follows that his followers discover that 
self-fulfillment comes to those who seek it least. In fact, 
it can only come in free and willing service to the neighbor 
without thought for the self. For the moment a man seeks to 
fulfill himself in the service of his neighbor he does not 
truly love the neighbor in the same way as God loved him in 
Christ. 
1Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 33f. 
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This is precisely why a Christian man, unlike any 
other who is not justified by faith in Christ, is free to 
serve the neighbor for the sake of the neighbor. A Chris-
tian man ought to think thus: 
Though I am an unworthy and condemned man, my God 
has given me in Christ all His riches and righteous-
ness and salvation without any merit on my part, 
out of pure, free mercy, so that henceforth I need 
nothing whatever except faith which believes that 
this is true . Why should I not therefore freely, 
joyfully, with all my heart, and with an eager will, 
do all things which I know are pleasing and accepta-
ble to such a Father, Who has overwhelmed me with 
His inestimable riches . I will therefore give myself 
as a Chris t to my neighbor, just as Christ offered 
Himself to me; I will do nothing in this life except 
what I see is necessary, profitable and salutary to 
my neighbor, since through fafth I have an abundance 
of all good things in Christ . 
Thus, for Luther: 
A Christian man lives not in himself, but in Christ 
and in his neighbor •••• He lives in Christ through 
faith, and in his neighbor through love; by faith he 
is caught up beyond himself into God, by love he 
sinks down beneath himself into his neighbor . 2 
Luther combines two seemingly contradictory statements 
into a meaningful Christian paradox, when he says: "A Chris-
tian man is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none • 
• • • A Christian man is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, 
subject to all."3 For Luther, faith is a busy, active thing 
that cannot rest content until it has shared the love of God 
1Luther, Works (Philadelphia), II, 337f . 
2Ibid. , p . 338 . 
3 Ibid. , p . 312 . 
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which it has received in Christ, by loving the neighbor who 
is in need . To preserve these paradoxical statements is 
essential to a Christian understanaing of ethics. 
6 . Summary 
God created man in His image . This means for Luther 
that man is qualitatively different from the animals and has 
a God-given capacity for eternal fellowship with his Creator. 
Luther manifests some ambiguity concerning man's essential 
goodness and man's reason. However, his position makes it 
clear that both Scripture and human experience teach that all 
men since Adam's fall into sin have no free will in spiritual 
matters . 
Luther sees man primarily as a dependent creature of God . 
However, this dependent creature becomes dissatisfied with 
his dependency and rebels against God by seeking independence 
and freedom from God. In this way Adam fell into sin, and all 
men since Adam are sinners by nature . 
Sin, for Luther, is not so much a matter of wrong acts, 
as it is a matter of unbelief . The essence of sin in his 
view is breaking the first commandment by refusing to acknow-
ledge God as God and neglecting to trust in Him alone for all 
things needful for life. Such sinful rebellion effectively 
separates man from God . 
Having lost this relationship with God in Adam's fall, 
man comes under the domination of Satan. Thus, man has no 
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free will because he is either given grace to do good and is 
bound to God's will, or he is without grace and is bound to 
the will of Satan . In this way Luther seeks to repudiate 
all free will in man coram deo. 
Luther attempts to drive home the truth of his concept 
of bondage in sin, which denies free will, by these basic 
arguments: First, God is omnicompetent, omniscient, omnipo-
tent. Therefore, whatever comes to pass, happens by the 
necessitating will of God and nothing is contingent upon 
man's free will . Second, the Scriptures, which are the sole 
authority in matters of faith and doctrine, clearly teach 
that all men sin, and by sin come under the dominion and con-
trol of Satan . Therefore, the will which is in bondage to 
Satan is not free . Third, man is powerless to escape this 
bondage. God's commands (law) teach us how impotent we are 
and drive us to despair of ourselves in order that we might 
be saved by the grace of God alone . Salvation by grace 
alone precludes free will in the matter of salvation. Thus 
Luther contends that coram deo, free will is a meaningless 
term and ought to be discarded by theologians. 
Not only does Luther repudiate Pelagius and his teaching 
that man is free to will and do the good without the grace of 
God, but he also rejects the middle way of Erasmus which 
ascribes much to God's grace and only a little bit to man's 
free will . Salvation for Luther cannot be described in syner-
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gistic terms, but only in monergistic terms because God does 
all that is necessary for our salvation. Man is simply the 
passive recipient of all God does in and for him. Even faith, 
which man must have to accept and appropriate God's gifts, 
is the gift of God. 
Luther does, however, speak of a spark of freedom in 
man . Yet in his De Servo Arbitrio his predominant view is 
consistently that of a theological determinist, who argues 
against compulsion, but for all things happening by necessity. 
Thus, terms like cooperation and free will are always defined 
in a deterministic fashion and do not seem to make adequate 
provision for man's natural freedom . 
Likewise, when Luther speaks of man resisting the work 
of the Holy Spirit, he undercuts man's ability to resist by 
insisting that he cannot resist God . In fact, such resistance 
is simply the indication of man's bondage t o the demonic 
forces which dominate him. 
Luther does admit that Satan has power to resist the 
work of God's Spirit effectively . This real power given to 
Satan is part of Luther's dualistic view of the two realms. 
In the heavenly realm God is wholly sovereign, but in the 
earthly realm man has dominion over all things under him. 
Therefore, since Satan is sovereign over all things in the 
earthly realm and man is bound to him, all men resist God 
because they are actually ruled by Satan. 
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Part of this dualistic view is the two-sidedness of God 
and His will . ~he God revealed in Christ is merciful and 
wills the salvation of men . But the God who is hidden, be-
cause He does not choose ~ reveal Himself in His Majesty, 
wills the death and destruction of sinners. Why God should 
condemn sinners and hold them responsible for their sins when 
they cannot avoid sinning is a question for which we can never 
get an answer . Therefore , it would be better if we did not 
ask the question . Luther finds this concept of God to be 
consistent with the Biblical revelation of God. The Bible 
is the final authority in these matters, and reason, if it is 
unsatisfied, must simply bow to Biblical authority. 
In this way Luther defends a monergistic view of salva-
tion . He insists that the commands of God do not imply power 
to do them. Commands and imperatives simply show man his 
duty and make clear to him his impotence to do good without 
grace . Only when man in humi l ity recognizes his own impo-
tence and despairs of his ability to do what God commands , 
is he ready to receive God's grace, which alone brings sal-
vation . 
Similarly, all talk of reward and merit is misleading, 
since man cannot in any way deserve or merit that which God 
has promised him and provided for him from the foundation of 
the world. Furthermore, what God has promised He delivers, 
since He cannot lie . He promises and gives man salvation by 
His grace delivered in Jesus Christ, and such salvation by 
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grace alone precludes merit of any kind. 
In his "Treatise on Christian Liberty" Luther affirms 
that the only freedom the Christian man can Anow and have 
is obtained by faith in God and glad submission to His will. 
Sinful man is sinful precisely because he will not trust in 
God and submit to His will. It is at this point that the 
law of God comes to reveal man's real condition to him. The 
law leads man to despair of ever being able perfectly to ful-
fill the whole will and law of God. Self-salvation on the 
basis of doing the works of the law becomes an impossibility. 
In his monastery experience the law led Luther to despair and 
spiritual bankruptcy. Such alien work of God is actually the 
prevenient work of grace which prepares man for God's proper 
work through the Gospel. Here salvation comes by faith in a 
forgiving God, revealed by Christ, who does not condemn man 
estranged by sin, but heals and restores him to a right rela-
tionship with God. It is faith in this gracious God and His 
deed in Christ, and not in the effort of man's will, that 
frees man from the demonic destructiveness of his own autono-
mous will, which is in rebellion against God and actually 
serving Satan. 
The law is man's enemy in so far as it reveals the wrath 
of a righteous God who cannot abide sin in His presence. But 
the Gospel shows us that this same God does not will condem-
nation for sinners, but demonstrates his righteousness in 
love which forgives sinners. 
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On the other hand, the law is man's friend in so far as 
it constantly prods man; and even the forgiven sinner needs 
the law as a schoolmaster to make him conscious of sin and 
lead him to daily repentance and renewed effort toward right-
eous living. 
According to Luther, however, grace frees man from the 
necessity of doing the works of the law in order to merit 
salvation. Having been saved by the grace of God, man's de-
sire for self-salvation is undercut. Realizing that he is 
already saved by his faith in a gracious God revealed in 
Christ, the Christian man, in sheer gratitude for what God 
has done for him in Christ, freely and gladly does good works 
because it is God's will, and it rightly glorifies God. 
Freed from the necessity of doing good works in order to 
save one's own soul, the Christian can love as God loves. 
This means that be can love his neighbor for the neighbor's 
sake and not simply do good for the neighbor in order to earn 
his own salvation. In this way the neighbor is never thought 
of as a means to an end, viz., man's salvation, but he is an 
end in himself. Man is free to be good as God is good and to 
do good and to love without an ulterior motive. In fact, 
God's love manifested to him in Christ dwells in his heart 
and pours out through him upon those who surround him. 
For Luther, then, Christian freedom is life in the Spirit, 
where man, in response to what God has done for him in Christ, 
conveys the same spirit of Divine love given to him in Christ 
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toward his neighbor who is in need. Freed from the fear and 
grasp of sin, death, and the power of the devil, man is trans-
formed by God's grace into the child of God be was created to 
be . Now he believes and trusts in God above all things. Now 
he gladly serves God in willing obedience, and gains the as-
surance of salvation in God 's kingdom which was prepared for 
man from the foundation of the world. 
CHAPTER IV 
AID~INIUS 1 TEACHING 0~ HUMAN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 
There is a marked similarity between Arminius' and 
Luther's doctrine of man. Both of them see man as a depen-
dent creature of God who falls into sin and is bound in sin 
until God's grace rescues man from sin. But there is a 
significant difference as to how each man portrays the part 
which God and man play in man's salvation. To highlight the 
similarities and differences , we shall now turn to the 
anthropology of James Arminius. 
1. God 's Covenant with Man 
It is Arminius' contention that God created man and all 
that exists out of nothing. It was God's Word and Spirit 
which brought forth all things out of nothing. All things 
were created by God for himself and in order to show forth 
his love and goodness. 1 Only God is capable of creating out 
of nothing and this power sets up a clear distinction between 
Creator and creature. Furthermore, God was not bound by any-
thing outside his own will to bring forth his creation. How-
ever, the purpose of creation was the good of his creatures 
and especially man . 2 
1Arminius, Writings, II, 54. 2 Ibid., II , 55f. 
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Angels, like men, were created in the image of God, but 
differ from man in that they are composed of spiritual sub-
stance and not of matter . Angels, like men , are finite. 1 
Man was also created in the image of God composed of a body, 
soul, and reason. The body is composed of the same elements 
of which the earth is made, but was not subject to death and 
corruption until after man fell into sin. The soul, housed 
in the body, is separate from the body, and composed of sub-
stance qualitatively different from the body ana capable of 
immortal life, apart from the body, but not without the grace 
of God . 2 The soul possesses two faculties, namely, willing 
and understanding . The will has a basic inclination toward 
the gooa. Therefore, man and all his faculties possessed an 
original righteousness. 
'l'he image of God was evident in man ' s body and soul, 
though of course it cannot be said that God has a body. He 
is pure spirit . But man's body was capable of eternal life 
until he sinned. The soul, however, is incapable of dying 
unless God refuses to allow it to exist and it simply ceases 
to be . Man was created for fellowship with, and the worship 
of , God forever in a state of blessedness. "By this act of 
creation, God most manifestly displayed the glory of his wis-
dom, goodness and power."3 
1Ar minius , Writings, II , 58f . 
3~. , II, 65 . 
2 Ibid. , II, 63 . 
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By virtue of creation, man is the property of God and he 
can command "whatever the relation of creation and equity 
which rests upon it, permit . "l This means that God will not 
deliver man over to the control of another and will not com-
mand man to do that which he has not the power to do. Neither 
will God use man to introduce sin into the world just to 
promote his own glory by punishing man or by forgiving him. 
Furthermore, he would not condemn man unless man commits sin. 
In this way, Arminius points out that God limits Himself. 
He argues that God is not a despot, but a patriarch, who wills 
the good of his creatures . Furthermore, God enters into an 
agreement with man not to demand obedience, arbitrarily, but 
in order that man may obey him; not out of a sense of debt, 
but freely and spontaneously . However, when a man spurns 
this covenant, he falls under the arbitrary rule of God. This 
means that God bas a two-fold right over man. "The first, 
which belongs to him through creation; the second, through 
contract. " 2 If man sins against these rights of God and 
breaks the covenant, then God has the right to inflict proper 
punishment. 
Arminius emphasizes the idea that while God could have 
demanded obedience from his creatures by virtue of his power 
over man, he declined to do so because he wanted to elicit 
from man free and voluntary obedience. It was for this reason 
1 2 
- Arminius, Writings, II, 66. ~., II, 68. 
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that he entered into a contract with man and promised reward 
if man kept the covenant, and punishment, if he refused to 
do so. 
We must ask, however, does not the introduction of reward 
and punishment into the covenant undercut the meaning of com-
pletely free and spontaneous obedience of God? Rather, woulri 
not man be motivated by the hope of reward or the fear of 
punishment? Does not true spontaneity of action come only 
with the new covenant in Christ because it removes fear of 
punishment and puts the God-man relationship on a level of 
love instead of law? 
Apparently, Arminius recognises this when he says: 
God prescribed this obedience, first, by a law 
placed in and imprinted on the mind of man, in 
which is contained his natural duty towards God 
and his neighbor, and, therefore, towards himself 
also; and it is that of love, with fear, honor, 
and worship towards a superior. For, as true 
virtue consists in the government or right order-
ing of the affections, (of which the first, the 
chief, and that on which the rest depend, is LOVE,) 
the whole law is contained in the right ordering 
of love.l 
Yet, it seemed to Arminius that man had a tendency toward 
self love. It was this self love which had to be restrained 
and ordered if man was to live rightly with his neighbor. 
As if to test man, God gave a symbolic law which expressly 
forbids a certain act. It was the command not to eat the 
fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But the 
l Arminius , Writings, II, 71. 
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fruit was attractive and man was drawn toward it. Ma n should 
have wi llingly yielded obedience to God in this matter in 
order to demonstrate his willing submission. Obeaience to 
the first type of law (love) would have brought life eternal. 
Obedience to the second type of law (symbolic) would have 
brought the enjoyment of the fruits of paradise, ana power to 
eat from the tree of life . Therefore, if Adam and Eve had 
not fallen into sin, Adam's posterity would have continued 
under the same covenant that he had with God . But they 
probably would not have had access to the tree of the know-
ledge of good and evil . However, if our first parents had 
not fallen into sin, they probably would have been translated 
from natural bodily life which is corruptible, into a spiri-
tual life that is incorruptible, and enjoyed the bliss of 
heaven forever . 1 
2. The Fall into Sin 
Arminius makes it clear that Goa can in no way be held 
res ponsible for man 's fall into sin . Adam and Eve were not 
forced or compelled in any way to defy God's command, but did 
it of their own free will . This of course implies that God 
allowed or permitted man to sin and, therefore, limitea his 
powers by giving man from the time of his creation a truly 
lArminius, Writings , II, 73 . 
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free will that was capable of defying God. 1 
The immediate result of this sin was that God was offended 
and that Adam and Eve brought guilt upon themselves . Their 
shame is evidenced by an ensuing consciousness of their naked-
ness. At that moment, God's Spirit of grace departed from man 
and no longer directed him. Now man became subject to physical 
death, i . e . , the separation of body and soul, and spiritual 
death, i . e . , eternal separation of man ' s body and soul from 
God. This is symbolized by the fact that they were barred 
from the tree of life which stood in the center of the garden . 
In addi t ion woman was now subjected to the pain of child birth . 
Man had to win his food from the soil by the sweat of his brow 
and even the ground was cursed and brought forth thorns and 
thistles. 
According to the covenant which God made with Adam and Eve, 
their posterity were to be given God ' s gracious blessing if 
they were obedient. But because they were disobedient, Adam's 
progeny were cursed with the same evils that befell their 
parents . 
This is the reason why all men were to be propagated 
from them in a natural way, became obnoxious to death 
temporal and death eternal , and devoid of this gift of 
the Holy Spirit or original righteousness . This punish-
ment usually receives the appellation of "a privation 
of the image of God," and "original sin . "2 
1Arminius, Writings, II, 76; cf'., our definition of natural 
freedom above, p . 4 . 
2 Ibid., II, 78f. 
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According to Arminius, original sin simply means that man 
has lost his original righteousness . It may entail more than 
this, as some argue, but he doubts that it does. As we have 
seen, Luther thinks of sin as a state of being turned from God 
by a positive bent toward evil (incurvatus in~). It is per-
haps at this point that Arminius, by defining original sin 
differently, escapes some of the determinism which we find in 
Luther•s concept of sin . Original sin, as Luther defines it, 
implies that man sins by necessity . At this point, however, 
Arminius does not allow the fall into sin to carry such an 
idea with it. Be does, however, with Luther, argue for man's 
bondage in sin . 
3 . Bondage in Sin. 
On the basis of his understanding of Scriptures, James 
Arminius argues for both freedom of the will and bondage in 
sin . While Luther sees freedom of the will and bondage in sin 
as incompatible with one another, Arminius suggests that both 
truths may be asserted side by side without contradiction. 
Like Luther, he goes primarily to the writings of Paul 
for his teaching on man's bondage in sin . Man is tte servant 
of whomever he seeks to obey . l It is man's nature that he must 
serve someone or something . If he serves God, man enjoys 
spiritual freedom, but if he serves anything other than God, 
he is the servant of sin. There is no middle ground of 
1Rom. 6:16 ; cf . II Pet . 2 : 19 . 
neutrality upon which man can stand. Arminius writes: 
But man was not firmly established in the state of 
innocence so that this desire for some good led him 
spontaneously and freely to disobey God. Turning 
from God toward a lesser ngood", he transgressed 
God's command that was essential t~ his life. Thus 
he came under the dominion of sin. 
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After the fall into sin, the free will of man has no power 
in ana of itself to do the good unless God's grace excites and 
moves it to do the good.2 Natural man, i.e., man after his 
fall into sin, has no ability to perceive the things of the 
spirit. 3 This seems to i~ply that without the supernatural 
gift of grace , man is fleshly and incapable of perceiving 
spiritual things except in a distorted way. Man's mind is 
darkened by sin, though it is not bereft of all light, never-
theless, it cannot grasp its lost condition or perceive the 
truth of the gospel . 4 Natural man sees the cross and the gos-
pel as foolishness and cannot believe in them (I Cor . 1:16, 
24) . 
1Arminius, Writings, I, 525. 
2 Ibid., I, 526. 
3see I Cor. 2:14; cf. Rom. 1:2lf.; Eph. 4:17f.; Titus 3:3; 
Eph. 5:8 . ~otice that natural man is used by Arminius in a 
special way as rreaning sinful man estranged from God by sin. 
In this sense man is often ealled a sinner by nature. But 
would it not be less ambiguous to speak of sinful man as 
unnatural man, who contrary to God 's will, when he created 
man for fellowship with Himself, became estranged from God 
by sin? See above, p. 88f. 
4Arminius, Writings, I, 527. 
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It is the fleshly character of natural man that gives 
him a carnal mind and puts him at enmity with God (Rom. 8:7) . 
Out of his evil heart, hardened by sin (Jer. 13:10; Ezek . 36: 
26), proceeds all kinds of evil thoughts and desires such as 
murder, adultery and the like (Matt. 15:19). In this condi-
tion, man finds it utterly impossible to do any good thing. 
Jesus makes this clear when he says: "A corrupt tree cannot 
bring forth good fruit" (Matt. 7:18, 12:34), and "No man can 
come unto me except the father draw him" (John 6:44). The 
carnal mind of man is not and cannot be subject to God. For 
Arminius the Scriptures seem to argue strongly for the fact 
that all men sin and become bound in sin.l 
I n this state of captivity to sin and Satan man is dead 
in his sin (Rom. 3:10-19). Arminius leaves no doubt in our 
minds that he follows Pauline thinking on the matter of bondage 
in sin. Furthermore , he argues, man's will is not freed from 
this bondage in sin until Jesus Christ frees it through the 
gift of His Spirit .2 
This is why Scriptures talk about all the gifts and bene-
fits which Christ offers to man: freedom from immorality, I Cor. 
6:9-11; freedom from lusts of ~he flesh to do works of the 
lArminius, Writings, I , 528; cf. Rom. 6:20; II Tim. 2:26. 
2Ibid., cf. Carl Bangs, op. cit., p . 160ff. Here Bangs contends 
ttat Arrninius stands in the central stream of reformed theology 
and ascribes salvation to the grace of God alone. Free will in 
the thinking of Arminius is in no way to imply that man merits 
his salvation or initiates his conversion. Therefore, Arminius 
is more properly called a monergist than a synergist! See below, 
p. 158. 
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Spirit, Gal . 5:19-25; cf . Eph. 2:2-7; Titus 3:3-7 . Where the 
Spirit of the Lord is operative, there man finds true liberty, 
II Cor. 3:17; John 8:36 . The selection of these passages by 
Arminius inaicates he believes that the sinner is bouna in his 
sin until such time as God's grace comes to him and releases 
him from such bondage . Then, 
after new light and knowledge of God is kindled in 
man's mind and new obedience to the law of God is 
kindled in his heart, man is liberatea from darkness, 
he understands true and saving good and loves and em-
braces the good and is capable in Christ of cooperat-
ing with Goa, he loves good and per forms it . This is 
all the work of the Holy Spirit (II Cor . 4 : 13; Rom. 
8:16).1 
This regeneration, however, is not instantaneous, but 
something which increases day by day (Rom. 6:6; II Cor . 6:16) . 
"Sin must be aestroyed and the inne r man renewed day by day."2 
Even the regenerated man finds that there is a constant battle 
between fleso and spirit (Gal . 5:17), ana man continues in sin 
in spite of the fact that the Spirit of God is at work within 
him. Here we see a definite parallel with Luther's teaching 
of man as simul justis et peccator . 
In Arminius' thought, not only is rebirth by the Spirit 
to be attributed to God, but also man's continual growth in 
grace is the work of Goa's Spirit (Phil . 1:6; I Pet . 1:5,10). 
Further~ore, it is quite possible that those who have already 
1Arminius , Writings, I, 529 . 
2Ibid. 
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been regenerated by the Spirit of God may again fall into sin 
and so stand in need of God ' s Spirit to renew their faith and 
lead them to fresh repentance . 1 
It is at this point that Arminius makes clear a very 
important point, namely , that God's grace can be resisted. 
This means that man is free to cooperate with God or to reject 
the grace of God. Not only may grace be resisted (Acts 7:51), 
it may also be received in vain (II Cor . 6 : 1), and man may, 
if he so wills , refuse to cooperate with the grace of God 
(Heb . 12 : 15; Matt. 23 : 37; Luke 7 : 30} . Salvation comes to 
him who opens himself to the work of God's Spirit and consents 
to believe {Mark 1:15 ; 16: 16 ; cf . John 3 : 36; 3:10; I Tim. 2: 
1-4) . By these passages Arminius attempts to restablish that 
man has the ability or power of free will to resist the work 
of God's Spirit . Furthermore , man can only come into a right 
relationship with God when he cooperates with God and believes 
in the good news of the gospel . 
In other words, Goa offers his salvation to whomever will 
receive it . God wills that all men shall be saved, but some 
men, by refusing God 1 s profferea grace , can frustrate the 
primary will of God by cutting themselves off from God . This 
is defined as sin and leads to condemnation . The important 
point for Arminius is that God is exonerated from being the 
cause of man's sin and condemnation is put where it rightly 
1Arminius, Writings, I, 530f . 
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belongs , namely , upon the ability and responsibility of man 
to accept ana cooperate with Goa ' s will or reject and rebel 
against God ' s will . 1 
In view of the Scriptures, then, it seems to Arminius 
that man, even in his state of innocence was ca pable of doing 
evil . In his desire for lesser bood, he was freely led to 
disobey God . Such disobedience led Adam to fall into sin and 
come unaer its dominion . 
In this state [of bondage to sin], the free will of 
man towaras the true good is not only wounded, mai med, 
infirm, bent and weakened; but it is also imprisonea, 
destroyed and lost . And its powers are not only 
debilitated and useless unless they be assisted by 
grace , but it has no powers whatever except such as 
are excited by divine grace . 2 
Like Lutt er, Arminius argues that the mind of man is dar-
kened, his heart is perverted and he is impoten t to do any 
good thing . Unregenerate man is unable to perceive t he things 
of the Spirit and cannot even perceive his sinfulness and lost 
conaition or understand the gospel. Now, he active l y hates 
God and his heart is hardened in sin. Thus, i s man bound in 
sin . "It follows, that our will is not free from t he first 
fall; that is , it is not free to gooa, unless it be made free 
by the Son . " 3 
Armini us firmly rejects the stand taken by Pelag i us and 
lArminius, Writings , I, 227f. 
2 ~. , I, 526 . 
3Ibid., I, 528 . 
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affirms that the heathen or unregenerate man cannot be saved 
by his own efforts or through his natural powers . Anything 
done by man that is not done in faith is sin . But God has not 
wholly deserted the heathen. He still 6ives them a natural 
knowledge of Goa. But no man can do good unless the grace of 
God assis~s him. Grace always precedes, accompanies and fol-
lows any gooa which man does. 1 
4. Regeneration and Salvation: God and Man Cooperate . 
The primary emphasis of Arminius in the process of conver-
sion and salvation is always the grace of God . This grace is 
made manifest by the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. His 
orientation toward atonement is Anselmian in nature. But this 
is not our primary concern here . What needs to be pointed out 
is that Arminius sees sin as a barrier between God and man . It 
destroys their fellowship. Man as sinner has no hope of access 
to God . Cut off from God he is doomed and dead in sin. Thus, 
there must be a new covenant or agreement set up between God 
and man . This God does in Jesus Christ.2 
Like Luther, Arminius sees the justification of a sinner 
as the work of God's grace through Jesus Christ. 
Justification is a just and gracious act of God as a 
judge, by which from the throne of his grace and mercy, 
he absolves from his sins, man, a sinner, but who is a 
believer, on account of Christ, and the obedience and 
righteo~sness of Christ, and considers him righteous, 
to the salvation of the justified person and to the 
lArminius, Writings, I, 322f. 2Ibid., II , 80. 
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glory of divine righteousness and grace. 1 
Not only is righteousness imputed to the sinner for 
Christ's sake, but God only forgives those who acknowledge 
their sins and believe in the satisfactory atonement which 
Christ made through the spilling of his blood. 2 It is man's 
faith, and faith alone, in the effective work of Christ that 
justifies man . Furthermore, this faith is not to be construed 
as a good worK on tne part of man, ror Christ and Christ alone 
through his meritorious work is the cause of our salvation. 
It is his obedience that is imputed to us for righteousness . 3 
To accomplish the redemption of man, God comes to him 
through His written or spoken word, i . e ., the Bible and 
preaching. Ordinarily, God calls us to faith by His Holy 
Spirit working ttrough the gospel . First, there is an internal 
calling by the Holy Spirit who prepares our hearts to receive 
the word of God, hear it, and believe it. There is also an 
external calling by the proclamation of the word. When the 
internal and external call concur, then man's vocation is 
fruitful. He co~es to faith, believes and is saved. But, and 
this is important for Arminius, we do have the power to resist 
and reject this calling. 4 Suer rejection leads to the hardening 
of man's heart and reprobation. 
1Arminius, Nritings, II , 116. 
3 Ibid., II, 473f. 
2 Ibid., II, 117. 
4 Ibid., II, l04ff. 
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If, however, man believes, new light is kinaled in his 
heart, he is liberated from darKness and sin, he understands 
true and saving good, loves and embraces it and is empowered 
to cooperate with God in his salvation . Now he loves what is 
good and performs it; and all of this is the work of the holy 
Spirit (II Cor . 4 : 13; Rom. 8:16) . 1 
Regeneration and the new life is not immediate in coming, 
but the result of con tinued growth in grace. Sin must be 
destroyed daily and the inward or spiritual man renewed day 
by day . The outer man, the Old Adam, or what may be called 
flesh continues to harass the new Christian as long as he 
inhabits his human body . All of this growth in goodness must 
likewise be attributed to the worK of God's Spirit in man. 
However, it is possible for man to fall from grace . These are 
men who resist the work of the Holy Spirit . Their only hope 
is to be led to repentance and renewed in faith by God. 2 But 
to him who believes and employs God's grace to work toward the 
good, God gives him further grace . 3 
The author of man's faith is the Holy Spirit . The means 
used to bring man to faith is the gospel and it is the Spirit 
who convinces man that the gospel is true. 
The sinner does not have the power of faith within him, so 
he is in need of God's grace in order to believe . This means 
1Arminius , Writings, I, 529 . 
3 ~. , I , 329. 
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that God predetermines from all eternity who shall or shall 
not be given faith . But he does this in accordance with his 
mercy and severity to his glory and to save believers . To 
accomplish his purpose he employs his word and Spirit, for 
without them man cannot come to faith. God gives these means 
of faith to no one on the basis of merit but by grace alone . 
Furthermore, he denies them f'rom no one except him who sins. 1 
This seems to imply that man's destiny is wholly in God's 
hands and that Arminius is proclaiming a determinism according 
to the eternal will of God. But as we shall see later, he 
believes that God foreknows who will believe and who will not 
believe, but ris foreknowledge does not determine these events, 
rather, he knows them because they will happen the way he fore-
knows it. This is rather a tenuous position, but elsewhere, 
Arminius clearly argues against anything happening by necessity 
because God wills it. 
What is more important here is tnat he always argues for 
man's ability to reject the proffered grace of God . This means 
that man, not God, is responsible for his conaemnation . Indeed 
God's grace always has preeminence in the regeneration and 
salvation of man, but the will of man is liKewise always involved 
in his salvation. 2 God's grace enlivens and empowers man's 
will to accept and cooperate with God's grace. 
1Arminius, Writings, II, 102 . 2 ~. , I, 368f. 
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Some woula argue that such a view implies that Arminius 
is saying then that salvation comes by the grace of God alone, 
and in this sense he is a monergist . 1 If grace is always 
prior and prevenient, what is the difference between saying 
salvation comes by grace alone and saying that after God's 
grace comes man cooperates with God? Furthermore, if Arminius 
argues that man has power to accept or reject God's proffered 
grace, then is he not saying that man merits salvation depending 
upon whether or not he accepts God's grace . Is not faith then 
a meritorious act? 
Arminius counters such views in this way . If a rich man 
gives a beggar a gift, does it cease to be a pure gift because 
the beggar extends his hand to receive it? The obvious answer 
is no , 2 Furthermore, if we attribute salvation wholly to the 
grace of God and let man take no active part in his salvation, 
then we are guilty of cla i ming God's grace is irresistible. 
1carl Bangs, op . cit., p . 166 . However, we define monergism as: 
the doctrine of some Augustinians who affirmed that regeneration 
is the work of the Holy Spirit alone, the human will being pas-
sive and having no part (see above p . 6) . Arminius, who argues 
for man's free will accepting and cooperating with the Divine 
Spirit or resisting and rejecting the same, can hardly be called 
a monergist, though like monergists (cf . Luther), he does give 
priority to God's grace and the work of His Spirit, but as a 
theologian who argues that man's will is active in regeneration 
he can more properly be defined as a synergist (see above p . 6) . 
However, he is not a Pelagian who allows free will to carry im-
plications of merit with it . We shall treat this problem more 
fully later. 
2Arminius, Writings, I, 365f. 
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This would mean that man is no longer man, but a thing. Man 
must possess freedom to accept or reject God's gift or else 
he is reduced to something sub-human. Arminius holds stead-
fastly to the firm belief that salvation is a matter of genuine 
cooperation between two a gents, namely, God and man, and when 
two agents are involved, the one can accomplish nothing without 
the aid and cooperation of the other. Human experience teaches 
us that a husband must return his wife's love and vice versa, 
if they are to have fellowship. If either one resists the 
other, or refuses to love the other, then fellowship is broken 
off. So too, in the God-man relationship. 
Concerning the doctrine of predestination, Arminius writes: 
It is an eternal and gracious decree of God in Christ, 
by which he determines to justify and adopt believers, 
and to endow them with life eternal, but to condemn 
unbelievers, and impenitent persons; ••• predestination 
is the foundation of Christianity, of our salvation, 
and the assurance of salvation, • • • which the apostle 
treats in the eighth and ninth chapters of • • • Romans, 
and in the first chapter ••• to the Ephesians . 
But such a decree as I have there described is not 
that by which God resolves to save some particular per-
sons, and, that he may do this, resolves to endow them 
with faith. Yet many people declare, that this is the 
kind of predestination on which the apostle treats in 1 the passages just cited. But I deny what they assert. 
According to Arminius, however, a sinner does not become a 
believer by his own merit or strength, but only by the grace of 
God. 2 It would seem then that God alone determines to whom the 
lArminius, Writings, II, 471. 
2Ibid., I, 576; cf. GaL 2:20; Matt . 9:25; 13:11, John 6:44; 
Phil. l: 29. 
160 
secrets of his gospel shall be revealed. Therefore, even 
faith is a gift of God, and this gift is given to believers 
whom God himself chooses . 
At other times, however, Arminius suggests that God's 
grace is freely given to all men who will believe and accept 
it . Arminius usually solves this dilemma by suggesting that 
God foreknows who will believe and accept the good news of the 
gospel . To such a person God gives his grace, but he with-
holds it from those whom he foreKnows will not believe. 
On the other hand, reprobation is a product of the wrath 
of God, whereby he decides from all eternity to condemn unbe-
lievers to eternal death. Their unbelief, however, is their 
own fault, not Goa ' s . 1 This implies that salvation does come 
by the grace of God alone and is not dependent upon the good 
works of man, but that man is responsible for his own condem-
nation if he rejects the gospel. Just why it is that some 
believe and are saved, and others refuse to believe and are 
condemned must remain forever a mystery. 2 The best that can 
be said about those who are condemned by God is that it is 
the accidental result of vocation, and that which is 
not of itself intended by God, [and) is the rejection 
of the word of gs ace, • • • the resistance offered to 
the Holy Spirit . 
libid., I, 568 ; cf. John 3:18; Luke 7:30; II Thess . 2:10-ll . 
2~. , I , 569. 
3Ibid. , I, 574 . 
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Such rejection of the proffered grace of God and resis-
tance to the holy Spirit leads to the hardening of the human 
heart in sin and deliverance of the unbeliever over to satan 
(Acts 7:51; 13:46; Luke 7:30; II Thess. 3:2). When individuals 
resist the Holy Spirit and God gives them up, it simply means 
that He ref~ses to override their rejection of his grace, and 
so, respecting man's freedom to reject him, God releases his 
hold upon them and gives them up. 
In spite of the fact that it might seem that man can frus-
trate the will of Goa by rejecting his grace, Arminius insists 
that Goa always acts in agreement with that which he has decreed 
from all eternity. To suggest that God or his will is mutable 
is to deny scriptures (Acts 15:18; Eph. 3:5, 6, 9-ll ; James 
1:17-18; II Tim. 1:9), and to create havoc with the doctrine 
of preaestination and the sure promises of God. 1 However: 
a decree of itself imposes no necessity on any thing 
or event. But if any necessity exists through the 
decree of God, it exists through the intervention of 
the divine power , ana indeed when he judges it proper 
to employ his irresistible power to effect what he has 
decreed. 
Therefore, it is not correctly said, "The will of 
God is the necessity of things." 
Nor is this a just expression: "All things happen 
necessarily with respect to the divine decree ."2 
Arminius, then, seems to argue, first, God and his promises 
and decrees are immutable and will never change. Second, these 
decrees do not bring anything about by necessity. Third, man 
has freedom and power to resist the decrees of God and the 
1Arminius, Writings, I, 574. 2Ibid., II, 483. 
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work of His Holy Spirit . Fourth, man, and not God, is respon-
sible for sin anu for his own condemnation. 
Such a view implies synergism, but at the same time argues 
strenuously for the prevenience and absolute necessity for 
divine grace and the God-given gift of faith to bring man to 
salvation . Thus, when the gospel is preached, God gives 
sufficient grace to man in order that he may, if he will, 
believe the gospel and be saved. If this is not so, argues 
Arminius, then God is guilty of mocking man . 1 
Arminius insists that divine grace precedes, goes with and 
follows after the proclamation of God's word. The Holy S ~irit 
is always active, never quiescent . He does not wait until man 
first makes the choice to believe the Gospel. 2 In other words , 
man ' s relationship with God is a personal one and such a rela-
tionship demands that there must be simultaneous activity and 
mutual cooperation on the part of both parties, God and man . 
To say that man and his free will accomplish his salvation is 
contrary to the scriptures and human experience. To say that 
God and man cooperate in man's salvation seems to Arminius to 
be the most logical, scriptural and satisfying answer to this 
thorny problem. 
The God-man relationship is always thought of by Arminius 
as being a corporate and cooperating venture. He is always 
careful to argue that God and His Spirit initiate man ' s salvation; 
1Arminius , Writings, I, 299. 2Ibid . , I, 300f . 
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but similarly, he always stresses man's part in regeneration 
and salvation. God is given credit and glory in that He is 
man's creator, sustainer and redeemer . But at no time does 
Arminius want to lose sight of the belief that man also 
plays an active and cooperating role in his salvation. Unlike 
the monergistic view of Luther, Arminius does not believe 
that giving man an active role in his salvation takes the 
initiative from God or robs Him of His glory. The real con-
flict between monergists and synergists centers around this 
problem: Is God alone the only agent affecting man's salva-
tion , or ls it a cooperating venture of both God and man? 
5. Summary 
God, who is unlimited by anything outside Himself, cre-
ated all things out of nothing in order to manifest His love. 
He created man in His own image with an original righteousness 
and with a capacity for fellowship with God. 
God did, however, limit Himself. According to Arminius, 
God is not a despot but a patriarchwho wills only good for 
His creatures . Therefore, He makes a covenant with man . This 
means that God has a two-fold right over man: one by virtue of 
creation and the other by means of a contract. This means that 
God does not make any demands of man which man does not have 
the power to fulfill . By right of creation God could have 
compelled man's obedience, but He did not choose to do so in 
order that man might have freedom to obey voluntarily. 
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God testea man by forbidding him to eat the fruit in the 
center of the garden, but man freely chose to act contrary to 
God's will and fell into sin. Since God gave man a truly free 
will and man freely chose to sin, therefore, man, and not God, 
is responsible for sin and evil in the world. 
This original sin caused the earth to become evil and man 
to lose his original righteousness. Arminius' doctrine of 
original sin, ~owever, in no way implies that all men since 
Adam sin by necessity. 
Nevertheless, since the fall into sin, man lost his per-
fection ana marred the image of God in him. The fall into sin 
leads to man's bondage in sin. In this bondage man is impotent 
to do any good thing in God's eyes. Therefore, his will is not 
free to do good until God's grace leads man to repentance, 
regenerates him and moves him into the pathway of true right-
eousness. In his state of bondage, man is powerless to 
initiate his salvation. God must, and in fact does, through 
his gracious act in Jesus Christ, take the initiative in re-
storing man to a right relationship with Himself. 
Both Luther and Arminius agree that by the fall into sin 
man becomes bound in sin and by Goa's grace in Christ is freed 
from his bondage. Then led by God's grace and Spirit man con-
tinues to struggle with sin and finds true Christian liberty 
only when he lives under the guidance of the Spirit. 
However, there are also distinct differences . For example, 
Arminius always argues for the freedom of man's will and his 
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power to resist Goa and the work of His Spirit. He bases his 
argument for the free will on three major points. 
First, Goa chooses to limit Himself by entering into an 
agreement with man. While God has absolute power over His 
creation, He nevertheless chooses to limit that power by 
setting up a covenant with laws for man to obey. Furthermore, 
God does not demand that man fulfill any command which he does 
not have the power to obey. 
Second, God gave man the power of freedom to choose to 
obey or not ~o obey His commands, in order that man might not 
be compelled in any way. Thus, man is capable of doing Goa's 
will voluntarily. 
Third, though man through his disobedience to God falls 
into sin, becomes bound in sin, and cannot initiate his salva-
tion because he is utterly depenaent upon God's grace for 
freedom from this bondage, man still retains the power, when 
Goa's grace assists him, to accept or reject God 's proffered 
grace. 
If man accepts God's grace, he is freed from sin and its 
bondage and is able , with the aid of God's grace, to pursue 
good and perform good works. The God-man relationship is 
described by Arminius as a cooperating venture . Thus at least 
two factors play a part in determining man's destiny: God's 
grace , and man 's free will which accepts or rejects that grace. 
Then Arminius raises the problem of predestination. Does 
not the free will of man undercut God's omnipotence, omniscience, 
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and the sovereignty of his grace? Arminius points out that 
God limits Himself by covenant with man and by giving man a 
free will. 
Does not the free will of man wreak havoc with God 's 
eternal decrees and promises? Arminius argues that it is 
God's will that all men be saved. God does not resolve that 
particular persons should be saved and others condemned. The 
implication of this view is that salvation is contingent upon 
something man does or refrains from doing . But Arminius 
hedges by suggesting that God, who foreknows all things, 
gives or withholds His grace according to whether a man will 
believe or not. Thus, why some are saved and others condemned 
is a mystery known only to God . In this he seems to agree 
with Luther. Yet, a~ other times he argues that men freely 
choose to reject God 's grace , and Goa, who respects their 
freedom, will not override their resistance to His Spirit and 
simply gives them up to reprobation. 
On the one hand, Arminius argues that God's promises are 
sure and that predestination is the foundation of Christianity. 
On the other hand, he also maintains that the decrees of God 
do not impose necessity on anything. We must ask: Would not 
such ambiguity be avoided if Arminius admitted that God fore-
knew things contingently? Would such contingency undercut the 
certainty of God's promises and decrees? 
The core of Arminius' doctrine of God and human free will 
is: First, God and His promises are immutable and sure. 
Second, the decrees of Goa do not bring anything about by 
necessity . Third, man has freedom and power to resist God 
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and His Spirit . Fourth, therefore man, and not God, is respon-
sible for his own condemnation . In this way Arminius seeks 
to establish his belief that the salvation of man is a cor-
porate and cooperating venture involving two active agents, 
namely, God with His grace, and man with his free will . 
CHAPTER V 
GOD ' S GRACE AND MAN'S FREE WILL 
After exploring the anthropologies of Luther and Arminius, 
it becomes evident that most of the real and apparent differ-
ences between these two men occur in the area of the relation-
ship between God's grace and man's free will . The task of 
this chapter is to single out for closer inspection the basic 
motifs in the theology of Luther and Arminius in order that 
we may observe how these motifs affect their views of human 
freedom and bondage . In this way we hope to be able to point 
up the real issues at stake in the aebate concerning the part 
God ' s grace and ~an's free will play in man's salvation. Then, 
using the insights which we gain from a comparison of a moner-
gist like Luther with a synergist like Arminius , we hope to 
discover whether these differing views of human freedom and 
bondage can be reconciled or not . 
1 . The Perpetual Antithesis 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the conflict between 
salvation by the grace of God, and the part man's free will 
has played in salvation, has raged through the ages . In Chap-
ter Three, we discovered that Luther attempts to argue against 
the free will of man coram deo . He admits that man has a free 
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will coram homnibus, but in divine matters Luther emphasizes 
the sovereignty of God and his grace. Here he assumes a 
monergistic position which states that regeneration and salva-
tion are the work of God's Spirit alone, and man is but the 
passive recipient of the work of God in and through him. In 
Chapter Four, we saw that Arminius, who in many respects 
holds a position similar to Luther's, nevertheless argues for 
the freedom of man's will, assumes a synergistic position, 
and states that God's grace and man's free will cooperate in 
the regeneration and salvation of sinful man . 
The problem to which we address ourselves is put by Mac-
kenzie, who asks? "Can God 's sovereignty be reconciled with 
such a freedom of choice as we require?"l 
First, let us look at the problem from the viewpoint of 
Luther. Then, we shall inspect it from Arminius' point of 
view. 
i. Luther's Principles: Sola Gratia et Soli Deo Gloria 
Luther's doctrine of the bondage of the will is a neces-
sary prelude to his doctrine of salvation by the grace of God 
alone. Packer and Johnston write: 
This then, is the Luther whom we meet in The Bondage 
of the Will, a great hearted Christian warrior; a 
thorough exegete • • • and above all, an unflinching 
1
nonalo Mackenzie, "Free Will ,n Encyclopedia of Religion and 
Ethics (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924}, VI, l26. This ques-
tion might also be posed in this fashion: Can the freedom 
which man seems to need to be human, be reconciled with the 
sovereignty God has over us? 
defender of the grace of a sovereign God. For this 
was the real matter unaer debate. Luther and Erasmus 
were not arguing about, and did not disagree about, 
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the reality of the psychology of human choice; although 
Erasmus did not altogether see this, and sometimes 
speaks as if Luther's determinism involved a doctrine 
of psychological compulsion. But Luther's denial of 
'free-will' has nothing to do with the psychology of 
action. That human choices are spontaneous and not 
forced he knows and affirms; and any formulation of 
the gospel which amounts to saying that God shows 
grace , not in saving man, but in making it possible 
for man to save himself, is to be rejected as a lie. 
The whole work of man's salvation, first to last, if 
Goa's; and all the glory for it must be God's also. 
Thus, according to Packer and Johnston, does Luther reject 
all forms of Pelagianism, even that which allows man only a 
tiny bit of merit . The reason for this assertion is that any 
merit on man's part, no matter how small, puts God in man's 
debt. This is impossible. By grace God creates man, by grace 
He redeems man, and by grace He offers man the gift of eternal 
life. Hence, how can a creature so dependent on God's grace, 
mercy, and love ever put God in his debt? Furthermore, Packer 
and Johnston argue that semi-Pelagianism is a more treacherous 
doctrine than out-and-out Pelagianism, because it allows men 
to purchase grace necessary for salvation at a cut rate price 
from God . 2 That is why Luther's teaching on the bondage of 
the will is so important.3 
1J.I. Packer and O. R. Johnston, "Historical and Theological 
Introduction" to; Luther, Bondage of the Will , p. 47f. 
2 ~· p. 50. Also see above p. 116. 
3Luther•s bondage of the will makes it clear that sinful man 
can do nothing by way of outward woras or acts to remove the 
guilt of his sin. Sinful man is completely dependent upon the 
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Rupp, too, is sympathetic toward Luther's defense of God's 
grace and glory, but he admits that Luther needs restating in 
modern language and thought forms of the Twentieth Century. 
Only in this way can his views be reconciled with a deeper 
understanding of human personality which we possess today 
and Luther lacked in his day . Nevertheless, he says: 
But I hope it can be seen why this treatise "De Servo 
Arbitrio" still lives and why it is, as Bishop Normann 
has it, "the finest mos t powerful Soli Deo Gloria to 
be sung in the whole period of the Reformation."! 
Luther's teaching of man's bondage in sin makes it clear 
that man is helpless, after his fall into sin, to change his 
will, to do good, and to merit salvation. Salvation, if it is 
to come at all, must come from outside man by God's grace 
alone, without any merit on man's part! Salvation comes only 
when God works His good and gracious will through man. Luther's 
view of this in his De Servo Arbitrio suggests , however, that 
God's will cannot be resisted and He works all in all in both 
good and evil men. 2 In this way Luther lets God be God. 
grace of God in Christ to release him from his bondage in sin. 
The assumptiom here is, that no man can make full reparations 
for his sin and can only get rid of the guilt of his sin when 
God forgives him and man chooses to accept God's proffered 
grace. (We shall develop this idea more fully in the next 
chapter.) But, as we have seen, Arminius makes it an impor-
tant part of man's salvation to insist that man is free to 
make such a choice, while Luther in his De Servo Arbitrio 
does not explicitly make such a claim. We must ask, does man 
possess what we call natural freedom even in his state of 
bondage to sin? 
lGordon Rupp, op. cit., p. 283. 
2Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 84. See above, p. ll7f. 
It is teaching like this that prompts many critics of 
Lutter to insist that his view of God's grace squeezes tte 
very life blood out of natural man because it seems to reduce 
him to the level of a thing in the hands of an arbitrary God. 
This criticism is justified, for at times Luther does seem to 
reduce man to the level of a thing . 1 
Luther leaves no doubt in anyone's mind that sinful man, 
i . e ., man alone without grace , cannot in any way make even the 
smallest contribution towards his salvation . he is, in this 
matter, wholly dependent upon the grace of God . Only when man 
sees this is he properly humble and does not even try to find 
ways to save himself . 
This is why Luther says, "Man's free will without divine 
grace has not the least ability to secure righteousness, but 
is totally corrupt . "2 He goes even farther and maintains that 
all are sinners of necessity and under God's condemnation. Yet, 
he argues, no one is coerced to sin a gainst his will . 3 
lsee above, pp . 78ff. and l07ff . 
2Luther, Commentary on Romans, p . 114. 
3 Ibid., Note that here as in his De Servo Arbitrio, Luther's 
position is that of a determinist. If man sins by necessity 
then he is compelled to sin by an inner necessity if not by 
an outer compulsion. Does not the idea of man sinning by 
necessity undercut the meaning of sin? (See our definition 
of sin, above p . 5 . ) Is there anything less deterministic in 
sinning by an inner necessity than by an outer compulsion? 
What does such a view do to man's natural freedom to choose 
what he prefers under a given set of circumstances? 
173 
What we must always keep in mind is that when Luther 
argues for total corruption, bondage in sin, and sinning by 
necessity, he is contenaing a gainst theologians like Biel, 
whose doctrine concerning freedom of the will lent itself 
quite readily to a doctrine of merit. 1 Furthermore, it was 
Luther's own experience as a monk seeking to win merit and 
favor in the eyes of God, and utterly failing to do so, that 
led him to despair of ever saving himself. This is why he 
opposed Biel so vehemently, when Biel implied that a man could 
do anything he willed to do. L~ther's experience proved this 
to be false. The more he tried to please God by his own work 
and effort of his will, the deeper he fell into sin and despair. 
Luther is specific in distinguishing his view from 
that of medieval interpretations of freedom which 
grew out of the semi-Pelagianism of the Roman Church. 
The latter view atomized the behavior of man into 
individual acts. Such acts in themselves might 
appear very worthy and serve as a basis for unjusti-
fied optimism in evaluating human nature. Luther 
takes neither an atomistic , nor Jet a mosaic view of 
behavior. he coosiaered life as a whole in its 
relation to God.~ 
lGordon Rupp, op . cit., p . 104; cf . p. 187 . Here Rupp argues 
for Luther ' s view that free will without grace sins necessarily, 
but not by coercion of any kind . See also, fn . , p . 104 which 
quotes Biel as sa~ing: "Free will is more essential to merit 
than the infusea virtue of charity. " (P.A. Vignaux, "Luther 
Commentateur" in Diet . Theel. Cath., XI, 77lf.) 
2vernon L. Strempke, op . cit . , p. 39. It is ~t this point we 
must keep in mind Luther's discussion of flesh and spirit. 
The whole man without God's Spirit guiding and controlling 
him is fleshly, sinful and corrupt. But when the whole man 
is redeemed by God's grace he is righteous altogether . Thus, 
both the sinner and the righteous man are seen by God and 
judged by him according to whether they trust and believe His 
gracious offer of forgiveness in Christ or refuse to believe . 
It is at this point , the power of man to accept or reject 
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Luther is often accused of so emphasizing the grace of 
God as the effective agent in man's salvation that he dis-
parages good works and destroys their value altogether . This, 
too, must be understood in the light of his conflict with 
medieval theologians. 
Likewise, it was easy and pleasant for the Jews and 
Pelagians to believe that works without grace made 
one pious ; and under the papacy it was said in an 
attractive way that free will also contributes some-
thing towards grace •••• So our concern here should 
now be that we keep these two teachers, i .e., faith 
and works. For more depends on the teaching of faith 
and a good conscience than on the teaching of good 
works. When works are lacking, help and counsel are 
at hand so that one can produce them if the teaching 
of faith remain firm and pure. But if the teaching of 
faith is placed in the background and works are put 
forward, then nothing can be good and there is neither 
counsel nor help . Then works lead to vain glory and 
seem to peo£le to be something great, while God's glory 
disappears. 
Luther's chief concern was to put first things first. 
Thus, only after God makes man righteous, does man bring forth 
good works; and nothing but complete faith and trust in God's 
forgiveness offered in Jesus Christ can make a man righteous 
God's grace that Luther, by ascribing all things related to 
man's salvation to the work of God alone, is in danger of 
destroying man's natural freedom. He never explicitly states 
that God gives man any freedom at all with respect to regene-
ration and salvation. It is his persistent denial of man's 
free will in spiritual matters that leads many to criticise 
his doctrine of the bondage of the will. The question which 
we must raise is: Is it possible even for sinful man who has 
lost his spiritual freedom to possess natural freedom, i.e., 
the power to say yes or no to the work of C~d's Spirit in and 
through him? 
1Luther, Work~ (St. Louis), XL, 80f . 
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and his works good . This is why faith is so important to 
Luther. He never disparages good works; he simply tries to 
put them in their proper perspective. If this is not done, 
then God is robbed of His glory and man is lost in his sin, 
because man is justified by faith alone, without the works of 
the law (Gal . 2:16) . Luther goes even farther when he argues 
that "to desire Christ, and ask for him, to look and to knock 
is the gift of prevenient grace, and not the choice of our 
will."l 
Yet, Luther, determined as he is to sing the glory of God 
and the sovereignty of His grace by ascribing sinful man's 
regeneration and salvation to the grace of God alone and nothing 
to man's will, also affirms with St . Paul a paradox of grace . 
It is man who must live, act, move, and work in his own flesh, 
even though it is Christ who lives and moves in and through 
man by faith. 2 
1Gordon Rupp, op. cit ., p . 207; cf. Luther, ~ork~ (St. Louis), 
LI, 58. 
2Luther, Commentary on Galatians, p. 270; cf. Gal . 2 :20 . This 
is paradoxical in the sense that any good a Christian does is 
ascribed to God, just as Jesus ascribed all goodness to God 
(Matt. 19:17), and any sin or evil man does is ascribed to his 
own will. Therefore , man is solely responsible for his sin 
and Goa is solely responsible for any good which man accom-
plishes . Just as Jesus is the incarnation of God and His 
Spirit of agape, so too, the Christian is the incarnation of 
Christ's Spirit. See I. Cor . 15:10, II Cor. 5:16-19, Rom. 
8:5-9 . Nevertheless, the question remains: Can man be held 
responsible for his sin, if he sins by necessity? 
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He also makes allowance for a paradox of grace in his Q! 
Servo Arbitrio, when he writes: 
These words ('If thou wilt enter into life, keep the 
commandments' Matt . 19:17], especially those that are 
hypothetical seem also to be put as they are on account 
of the predestination of God, which is unknown to us, 
and they incluae in their scope; as if they mean to say 
this: 'If thou art willin0 ; if thou shalt be willing' (that is, if thou art such with God that He sees fit to 
give thee this will to keep the commandments) 'thou 
shalt be saved.' By means of this figure of speech, we 
are enabled to understand the twin truths, namely, that 
we can do nothing of ourselves, and that anything we do 
God worAs in us. This would be my reply to those who 
are not content to have it be said that these words show 
up our impotence only, and claim that they also prove 
some power and ability in us to ao the things commanded . 
In tnis way, it would also become true that we can do 
none of the things commanded, and yet at the same time 
we can ao tLem all; true, that is, if we ascribe our 
impotence to our own strength and our ability to the 
grace of Goa.l 
Certainly Luther is not unmindful of the fact that theo-
logians like Erasmus gave God's grace priority in man's sal-
vation, but he became exceedingly wary of anyone who argued 
for freedom of the will as Erasmus did. The reason for this 
was to protect theology against the error that man can, by the 
exertion of his will, make himself righteous in God's eyes, 
win merit , and so put God in man's debt in such a way that he 
could force God into giving him eternal life as though he had 
earned it . 2 
For Luther, it was "God's predestination and sure election 
that is the cause of man's salvation and not the righteousness 
lLuther, Bondage of the Will, p. 179. 
2Ibid., p. 78f. 
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of the human will . "l Once more we tread on very dangerous and 
slippery 3round with Luther. It was at this point that both 
Augustine ana Calvin asserted a double predestination which 
placed man ' s eternal destiny wholly in God's hands . Thus man's 
moral choices seemed to be meaningless , because no matter what 
he did, he could not affect his eternal destiny which had been 
previously determined by God . But, let us see how Luther fares 
in this matter . He writes: 
God foreknows what he wills and wills what he foreknows . 
God's will is immutable . It follows then that all we 
do, however it may appear to us, to be done mutably and 
contingently, is in reality done necessarily and immuta-
bly in respect to God. 2 
That last italicized phrase is the key to Luther ' s view. Coram 
Deo, man and the world are completely in God's hands and He 
alone fashions their destiny . Nothing happens by chance . But 
from the human point of view (coram homnibus), everything is 
contingent . 3 
Luther then continues to argue: 
If we gra nt the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God, 
it naturally follows by irrefutable logic that we 
cannot do or be anything by ourselves, b ut only as God 
moves and governs us.4 
1Luther, Commentary on Romans, p . 120 . 
2Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 80; cf . James 1:17 . 
3Julius Kostlin, op . cit . , p. 431. 
4Luther, bondage of the Will, p . 216f . However, we must ask: 
Does such an idea imply that God moves us as the puppeteer 
moves the puppet, or does man's will play some part in this 
such as either saying yes or no to God's working in him? 
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Here we approach the point where human reason is pushed 
to its limits. Luther believes that God has within His con-
trol the destiny of the whole world and everyone in it. If 
this were not so, it would mean that ultimately God is not in 
control of His world. While man ' s knowledge is fallible, 
God's is infallible. Thus , what God foreknows infallibly 
comes to pass. If this were not so, "you undermine all the 
Divine Promises and threatenings and so deity itself."l The 
whole world may shake and tremble and pass away, but God and 
His promises stand fast forever. Such is the nature and 
strength of Luther's faith. 
On the other hand, if we deny man r ea l freedom to frus-
trate the will of God, are we not led to assert that man ' s 
eternal destiny is wholly predetermined by God in such a way 
that man's natural and moral freedom are undermined, or to 
assert with the universalists that ultimately all men will be 
saved? 
Actually, Luther chooses neither alternative . While he 
does argue for the foreknowledge of God and that all things 
come to pass by necessity, he never argues that God predes-
tines some to damnation. 2 However, this does not remove the 
1Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 213. 
2Gordon Rupp , op. cit., p. 28lf. On the whole, as we shall 
presently see, this assertion is true; yet Luther, in his De 
Servo Arbitrio , does lean toward double predestination in --
preference to Erasmus ' view of free will which seems to leave 
man's salvation in the realm of chance. he writes: "On your 
[Erasmus'] view, God will elect nobody, and no place for 
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charge that Luther's view of the God-man relationship is de-
terministic, if he means, as he seems to argue, that man is 
completely powerless to frustrate or resist the will of God 
in any way and that all men sin by necessity. If this be true, 
then it seems one of two alternatives follows. Either man is 
completely determined and those condemned for their sins are 
not really guilty because they could not have acted other than 
they did; or else even sinful man has natural freedom to ac-
cept or reject God's proffered grace and condemns himself only 
when he freely rejects God's grace and actually frustrates 
God's will that all men should be saved. Yet neither of these 
alternatives is taken by Luther. Luther simply refuses to 
break the paradox that God works all in all , yet man is respon-
sible for his sin and condemnation . Luther simply affirms his 
faith in an omnipotent God. God's omnipotence leads to a con-
cept of predestination where whatever God foreKnows and wills 
comes to pass by necessity and man has no freedom whatever 
election will be left; all that is left is freedom of the will 
to heed or defy the long-suffering and wrath of God. But if 
God is thus robbed of His power and wisdom in election, what 
will He be but just that idol, Chance, under whose sway all 
things happen at random? Eventually, we shall come to this: 
that men may be saved and damned without God's knowledge t For 
He will not have marked out by sure election those who should 
be saved ana those that should be damned; He will merely have 
set before all men His general long-suffering, which forbears 
and hardens , together with His chastening and punishing mercy, 
and left it to them to choose whether they would be saved or 
damned, while He Himself, perchance , goes off, as Homer says, 
to an Ethiopian Banquet t" (Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 
l99f . ) 
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with respect to fashioning or effecting his salvation. Why 
or how this is so is not open to rational speculation. In 
fact, according to Pinomaa, 1 it was to prevent such rational 
speculation that Luther wrote his De Servo Arbitrio. When 
this paradox is broken by philosophy, then one falls into the 
error of asserting a double predestination as Calvin did. Un-
like Calvin, "Luther never taught • • • a philosophical pre-
destination . "2 Instead he suggests that from God's point of 
view all is predestined and happens by necessity, but from 
the human point of view all things are, or at least appear to 
be contingent . 
Whether man is truly free with respect to his relationship 
to Goa can never be known . Therefore, according to Iwand,3 
theology must always be skeptical concerning human freedom in 
relation to man's ultimate destiny. It is this truth which 
Luther's De Servo Arbitrio seeks to preserve. 
Luther allows for the individual initiating his own acts 
without coercion, and for a creativity which comes bJ virtue 
of his choice, but he does not allow for an intrinsic unpre-
dictability in man ' s action from God's point of view. 4 Adler 
1L. Pinomaa, 11Dnf'reier Wille and Prlidestination bei Luther, 11 
Theo1ogische Zeitschrift, 13 (1957), 339- 49 . 
2Ibid. , p . 349 . 
3Hand J. Iwand~ "Studien zum Problem des unfreien Willens," 
Zeitschrift fur Systematische : heologie, 8(1931-32), 216-50 . 
4 M.J. Adler, op . cit . , p . 497. 
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also points out that Luther finds God's omniscience incompati-
ble with man's free will . Man has a free will in mundane 
things, but not in divine things . 1 Hence salvation and con-
derrmation are wholly in God's hands . He alone can create man 
and redeem or condewn him. Yet causality coram deo is not to 
be construed as causality coram homnibus. Again we are con-
fronted with the dualism in Luther' s thinking of the two realms . 
Furthermore, this dualism is never rationally explained by 
Luther since he affirms that human reason cannot penetrate the 
mystery of God in His majesty. Therefore reason only applies 
to the earthly realm. This makes God's predestination simply 
a matter of faith , almost wholly blind faith for Luther . 2 
The dualism of Luther's thinking also helps us to under-
stand why he is not much concerned with theodicy. Luther does 
not try to defend God and the harshness of His judgment which 
condemns the unrighteous in spite of the fact that they sin by 
necessity . Luther's views raise the problem of theodicy, but 
he in no way seeks to solve it . 3 
As was pointed out earlier, 4 Luther pictures God in His 
majesty as an arbitrary Lord who has mercy on those who please 
lM.J . Adler, op . cit. , p. 449 . 
2Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 101. Also, see above, p . 106 . 
3hans J . Iwand, op. cit . , p. 241 . 
4see above , p . 120; cf . Luther, Bondage of the Will, pp . 171, 
175ff . 
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Him and hardens the hearts of those who sin and displease Him. 
It is in this frame of mind that Luther, like Paul before him, 
likens man to a pot made by the Potter. Just as the pot has 
no right to ask why it is destroyed for its imperfections, 
neither has man the right to challenge God 1 s actions toward 
him. Luther argues that no one complains when God grants His 
forgiveness and grace to the undeserving, but let God condemn 
the evil or act against what man believes to be his own inter-
ests and man complains bitterly and calls God unjust or unlov-
ing. It is this seemingly irrational aura of authority which 
makes of God an arbitrary potentate in so much of Luther's 
theology and which causes humanists such as Erasmus, who advo-
cate the free will of man, to criticise Luther so severely. 
Pinomaa1 points out that Luther's dualism of God and Satan is 
transformed by Erasmus and modern humanism into a dualism be-
tween God and man and that this is the cause of Erasmus' mis-
interpretation of Luther's position concerning the free will 
of man . It is also the reason why modern Lutherans misinter-
pret Luther's conception of man 's freedom and bondage in his 
relation to God . 
Be that as it may, it still remains clear in this writer 's 
mind that it is Luther ' s failure to ma~e adequate provision for 
man's natural freedom coram deo as well as coram homnibus in 
1L. Pinomaa, op. cit., p. 346. 
183 
his De Servo Arbitrio which makes his basic position determin-
istic. Such a aeterministic position destroys man 's natural 
freedom and tends to reduce man to the level of a puppet. The 
unconditioned sovereignty of God which Luther espoused in his 
De Servo Arbitrio lets God be God, but fails to let man be man. 
For this, Erasmus, Melanchthon, Runestam, and otners rightly 
criticise Luther. Man without a truly free will in the sense 
of being able to choose between alternative courses of action 
in divine matters as well as human affairs, ceases to be truly 
human and cannot be held responsible for his actions . Such is 
the result of Luther's dualism between God and Satan which leads 
to a denial of free will in man coram deo. Furthermore, Lu-
ther's desire to ~ive God all the glory leads to the conception 
of a sovereign Goa who is quite irrational and arbitrary in 
His dealings with man. 
Carlson and billing, 1 as well as Forell,2 emphasize the 
sovereignty of God as it is expressea by Luther in his concept 
of the state. For Luther, autonomy, even in the so-called 
"secular realm," is a fiction. God is always in command of His 
world. For Luther, the Turk represents the rod of God's anger. 
Likewise the Christian is the mask of Goa. God is working in 
both good and evil men . However, Arvid Runestam criticizes 
l 
2 
E.M . Carlson, op. cit., p. 100. Here Carlson quotes Billing 
as saying that Luther bases his concept of the state on the 
sovereignty of God . 
G.W . Forell, op. cit., p . 130. 
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Luther for insisting on the unconditional omnipotence of God.l 
In speaking of the miraculous conception of Jesus in the 
Virgin Mary's womb, Luther argues that God was powerful enough 
to effect this event in Mary's life even though it was con-
trary to nature. 2 Luther insists at times that suffering is 
a token of the grace of God , 3 and that it is the will of God.4 
Yet at other times he argues that though most evil which comes 
is of God, not all of it is. 1hus, it is proper to defend 
ourselves from evil, and employ doctors and medicines, provided 
we are certain that it is not God's will that we suffer . 5 
Arminius criticizes and attacks views similar to these of 
1viljans frihet och den kristli'a friheten - en unders8kning i 
tuthers theologi {Upsala, i92l , pp . 67f . ; cited by E.M . Carl-
son, OE· cit., p. 54. There is much evidence of Luther inter-
preting God as irrational authority among Luther scholars; e . g . , 
Hans Lilje, Luther Now, trans. Carl J. Schindler (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, l952), p . 88f. Lilje writes: "Luther was 
confirmed in his faith that even the great leaders of men are 
only puppets whom God has placed on the stage of history and 
manipulates for his purposes . " Luther also suggested that it 
was God ' s will to lead the Church into calamity and God would 
preserve it . See also, Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, 
trans . Carl Rasmussen {Philadelphia : Muhlenberg Press, 1957), 
p. 138 . Wingren points out that Luther says that God could in-
ter vene and act directly in the affairs of men, e. g . , produce 
children without parents), yet God prefers to let men and women 
think that they are responsible for procreation . 
2Luther, What Luther Says, I, 151. 
3Luther, "Letters of Spiritual Counsel," ed. 'I'. G. Tappert in 
The Library of Christian Classics (London: S.C . M. Press, 1955) , 
XVIII, 33. 
4Ibid. , p . 36. 
sibid . , p. 230ff . 
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Luther in Calvinistic theology. He violently objects to them 
because they seem to make God into an arbitrary oriental tyrant 
and seem to reduce man to the level of a toy in t he hands of 
such a God . Therefore Arminius wades into the problem of the 
sovereignty of God where Luther refuses to tread. What Luther 
leaves vague and undefined as a tenet of faith, Arminius sets 
out to explore and explain. By asserting that God's will neces-
sitates nothing on the human level, and by affirming that man's 
free will is solely responsible for sin and evil in the world, 
Arminius seeks to solve the problems of predestination and 
theodicy. Let us turn now to Arminius' handling of the problem 
of the interrelationship of grace and free will in the God-man 
relationship. 
ii. Arminius' Denial of Irresistible Grace 
Arminius argues that the providence of God presides over 
all that can happen . Nothing is separate or isolated from the 
care and control of Goa. ~ven the free will of man and con-
tingent events which happen as the result of the action of such 
a free will are within God 's care and keeping . Furthermore, 
sin itself is under the providence of God. God permits sin, 
but it is under his control, and He either punishes or forgives 
it. 
But I most solicitously avoid two causes of offence --
that God be not proposed as the author of sin, ana that 
its liberty be not taken away from the human will. These 
are two points which, if anyone knows how to avoid, 
he will think upon no act which I will not in that 
case most gladly allow to be ascribed to the provi-
dence of God, provid~d a just regard be had to the 
divine pre-eminence. 
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This means for Arminius that God does not permit anything 
to happen in time or in human history which He has not decreed 
from all eternity. He foreknows everything that can or will 
happen in human history and His world. However, this does not 
mean, according to Arminius, that God's foreknowledge induces 
a necessity upon anything that does happen or will happen . In 
the mina of God things do not come to pass because theJ are 
foreknown , but are foreknown because they are yet to come to 
pass.2 
Similarly, the decrees of God do not make things come to 
pass by necessity. Decrees are decisions of God contained in 
His mind. They do not directly affect the things of this world 
or man's will until God chooses to employ them. 
Neither does the decree itself, by which the Lord 
administers providence and its acts, induce any 
necessity on things future; for, since it, the decree, 
is an internal act of God, it lays down nothing in 
the thing itself. But things come to pass either 
necessarily or contingently, according to the mode 
of power, which it has pleased God to employ in the 
lArminius, Writings, II, 468f. 
2 Ibid., II, 70. We must note here that such an idea is diffi-
cult to maintain . If man always has natural freedom, as 
Arminius argues that he does, then does it not follow that God 
must know some things contingently? Thus, may not some things 
come to pass in a certain way if man acts in one way, but in an 
entirely different way, if man chooses to act in another way? 
Arminius never fully develops this idea . 
1 
administration of affairs. 
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Such a view seeks to afford man natural freedom and at 
the same time let God be God. It tries to avoid determinism 
according to the will of God by allowing some things to happen 
contingently. Arminius argues, however, that just because some 
things happen contingently, this does not mean that they are 
outside the control and providence of God. God is able to alter 
His plans and purposes to suit each particular situation. To 
suggest that this is not so seems to Arminius to be wrong, 
because it woula lead to determinism and preclude the possi-
bility of man possessing a truly free will. 
If this is so, then how can God bring anything to pass 
surely and immutably in His relationship with man? If man has 
a truly free will, can he not frustrate God's will that all 
men be saved in such a way that all men are not saved? Is not 
man 's salvation wholly dependent upon man's free choice in the 
same way that it is wholly dependent upon God's grace? Must 
we not always speak dialectically about the God-man relation-
ship? Does this not mean that our hope of salvation is sure, 
if our faith in the grace of God is true, but if our faith be 
false, then our hope for salvation is not grounded in actual 
fact ana is false also? Be that as it may, if man is truly 
1Arminius, Writings, II , 70. Does not such a 'fence straddling' 
position pose a logical contradiction by arguing some things 
h~ppen by necessity and others contingently? Does it not leave 
a 'loophole' where God can, if he wills, override man 's natural 
freedom? Can things happen both necessarily and contingently 
or does man's natural freedom rule out all necessity? 
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free to accept or reject what God gives and does, then must 
not God foreknow all things contingently accoraing to the 
choice of man's will? God may certainly know all the possi-
bilities of what will happen, but can He know things absolutely 
and surely if man possesses natural freedom? Or can God bring 
things to pass necessarily if man possesses natural freedom? 
Must not things happen necessarily or contingently, depending 
upon whether or not we assert man has natural freedom? Since 
Arminius consistently argues for man's free will and makes sal-
vation contingent upon man's acceptance or rejection of grace, 
then it seems to follow that God must foreknow things in rela-
tion to man only in a contingent way. 
Arminius defines predestination as: 
The decree of the good pleasure of God, in Christ, by 
which he deterrrdned, within himself, from all eternity, 
to justify believers, to adopt them, ana to endow them 
with eternal life, "to the praise of the ~lory of his 
grace ," and even for the declaration of his justice.l 
He argues that this was God's decision and decree . It cannot 
be said that God was somehow motivated or cajoled into His 
decree by some action of man . In fact, it was from all eternity 
that God decided that He would send His Son into the world to 
redeem it from sin. Christ alone is the efficient cause of 
man's salvation. Nothing a man does can justify him in the 
sight of God. Salvation is the pure gift of Goa, willed by Him 
from all eternity. 
1Arminius, Writings, II, 99 . 
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On the other hand, reprobation is defined as~ 
The decree of God's anger or his severe will, by which, 
from all eternity, he determined to condemn to eternal 
death all unbelievers and impenitent persons, for the 
declaration of his power and anger; yet so, that un-
believers are visited with this punishment, not only on 
account of unbelief, but likewise on account of other 
sins from which they might have been delivered through 
faith in Christ . l 
Such predestination is the founda tion and cornerstone of 
the Christian faith . God's revealed will proclaims that all 
men should be saved . This gospel is for all men and not merely 
for the elect of God. Furthermore , the fact that God foreknows 
who will be saved and who will be conde~ed does not mean that 
Goa has determined it that way . It simply means tha t God fore-
knows all that will come to pass . 2 
This leads us to a very important point maae by Arminius, 
namely, that the foreknowledge of God and the aoctrine of pre-
destination do not preclude the free will of man . Only God is 
free , in the sense that He is bound and controlled by no one 
except Himself . Ee alone is truly sovereign . But such sover-
eignty of God does not mean that man's freedom must be taken 
away from him to maintain God ' s glory. 
Arminius argues strenuously for the fact that man enjoys 
freedom from all necessity. There is neither an external com-
pulsion nor an inner aeterminism which controls man . If there 
lArminius , Writings, II , 101 . 
2we must add, however, God foreknows what will come to pass in 
a contingent way, if man possesses natural freedom. 
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were either external compulsion or internal determinism, then 
it could not be said that man even has a will . There cannot 
even be such a t~ing as a will if it be not free . 1 This does 
not mean that man can do anything that he wills, or is equal 
to God . It does not mean that man c· nnot lose his freedom to 
do the good, or what we call spiritual freedom. It simply 
means that if all freedom be removed from the will of man, 
then man has no will at all, and, therefore, man has lost his 
humanity . 
In his innocent state man was free to choose and in fact 
did choose to disobey God and so fell into the state of sin. 
In this state of sin, man was not merely injured and weakened, 
he was imprisoned in sin and lost . In this state he has no 
powers for goodness unless the~ be elicited by the grace of 
God . The Scriptures make it plain that whoever co~mits sin 
is the servant of sin and that God ' s gracious act in Christ 
alone can free ffian from sin ' s grip upon him . But even in this 
state of bondage to sin, it cannot be said that all man's powers 
of freedom are destroyed . In other words, man still has the 
capacity to respond to the proffered grace of God . To assert 
the contrary is to say that man is not man, and, furthermore, 
that he is beyond redemption . Arminius is careful not to make 
such a claim. 
lArminius, Writings, I, 524 . In this sense Arminius' definition 
of free will is in substantial agreement with what we call 
man's natural freedom. 
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Neither does he say that free will can accomplish anything 
good without grace. 
I affirm, therefore, that this grace is simply and abso-
lutely necessary for the illumination of the mind, the 
due ordering of the affections, and the inclination of 
the will to that which is good •••• (God's grace is 
the source of all gooa and moves us to will and cooperate 
with God . ) 1his grace commences salvation, promotes it, 
and perfects and consummates it . 1 
But there are two limitations which Arminius places upon this 
idea of salvation by the grace of Goa. He will not allow it 
to be said that God's justice is set aside in His gracious act, 
nor will he let it rob man of his freedom to resist the prof-
fered grace of Goa . In fact, God's grace never destroys the 
freedom of man. It may and does give a right direction to 
man's will ana so corrects its depravity, but it can be re-
sisted (Acts 7:51), received in vain (II Cor. 6:1), and man 
can refuse to cooperate with the grace of God (Heb. 12:15; 
Matt . 23:37; Luke 7:30). 2 
Anyone who argues otherwise and makes God's grace an abso-
lutely determining power in man's salvation makes God the 
author of sin, makes the fall necessary, and takes away human 
responsibility for sin . This, it seems to Arminius, is impos-
sible to believe. Therefore salvation contes only to him who 
( • ) 3 consents to believe Mark 1:15; 16.16 • 
lArminius, Writ1n~, I I , 472. 
2ill5!., I, 228. 
Two important ideas 
3Ibid., I, 232; cf. John 3:16, 36; I Tim. 2:1-4. 
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are conveyed by Scriptures when they suggest that God offers 
His forgiveness to all men, but limits its effectiveness to 
whosoever will believe. 
This does not mean that God does not know who will be 
saved ana who will be condemned . God appointed His Son from 
all eternity to be a savior of all men. Those who repent and 
believe in him are saved by Goa, while those who refuse to 
believe He leaves in their sln and condemns them. And yet, 
Arminius argues, God foreknew who woula believe and who would 
not believe.l 
God does not, however, pick out particular persons whom 
He will bless ana grant them grace in order that they may 
believe and be saved. Nor does He withhold that grace from 
other particular persons and refuse to give them His g race and 
so condemn them. God's will is that all be saved. But God 
has resolved from all eternity to condemn unbelievers who by 
their own fault will not believe. God justly condemns such 
persons to reprobation.2 
To argue that God foreknows and, therefore, predetermines 
particular individuals to salvation and others to condemnation, 
leads logically to the blasphemy that Goa is the author of sin. 
On the other hana, to argue that man has the freedom to accept 
1 
2 
Arminius, Writings , I, 248. Again we ask: Does not God know 
this only in a contingent way, if man is truly free to choose 
what he prefers under the circumstances. 
Ibid., I, 568; cf. John 3:18; 12:37-40; II Thes . 2:10,11. 
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or reject God's grace seems to imply that it is ultimately 
man's freedom and not God 's grace that saves man . Such an 
argument seems fallacious, for at no time does Arminius sug-
gest that God 's grace is quiescent . It always goes before, 
with, and follows after man's decision to accept and cooperate 
with God, or his decision to reject and refuse to cooperate.l 
Therefore , it must be said that if a man comes to salva-
tion, he gives glory to God who accomplished it by His grace 
free ly received by man . On the other hand, if a man rejects 
the proffered grace, it is not God 's fault, but is attributed 
to the recalcitrant, unbending, and unreceptive will of man. 
This means that God has limited His power over man and will 
not force him in any way, nor determine his decisions. By 
virtue of the fact that Goa alone gives life, redeems life, 
and grants eternal life as a result of His pure , gracious, 
and good will, it can never be said that man saves himself, 
no matter how important his decision to accept or reject God's 
gifts may be . Yet, on the other hand, it may be affirmed, 
that if God gave man freedom, and so limited himself, it must 
be argued that man has the power to resist God's gracious 
gifts by refusing to cooperate with God . 
This position seems to limit God's sovereign power over 
man in such a way that it makes some monergists shudder. But 
Arminius prefers this solution to the seeming deterministic 
1Arminius, Writings, I, 298f. 
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solution of monergists, who argue that God's Spirit alone is 
active in man's salvation and man is wholly passive . 5uch a 
view, accoraing to Arminius, implies that God is the cause of 
sin and evil i n the worla, ana man is reduced to a will-less 
automaton. Since God has revealed Himself as a loving Father 
in His Son Jesus Christ; and man experiences 3uilt and respon-
sibility for his sin because he freely chooses it by resisting 
the work of God's ever-active Spirit; and God's foreknowledge 
ana predestination do not bring things to pass by necessity, 
it seems lo~ical for Arminius to argue for Goa's grace and 
man ' s free will cooperating in regeneration and salvation . 
Such is the conclusion to which Arminius is driven by his stuay 
of Scriptures , and his reason applied to those Scriptures , and 
his own experience as a human being created in the image of 
God . Since we define synergism as referring "specifically to 
the operation of man ' s will in the matter of conversion and 
salvation," it seems proper to label the view of Arm:nius as 
synergistic in nature . The key to this synergistic view is 
Ar minius' argument for man ' s God-given power to choose to ac-
cept and cooperate with God's grace in salvation or to reject 
the same, which he labels man's free will . 
2 . An Attempt to Resolve the Antithesis 
In the history of Christian thought, many ways of attempting 
to solve the apparent conflict between God's grace and man's 
free will in the matter of conversion and salvation have 
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presented themselves. 1 We have chosen to limit our disserta-
tion to the study of the view of a man like Luther, who 
argues from a monergistic position for salvation by grace 
alone, and to a man like Arminius, who argues from a syner-
gistic position that God's grace and man's will cooperate in 
salvation, because their positions on human freedom and bond-
age are sufficiently similar to permit comparison, and yet 
sufficiently different to provide distinctly divergent ap-
proaches to the problem of human freedom and bondage . We 
shall endeavor to explore two possible solutions to this 
dilemma of the interrelationship of God's grace and man's free 
will by a paradox of grace and the freedom of man's will which 
are posed by Luther and Arminius respectively. However, be-
cause their views do not cover all the ramifications of such 
a complicated problem, we shall, in this section, draw upon 
the views of other theologians too. 
i. In ~onergism and the Paradox of Grace 
A synergistic theologian like Arminius and humanists like 
Erasmus and Melanchthon were disturbed by the monergistic em-
phasis upon the grace of God as the one effective agent in 
man's redemption. One of the chief reasons for this is that 
a monergist like Luther frequently interprets God as an omni-
potent and extremely arbitrary Lord who can do, and does, any-
thing which pleases Him in dealing with His creation--man. 
lsee above , Chapter Two. 
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However, monergists like Luther are aware of the fact that man 
must possess some kind of freedom and a will. Augustine con-
tinued to insist that man had a free will; Luther admitted that 
God does not work in man without man participating in this work, 
and that man was created for the very purpose of cooperating 
with God . Paul's view implies that God's and man's action must 
be viewed paradoxically. Each of these men, whom we call mon-
ergists, seems to preclude human freedom and destroy man's 
humanity. This is why, in one way or another, they view God's 
and man 's action concerning salvation paradoxically. 
Luther felt duty-bound to deny freedom of man's will in 
divine matters, ana affirm the bondage of man's will in sin, 
and salvation by the grace of God alone, because Scriptures 
and human experience taught him that sinful man could not, by 
the sheer exertion of his will power, ma~e himself righteous 
in the eyes of Goa. Sinful man, and Luther believed that both 
Scriptures and human experience taught that all men are sinful, 
stands in need of God's grace, if reconciliation is to be 
effected between him and a righteous God. 
However, his argument for salvation by the grace of God 
alone, when that alone is taken as seriously as Luther took 
it, implies that man is wholly passive in his salvation. It 
follows, then, that God's grace and Spirit , when they are the 
only effective agents in salvation, seem to preclude man's 
natural freedom. This is true, if Luther's position that all 
things in the divine realm are necessitated by God's grace is 
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carried out to its logical conclusion in such a way that there 
is no room for human freedom of any kina . But in fairness to 
Luther, we must remember that he did not allow his position 
to be rationally developed and explored, but simply maintained 
the logical paradox, that all things are necessitated by God's 
will, yet man is responsible before God in spite of the fact 
that he sins by necessity. This paradox led Erasmus, ~elanch­
thon, and later humanistically oriented theologians to see an 
inherent danger in Luther's position, because it can easily 
be interpreted in such a way as to suggest that man is simply 
a sub-human automaton pushed to and fro by God and Satan . 
However, Luther's view of salvation by grace alone does 
make one very vital point clear; namely, that since all men 
sin, they stand under God's just condemnation ana will remain 
bound in that sin until God chooses to forgive them. But in 
his desire to let God be Goa, and be wholly sovereign in 
divine matters, Luther fails to carry out to its logical 
conclusion the message of the gospel that God gives His grace 
to all men and makes it effective in whosoever will believe 
and accept it. It is the absence of an explicit admission in 
his De Servo Arbitrio that even sinful man, who is bound in 
sin, has what we call natural freedom, i.e., the power to ac-
cept or reject what God gives and does in and through him, that 
opens Luther to so much criticism. 
Luther is convinced that if salva tion comes by grace, then 
man can do nothin0 to merit that gift . It is in this sense 
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that he opposes the Scholastic teaching of free will, because 
it seemed to imply that what ffian aces by his own free will, 
i.e., a will without grace, actually helps man in some way to 
merit salvation . The real antithesis in Luther's theology, 
which he himself did not see, is not God's grace versus man's 
free will (natural freedom) per ~' so much as it is salva-
tion by the grace of God alone, which precludes the so-called 
"Pelagian notion" that man 's will alone can do good and merit 
salvation without God's grace . Luther does not make this 
clear but seems to confuse be lief in n.an' s natural freedom 
with the Pelagian aoctrine of merit. 
Luther always seeks to interpret Scriptures and human 
reason in the light of Jesus Christ. 1 Jesus Christ, the Word 
made flesh, the incarnation of Divine love, is God 's way of 
speaking to man in a language which all can understand. While 
no one can understand God in His majesty, all can see and 
understand Him when He is revealed in Jesus Christ as the 
Secona Adam. 2 Therefore, if llianhood can attain the stature 
it attained in Jesus Christ by doing the will of God, man is 
assured that the God he worships and glorifies, if it be the 
Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, does not destroy man's powers 
and freedom, but fulfills them. Christ raises manhood to the 
level of becoming sons of God, Thus, like Christ, those who 
submit to the will of God regain the image and likeness of 
1Luther, Nhat Luther Says, I, 148. 
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God which they have lost through their estrangement in sin . 1 
This Jesus, who attained perfect manhood, never hesitated 
to point out that there is no one good, save God alone (Matt . 
19:17) . Nor did He hesitate to admit that His will was to do 
the will of Goa, and not to pursue His own will {John 4 : 34) . 
Furthermore, Jesus interpreted God's will as redeeming, resur-
recting, and making all life new (John 6:39f) . Doing the will 
of God brings true freedom (John 8:32) , and life more abundant 
{John 10: 10) . Such is the message of Jesus Christ, God' s love 
incarnate, who became the Second Adam and the Son of God, the 
ideal and goal of all human life . 
This is the paradox of Jesus' life. 2 He was acknowledged 
to be the greatest man who ever lived, yet, by His own teach-
ing, He admits that it was not He, but God who dwelt within 
Rim that made Him what He was, namely, the Second Adam and the 
Son of God. 
Certainly this was the insight of Paul when he said: 
nwork out your own salvation with fear and trembling: For it 
is God who worketh in you both to will and to do his good 
pleasure" (Phil . 2:12-13) . For it was his experience that 
man was saved, that is, brought into a right relationship with 
God, by faith (Rom. 1 : 17) . It was his experience that God ' s 
grace made him what he was, yet he labored harder than all 
1Luther, What Luther Says, II, 884 . 
2see D. M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p . 145ff . 
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the other apostles . But it was not his effort that made him 
great . Rather, it was the grace of God that worked in and 
through him (I Cor . 15:10). Thus does Paul explain his 
greatness by a paradox of grace . 
Characteristically, Luther forever argues that God 's 
grace alone saves man and brings him into a right relation-
ship with God, and man contributes no thing to his salvation; 
yet Gou never works in us without us. 1 Luther reveals his 
attitude in the following statement : 
Man before he is created to be man, does and en-
deavors nothing towards his being made a creature, 
and when he is made and created he does and endeavors 
nothing towards his continuance as a creature: both 
his creation and continuance come to pass by the 
sole will of the omnipotent power and goodness of 
God, who creates us and preserves us without our-
selves. Yet God does not work in us without us; for 
He created and preserved us for this very purpose, 
that He m~ght work in us and we might cooperate 
with Him. 
Over and over Luther resorts to statements like this in 
all areas of theology, because he assumes that man, to be 
man, must respond to and work with God in his salvation . Be-
cause this is so, and because Luther in his De Servo Arbitrio 
remains so adamant in maintaining salvation by grace alone to 
avoid any concept of human merit, and because he fails to 
state explicitly that man has what we call natural freedom, 
i . e ., the God-given power to reject God's proffered grace or 
lsee above, p.l75f, where Luther's position makes provision for 
a paradox of grace . 
2 Luther, Bondage of the Will, p . 102f. 
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to accept and cooperate with it -- his view is open to severe 
criticism, and he is often charged with advocating philoso-
phical determinism. 
D.M . Baillie sums up the divine-human encounter with these 
words which explain the paradox of grace. 
Thus the paradoxical Christian secret, while it tran-
scends the moralistic attitude by ascribing all to 
God, does not make us morally irresponsible . That is 
part of the paradox. No one knows better than the 
Christian that he is free to choose and that in a 
sense everything depends upon his choice . Pelagius 
was quite right to insist upon that, if he thought 
it was being compromised by the extreme statements 
of the zealous Augustine. My actions are my very 
own, expressions of my own will, my own choice. No 
one else can choose for me or relieve me of the respon-
sibility. ~hen I make the wrong choice, I am entirely 
responsible, and my conscience condemns me. And yet 
(here is the paradox) when I make the right choice, 
my conscience does not applaud or congratulate me. 
I do not feel meritorious or glow with self-esteem 
if and in so far as I am a Christian. Instead of 
that I say: 'Not I, but the grace of Goa.' Thus 
while there is a human side to every good action, 
so that it is genuinely the free choice of a person 
with a will, yet somehow the Christian feels that 
the o~ner siae of it, the Divine side, is logically 
prior. The grace of Goi is prevenient. The good was 
His before it was ours . 
This, Baillie contends, is why the Christian can enjoy true 
Christian liberty beyond mere morality and le0 alism, which 
lead to false notions of man meriting or earning salvation . 
God created us to become His sons, who gain true freedom when 
God's Spirit controls and possesses them.2 
1n.M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1948), p. 116 . 
2Ibid. , p. 121; cf., p. 145, where Baillie argues that the 
paradox of grace enables us to understand the Incarnation. 
202 
This, then, is the critical point for the monergist. No 
concept of salvation which implies that man is able, by the 
exercise of his own will power, to earn or merit salvation 
can be tolerated . In this sense, Luther maintained that sal-
vation comes by the grace of God alone, and not by the free 
will of man, which does good works and merits salvation. 
If monergists can avoid robbing man of his natural free-
dom by affirming a paradox of grace in the God-man relation-
ship with respect to man's conversion and salvation, then 
their position lets God be God without removing all of man's 
freedom. Such a position has the advantage of preserving the 
Biblical truth that the salvation of sinful man comes by grace 
alone without any merit or worthiness on man's part . It has 
the weakness, however, of being in danger of so emphasizing 
the sovereignty of God and His grace in the matter of conver-
sion and salvation that man's will, and therefore man himself, 
is in danger of extinction. Luther's approach to the problem 
of man 's freedom and bondage is a good example of this danger . 
Both creation and redemption are glorious works of God in 
man . But one must beware of letting soteriology undermine the 
essentially good creation which God has made, as happened in 
some of the theology of later interpreters of Luther. 1 If God 
created man in His image, and if part of this image is that 
man is capable of fellowship with God, then no view of sin, 
1
see , for example Donald MacKenzie "Synergism," in Encyclopedia 
of Religion and Ethics , XII, 160. Also, see above p . 43ff . 
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bondage in sin, or salvation from sin should be allowed to 
destroy the essential goodness of God's creation of man in 
His image. No matter how perverted man may become through 
his sin or how distorted the image of God in man becomes, 
that image must be present to some degree if man is truly a 
human being capable of redemption and fellowship with God. 
If this is not so, then man is beyond the help even of God's 
grace and is incapable of being saved. 
Similarly, part of what it means to be created in the 
image of God means that man, like God, can take a hand in 
fashioning his destiny . Unlike the animal, he has a rational 
capacity which makes it possible for him to make choices be-
tween alternative courses of action and not be dfiven by in-
stincts or forces which wholly determine him. Therefore, 
part of the native equipment which God gives man with his 
rational faculties is what we call natural freedom. It is 
this freedom which enables man to be a moral creature who is 
capable of knowing what sin is and to feel the pangs of guilt . 
Therefore, no matter how bound in sin a man becomes, he still 
possesses his God-given freedom to choose what he prefers 
under the circumstances in which he finds himself. This is 
a freedom which he possesses and must continue to possess so 
long as he is a creature created in God 's image. It is for 
this reason that men like Arminius argue that even sinful man 
has and always possesses, when God's grace comes to him, the 
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power to choose either to accept God's grace and be delivered 
from bondage to sin and obtain salvation by cooperation with 
that grace ; or he has ana alwags possesses freedom to resist 
and reject that grace, and so be condemned by God . We shall 
turn now to the argument for man's free will from a syner-
gistic point of view . 
ii . In Synergism and the Free Will of Man 
A theologian li4e Arminius argues for the natural freedom 
of man. It seemed obvious to him that if we take away man's 
freedom of choice , we exonerate him from all responsibility 
for his actions and undermine all morality . In fact, the 
views of some monergists , as far as Arminius was concerned, 
seemed to destroy man himself by turning him into a puppet 
wholly controlled by forces outside of himself and reauced 
him to a will-less automaton . 
As we pointed out in Chapter Two, in his quarrel with 
Augustine, Pelagius was bent on defending the natural freedom 
of man . In this way , he attempted to preserve the essential 
goodness of God and His creation by putting the burden of sin 
and evil on the free will of man. It was not his purpose to 
prove that there was a man who was sinless. Rather, he sought 
to preserve the natural freedom of man by insisting that , in 
theory at least, it was possible for man not to sin over 
against the Augustinian position that man was not able not to 
sin. However, if Augustine's report of Pelagius' argument is 
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correct, what Pelagius failed to articulate was that when man 
sins, he becomes so bound in sin that he cannot in any way 
extricate himself' from that sin. Without grace , and unable to 
make reparations for his sin through good works enacted by his 
free will, man is destined to ultimate destruction. 
Erasmus, too, defended the natural freedom of man . But 
he was more cautious than Pelagius in asserting that man 
could attain goodness without grace . Erasmus admitted that 
the grace of God was necessary to man's salvation, but he re-
served the right for men to differ as to the precise mode of 
the Holy Spirit's operation . It seemed to Erasmus that man 
has power to fulfill God 's commandments, otherwise morality 
becomes a farce. What he sought to establish in his argument 
with Luther was what we call the natural freedom of man to 
choose actually to obey or to disobey God and His will for man. 
This power to choose what one prefers under the circumstances 
is what Erasmus called free will . 
Unlike Luther, Arminius argues for regeneration and sal-
vation by both God's grace and man's free will. By free will 
Arminius also means what we call natural freedom. Such freedom, 
however, puts definite limitations upon God and His sovereignty. 
He argues that any such limitations are wholly self-imposed. 
Goa's will is limited by that which is possible under the con-
ditions of preserving man's freedom to accept or reject God's 
grace . 
206 
Like Luther, Arminius argues that sinful man cannot get 
himself into a right relationship with God without grace , 
i.e., he lacks spiritual freedom. After man has fallen into 
sin, and all men do sin, man becomes the servant of sin and 
remains bouna in that sin until God chooses to forgive him. 
The New Testament reveals, however, that in the life and minis-
try of Jesus Christ, God has forgiven all men and seeks to 
restore them to fe llowship with Himself. 
Unlike Luther, Arminius explicitly states that man always 
has a will which is free from necessity. Such a will has the 
ability and power, when God's grace comes to man-- and God 's 
grace is always present and active -- to accept or reject the 
proffered gift of God. Therefore, regeneration and salvation 
always demand the cooperation of two agents, namely, God and 
man. Each has his work to do. God grants His grace and man 
must accept or reject that grace. 
God in the act of creating man in His image, which makes 
man little less than God, has given to him an essential or 
natural freedom that is inviolate. This freedom remains a part 
of man's natural equipment even after he has fallen into sin. 
To be sure, the sinner loses his spiritual freedom to do good 
and to please God, and can in no wise get himself into a right 
relationship with God without grace . Only God and His grace 
can forgive man's sin and remove his guilt . Only God can offer 
forgiveness to all who will accept it. Man without this gracious 
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offer would simply remain oound in his sin. It is never ar-
minius' in~ention to imply that free will can merit salvation 
and get man into a right relationship with God . 1 This can 
occur only when God offers His grace, as He has already done 
in Jesus Christ, and when man accepts and appropriates this 
gift with his free will . 
According to Arminius, it may be properly argued that 
while Christ died for all , the saving benefits of God's grace 
are granted only to believers. Only the man who believes and 
does not resist the calling of the Holy Spirit through the 
gospel can be saved.2 
The distinctive teaching of Arminius is that God has 
not only 5iven to man rational understanding, but also a free 
will . This means that man has power to do what jod prohibits 
and fails to do what God commands. He can ana does resist 
the will of God. Yet God never acts in such a way that he 
robs man of his freedom and ability to act . 3 
This in no way robs God of His glory, nor man of his free-
dom. Arminius properly maintains that both grace and free will 
must cooperate in man's salvation. Neither precludes or ex-
cludes the other. Sinful man does not have the power to do 
good and cannot, therefore, earn merit for his salvation . Nor 
does man have the power to save himself in any way. Only God 
and His grace can accomplish that . Only Goa can and does for-
1Arminius, Writings, I, 600f. 2Ibid., I, 316 . 
3 Ibia., II , 40 . 
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give man's sin and set him free from its bondage through Jesus 
Christ. out even man bound and lost in sin is never without 
the power to accept or reject God's grace . To suggest that 
sin or bondage in sin robs man of his natural freedom, is to 
suggest that man has completely lost the image of God in him 
and his humanity. Therefore, it follows that salvation is the 
corporate and cooperating venture of God's grace and man 's 
free will. 
In this sense, and in this context, Arminius' quotation 
of Bernard maKes sense and is a valuable contribution to Chris-
tian thought. 
What then, you ask, does free will do? I reply with 
brevity, it saves. Take away FREE WILL, and nothing 
will be left to be saved. Take away GRACE, and nothing 
will be left as the source of salvation. This work of 
salvation cannot be effected without two parties --
one, from whom it may come: the other, to whom or in 
whom it may be wrought. God-r5 the author of salva-
tion. Free will is only capable of being saved. No 
one, except God, is able to bestow salvation; and ~oth­
ing, except free will, is capable of receiving it. 
The strength of this position is that it clearly and unam-
biguously makes adequate provision for man's natural freedom, 
without denying the absolute need for grace and its practical 
priority in man's salvation. 
The weakness of such a position is inherent in its use of 
the term "free will." This term, as we have seen, is a "weasel 
word." It can be made to mean almost anything, e.g., the ab-
sence of compulsion or necessity, unrestricted power to do 
1Bernardus, De Libero Arbitrio et Gratia; cited by Arminius , 
Writings, I, 531. 
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anything one wills, real freedom to choose between alternatives, 
or the mere psychological experience of choosing for which de-
terminists make allowance . 
However, the mo s t important thing to remember here is 
that the term "free will" historic a lly carries with it the 
idea of merit in Christian theology. Therefore, anyargument 
for man's free will in the matter of regeneration or salvation 
must carefully avo id such a connotation. For it is, strictly 
speaking, merit, and not human freedom per ~, that salvation 
by grace alone precludes . 
To avoid such confusion, we would suggest that the term 
natural freedom be used to convey what Arminius means by free 
will. It is the contention of this writer that such freedom 
does not imply merit of any kind . l 
3. Summary 
Luther's central motif that the salva tion of sinful man 
is to be ascribed solely to the grace of God and redound to 
His glory sets the stage for a monergistic interpretation of 
the God-man relationship that precludes the free will of man 
meriting salvation in any way. This is the key to a ll moner-
gistic interpretations of salvation, na mely, that Pelagianism 
and all of its forms are to be ruled out as unscriptural and 
contrary to Christian faith and life. Luther sees the semi-
Pelagianism of the medieval theologians, with which he has to 
lHow and why this is so, we shall discuss in the next chapter . 
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do, ana its teaching of free will, as man's egocentric and 
sinful attempt to merit salv&tion by purchasing g race through 
the good works man's free will produces . 
Luther's teaching of the will in bondage makes it clear 
that sinful man can do nothing to remove the guilt of his sin 
and the condemnation it brings. Therefore, sinful man is 
utterly dependent upon the grace of God alone for his salva-
tion. Only after God frees man from sin by His grace and makes 
man righteous through faith, can man really do good works. But 
good works are the fruit of God's grace, and the work of His 
Spirit , and never earn grace or merit salvation in any way. 
Luther's denial of man's free will coram deo does not 
seek to rob man of all his freedom. However, he never speci-
fically spells out what freedom man has in matters concerning 
salvation. 'J:·hus, it seems to some of his interpreters that 
he robs man of all his freedom coran deo. By setting up grace 
and free will as opponents instead of grace and merit, he 
tends to confuse the real issue, which is salvation by grace 
or by the merit of man's works accomplished by man's free 
will. Furthermore, Luther's seeming denial of all free will 
coram deo in his De Servo Arbitrio, coupled with his emphasis 
upon the complete sovereignty of God whose will makes all 
things happen by necessity, (and even man to sin by necessity), 
makes it impossible, logically speaking, to affirm that man 
has any real or natural freedom coram deo. 
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Luther's dualism and his teachings which support a para-
dox of grace indicate that he does not seek to rule out all 
human freedom coram deo . Rather, his teachings in his De Servo 
Arbitrio simply oppose any logical development of God's saver-
eignty and man ' s freedom. He affirms that God works all in 
all in both good and evil men and that somehow man is still 
responsible before God . 
At no t i me is man's f reedom coram homnibus denied. In 
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fact, it does not seem to play any significant part a t all in 
Luther ' s doctrine of human freedom and bondage, except to in-
dicate that he believes man is qualitatively different from 
animals and holds the same kind of sovereign sway over crea-
tures under him as God holds over him. 
Thus, human freedom is denied coram deo by Luther only 
in the sense that the free will of man, i . e . , man without grace, 
can do no good thing that will merit him salvation. But Lu-
ther's view does open itself to criticism concerning his 
insistence upon the unconditional sovereignty of God, which 
seems to preclude any freedom in man coram deo, if his view 
is carried to its logical conclusion, which, we must remember , 
Luther refrained from doing . 
On the other hand, Arminius attempts to do what Luther 
studiously sought to avoid doing, na~ely, to develop a rational 
explanation of how God ' s sovereignty and man ' s free will work 
together in salvation . His motif that man has a free will, 
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{i . e . , natural freedom), undercuts irresistible grace, which 
Calvinistic predestinarians affirmed when they expounded 
God's sovereignty in a philosophically deterministic way. 
Arminius 1 aim was to avoid the implications of philo-
sophical determinism which make Goa ' s will the necessary 
cause of all things, even sin and evil, by undermining the 
natural freedom of man . 
Unlike Luther, Arminius maintained that Goa's omniscience 
and eternal decrees do not impose necessity upon things on 
this earth . He even suggests that things come to pass, not 
because they are foreknown by God, but are foreknown because 
they are yet to come to pass . He never admits that God's 
fore~nowledge is contineent because man has a truly free will. 
Ee does suggest, however, that things come to pass either 
contingently or necessarily as God wills. This seems to pose 
a logical contraaiction, until we note that elsewhere Arminius 
argues consistently for man ' s freedom to resist God's grace . 
Therefore, salvation is contingent upon man's free choice 
either to accept God's grace or repudiate the same. If this 
is so, then it seems that in the God-man relationship, God 
foreknows things in a contingent way, though Arminius never 
admits this . 
Like Luther, Arminius argues that God has revealed in 
Christ that He predestines all to salvation, and like Luther, 
he sees a mystery which surrounds the fact that apparently 
some are not saved; yet, unlike Luther, Arminius argues quite 
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consistently that salvation is contingent upon man's accep-
tance or rejection of God's grace . Thus, predestination and 
the foreknowledge of God do not preclude man's free will. Man 
is determined neither by an external compulsion nor by an 
inner necessity. If he were, then it could not be said that 
man even has a will; for there can be no will in man, if it 
be not free. 
Like Luther, Arminius states that man's free will does 
not imply that he can do whatever he wills to do . Furthermore, 
when man sins, and all men do sin, he loses his spiritual free-
dom to do good, please God, and merit salvation. He becomes 
bound in sin, and cannot in any way extricate himself from the 
guilt and condemnation of his sin without grace . Yet even in 
this state of bondage, man has power, when God' s grace comes 
to him, to accept or reject God 's proffered grace . 
God offers His grace to all men , but limits the effective-
ness of that grace to persons who choose to believe . So in 
one sense, salvation is wholly dependent upon God's grace, 
but in another sense, it is wholly dependent upon man 's free 
will, which accepts or rejects that grace . It cannot be said, 
however, that it is man 's free will and not grace that saves 
him, any more than it can be said that it is the grace of God 
alo ne and not man 's free will that saves sinful man. Grace , 
like man's will, is ever present and active, and grace always 
precedes, goes with, and follows after man's decision to 
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accept a nd cooperate with God's grace or to reject the same . 
In this sense, it may be said that grace and free will 
cooperate in man's salvation, and reprobation is decreed by 
God from all eternity for those who refuse to believe in 
God's gracious act of forgiveness in Jesus Christ, and there-
fore they do not obtain forgiveness for their sin and God 
justly condemns them. 
Unlike Luther, Arminius ' argument for free will decidedly 
limits the sovereignty of God. For Arminius, however, this 
is preferable to the apparently deterministic view of moner-
gists, who argue that Gou 1 s Spirit alone is active in man's 
salvation and man himself is purely passive . 
The key to Arminius' synergistic view, then, is his argu-
ment for man's God-given power to accept and cooperate with 
God in salvation or to reject the same. Arminius calls this 
power free will, but we would call it man's natural freedom. 
Thus, the thinking of Luther and Arminius concerning 
man's freedom and bondage set the stage for attempting to re-
solve the apparent antithesis between God's grace and man's 
free will in the monergistic argument for a paradox of grace 
and the synergistic argument for man's free will. 
The basis for the monergistic argument for a paradox of 
grace is the recognition that Luther was not contending 
against man's natural freedom per~' but against man's free 
will obtaining merit coram deo, as the arguments of medieval 
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theologians seemed to imply. It is the Christian's experience 
that it is God alone who works all good in us, though we too 
have work to do. But Paul, Luther, D. M. Baillie, and others 
have discovered that it was God's grace and not something man 
did that brought salvation to sinners. 
The Christian is free to choose between alternative courses 
of action, and so is responsible before God for the sin he 
commits . But when he chooses rightly, he does not claim merit, 
but says with Paul, "Not I, but the grace of God accomplished 
this good in me." 
Thus do monergists avoid robbing man of his natural free-
dom in his relation with God . The strength of this argument 
inheres in its firm insistence upon the Biblical truth that 
salvation comes by grace through faith without any merit or 
worthiness on man's part. The danger is, however, (particularly 
when one argues, as Luther did, that man has no free will at 
all coram ~) of so emphasizing the sovereignty of God and 
His grace, that man's will, and therefore man himself, is in 
danger of theological extinction. 
The basis for the synergistic argument for man 's free 
will is Arminius' recognition of the fact that the sovereignty 
of God and his grace do not preclude man's free will (or what 
we would call natural freedom) to accept or reject what God 
seeks to do in and through him. 
To allow any view of God and His sovereignty to destroy 
man's natural freedom is to assert a determinism according to 
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God's will and undercut man's moral responsibility before God. 
Such a view also tends to make God the author of sin and evil 
in the world. 
Arminius argues that both God's grace and man's free will 
are active agents in man's salvation. Furthermore, man's 
natural freedom and God's grace are not mutually exclusive. 
God's grace must ana does free man from his bondage in sin, 
but man has ana always possesses the God-given power to accept 
and cooperate with God's grace or to reject the same. 
Part of what it means to be created in the image of God 
is to possess natural freedom which is inviolate, even after 
man's fall into sin and its bondage. Thus man's natural free-
dom, given by God in creation, is not lost by his sin, no 
matter how seriously sin distorts God's image in him and makes 
it difficult for him to choose the good . However, when God's 
grace comes to man, he has power to accept (or reject) that 
grace which alone can restore to man the lost image of the 
righteousness and perfection which he once had in Adam. But 
since grace is absolutely essential to the restoration of that 
marred image, it can never be said that man's proper use of 
his freedom can obtain salvation without grace . 
The strength of such a view is that it clearly makes ade-
quate provision for man's natural freedom and essential good-
ness which he always has and must possess t o some degree to be 
human, without denying the absolute need for grace and its 
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practical priority, which he, estranged from God by the guilt 
of his sin, must have if he is to obtain salvation or the 
restoration of his lost righteousness. 
The weakness of such a view is inherent in its use of 
the term "free will," which may, and in fact does, mean so 
many different things to different people in different con-
texts . Most important of all, however, is the fact that his-
torically the term "free will" has carried with it connotations 
of merit . Strictly speaking, however, it is merit , and not 
human freedom per~~ that salvation by g race alone precludes. 
To avoid this confusion, we suggest that the term "natural 
freedom" be substituted for the term "free will." 
CHAPTER VI. 
SUMMARY AND CRITICAL COMMENTS 
In preparation for the conclusions of this dissertation, 
we will use this chapter to review, summarize, and develop 
the various problems which our study of the teachings of Luther 
and Arminius pose concerning the freedom and bondage of man. 
As we have seen in Chapter Five , Luther and Arminius ap-
proach the problem of human freedom and bondage from two dif-
ferent perspectives. It is Luther's primary concern that the 
salvation of sinful man be ascribed to the grace of God alone, 
in opposition to a medieval theological position which suggests 
that God's grace empowers man's free will to do good and so 
merit salvation . It is against this sort of teaching that 
Luther insists that man's free will, coram deo, is a fiction, 
because it is grace and not the merit of man's will that 
brings salvation . Hence he sees in Erasmus' argument for free 
will a form of the so-called "Pelagian" argument for man 
meriting salvation by his works without grace . 
Arminius , in his writings, argues consistently for the 
free will of man . It is his chief concern to affirm man 's 
God- given freedom to choose between alternatives against a 
kind of Calvinistic predestinarianism that seemed to be wholly 
deterministic in nature, and therefore destructive of man's 
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natural freedom. Yet Arminius• teaching about the free will 
of man in no way seeks to imply that the proper use of man's 
free will can merit salvation . 
In any comparison between these two men and their teachings 
of man's freedom and bondage, the essential difference between 
the aims and purposes of their teaching, and the different 
contexts in which they write , must always be borne in mind . 
It must also be kept in mind that when Luther speaks of free 
will , he means primarily a power or capacity in man like unto 
God's whereby man can choose to do anything he wills . Luther 
believes that man has such power in the earthly realm, where 
God has given him dominion over the earth and all things under 
him (Gen . 1 : 26ff . ; 2:19f . ) . For Luther, however , it was neces-
sary to deny such freedom to man coram deo, because it implied 
that man was equal to God and , furthermore, that if sinful man 
had such freedom, he could choose to do good in God ' s eyes and 
merit salvation without grace . 
Arminius, on the other hand, defines free will primarily 
as freedom from necessity of any kind, because such freedom 
inheres in the will of man by its very nature, and a will that 
is determined, and not free , is no will at all . This means for 
Arminius that man is given freedom by God to do or not to do 
what God commands and to accept or reject what God gives to man 
by His grace . Eut such free choice does not imply merit of any 
kind, because the salvation of sinful man comes by the grace of 
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God and not by the merit of man's works. It is Arminius' pri-
mary concern to oppose theological determinism in both the con-
cept of man's sin and salvation, in order to make adequate 
provision for man's natural freedom and, consequently, his 
humanity . 
When one keeps these differences in mind, it becomes 
significant that Luther began his argument for the denial of 
man's free will coram deo in his quarrel with Erasmus by as-
serting the absolute and complete sovereignty of God. From 
what appears to be a wholly deterministic position, Luther ar-
gued that whatever God wills or decrees must come to pass by 
necessity . Therefore, man has no free will at all in divine 
matters. While it is possible, as some authorities suggest, 1 
that Luther in his De Servo Arbitrio was oblivious to the 
problem of philosophical determinism, and that he wrote this 
work expressly to avoid philosophical speculation concerning 
predestination, and that it teaches that Christians must remain 
skeptical concerning human freedom with respect to man's ulti-
mate destiny, it nevertheless appears quite clear that Arminius 
views such a deterministic position to be destructive of man's 
natural freedom . Thus Arminius teaches that God chose to limit 
His sovereignty over man by s iving him freedom to choose between 
alternatives. In this way he seeks to avoid the pitfalls of 
theological determinism in a way Luther did not . 
If God's sovereignty (Gottes Allwirken) is a matter of 
lsee for example: Eduard Schweingruber, Luthers Erlebnis des 
unfreien ~illens (Zurich, 1947), p . 58ff.; and above p. l80ff. 
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faith, which may not be logically or philosophically explored 
and developed, then we must ask: Why does Luther use it in 
his polemic against Erasmus to buttress his argument against 
man's free will? Furthermore , if his teaching that free will 
without grace does nothing but sin, is intendea to controvert 
the "Pelagian notion" that man's free will without grace can 
do good and merit salvation, what does such an idea do to the 
affirmation that man is responsible before God? Whether or 
not we explain this apparently aeterministic position of Luther 
and the irrational aura of authority which he ascribed to God's 
sovereign will by his dualistic view, it cannot be denied that 
Luther's De Servo Arbitrio creates misunderstanding by affirm-
ing a determinism according to the will of God and by apparently 
denying all freedom in man's will coram deo. 
It is, therefore, this writer's contention that Arminius' 
insistence upon God's self-limitation of His sovereignty and 
natural freedom of man are helpful safeguards against the 
apparently deterministic statements of Luther in his argument 
with Erasmus . Luther's extreme view in his ~e Servo Arbitrio 
tends to distort the Scriptural concept of the interrelation-
ship of God's grace and man ' s free will (natural freedom) in 
salvation. 
Luther is so convinced that God's sovereignty works all 
in all in man's salvation, that to suggest, as Arminius does , 
that God limits himself by giving man power to resist the work 
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of His Spirit would simply undermine the certainty of God's 
promises and the sureness of the Christian faith. Rather than 
risk the notion that man's free will can upset God's will and 
purpose for man and the worla, Luther prefers to affirm para-
doxically that God is wholly sovereign ana works all in all 
in both good and evil men, yet somehow man is responsible for 
his sin, and God justly condemns him. How or why this is so 
is a mystery which belongs to God and His Majesty alone, and 
man has no right to question God and His activity. 1 
It is at this point that Ar~inius seeks to supply, through 
the use of Script~res and reason, an explanation which Luther 
suggests it is not lawful to seek. 2 Because Arminius is on 
his guard against theological determinism, he teaches that God 
chooses to limit Himself by making covenant with man and by 
giving man real freedom to choose to do or not do what God com-
mands. Thus, for Arminius, aeterminism according to the sover-
eign will of Goa is impossible, and man, not Goa, is respon-
sible for all sin ana evil in the world. Yet such a free will 
as man enjoys as a gift from God does not carry with it any 
implications of merit. 3 
Arminius believes that Scriptures teach that God offers 
His grace to all men, but limits the effectiveness of that 
grace to whoever will believe. But in oraer to prevent a con-
cept of the essential unpredictability of man 's action from 
1see above, p. l20f; cf., p. 180f. 
3see above, pp. 191, 158ff . 
2see above, p. l20f. 
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God's point of view, Arminius suggests that God gives His 
prevenient grace only to those whom He fore~nows will believe 
and withholds it from those whom He foreknows will not be-
lieve . Such foreknowledge does not induce necessity upon 
anyone. Things do not come to pass because God foreknows 
them, but Goa foreknows them because they are yet to come to 
pass . Why or how this is so, Arminius does not explain, but 
we shall deal with the problem this poses a little later. 
While there are some passages in Scripture which seem to 
support man's being wholly determined by God 's sovereign will 
{e.g ., Rom. 3:9ff.; 9:10ff . ; Matt . 24:14; John 13:18; and the 
like); and the Bible affirms that sinful man can do nothing 
to merit salvation, but is wholly depenaent upon God's grace 
{e . g ., John 15:5; Gal . 2:16; Eph. 2:8; and the like); and that 
no merit inheres even when a man does all that is commanded of 
him (Luke 17:10); nevertheless, as was pointed out above,l the 
Scriptures on the whole do not deny man's natural freedom of 
choice which makes him a responsible creature before God. The 
Biblical witness only denies that sinful man has the ability 
to perform good works which can, without grace, earn him sal-
vation. 
One passage from the Gospel of John (9:39-41) will illus-
trate what we mean concerning man's freedom and responsibility 
before God. Jesus points out: 
lsee above, pp. 14-30. 
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"It is for judgment that I have come into this world 
--to give sight to the sightless and to make blind 
those who see. 11 Some Pharisees in his company asked, 
"Do you mean that we are blind?" "If you were blind," 
said Jesus, "you woula not be guilty, but because you 
say 'We see 1 , your guilt remains." ( 'l'he New English 
Bible .) 
In Jesus' mind at least, guilt demanas moral responsibility, 
and moral responsibility demands freedom to act in a way other 
than the Pharisees actually chose to act. This is what we mean 
by man's natural freedom to choose which implies responsibility 
and incurs actual guilt when man chooses wrongly. It is also 
what Arminius means by freedom from determinism of any kind-
Such freedom implies moral responsibility. The absence of it 
precludes moral responsibility . 
Scriptures also make it clear that Goa demands nothing 
less than perfection (Matt . 5:48). Once man loses that per-
fection by actually falling into sin, and all men do sin (Rom. 
3:9ff . }, then there can be no talk of salvation by merit 
through performance of the works of the law (Gal. 2 :16), but 
only salvation by the grace of God (~~h. 2:8). 
Ar~inius is in accord with Scriptures when he affirms 
man's natural freedom and consequent moral responsibility be-
fore God. By teaching man's bondage in sin, however, he 
denies man spiritual freedom to get himself into a right rela-
tionship with God by means of the works of his free will, which 
some believe merit salvation for sinful man. 
Luther does teach in his concept of the human will in 
bondage that a proper definition of free will might be man's 
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inherent potentiality ana capacity to be caught up by God's 
Spirit and made fit for salvation . But he never spells out 
the implications of this potentiality or capacity which man 
has. However, his teaching in nis De Servo Arbitrio, though 
deterministic in nature , 1 does make room for a paradox of 
grace and, consequently, man's natural freedom. 2 It is this 
that makes Luther so difficult to understand. On the one 
hand, by suggesting that man has no free will coram deo and 
arguing for determinism according to the sovereign will of 
Goa, Luther seems to precluae all freeaom inman coram deo. 
On the other hand, he makes provision for man's natural free -
dom via a paradox of grace. 
Arminius attempts to define this God- g iven potentiality 
and capacity of which Luther speaks as man's God-given power 
to choose in such a way that it precludes any vestiges of 
determinism in the God-man relationship and, at the same time, 
avoids any implications of merit which often accrue in teach-
ings of man's free will coram deo . 
On the basis of this evidence, it may be argued that both 
Luther and Arminius affirm man's natural freedom corarr- deo, 
though the latter is much clearer and more precise in his affir-
mation of this freedom than the former. 
However, both Luther and Arminius affir~ the biblical 
teaching that once man falls into sin, he becomes bouna in sin 
1see above, p. ll5f . 2see above, p . 175f. 
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and is wholly powerless to do anything to extricate himself 
from that sin ana its consequent guilt . 'I'hey make it clear 
that sinful man does not merit salvation through the good 
works performed by man's free will. Luther admits that man 
can gain a certain civil righteousness by virtue of his good 
works, but coram deo, such works never justify the sinner . 
Both Luther ana Arminius agree that it is God's preveni-
ent grace which prepares sinful man, who is bound and lost in 
his sin, for the subsequent reception of God's gracious offer 
of forgiveness in Christ. Luther calls this God 's "alien 
work" through the law, which reveals to man his sinfulness 
and utter inability to save himself by willing to do what 
the law den!ands, namely, perfection. Thus he is driven to 
see his need for grace, if he is to obtain salvation. 
Luther's "Treatise on Christian Liberty" makes it clear 
that good works are never the cause of sinful man's justifi-
cation and subsequent salvation. Rather, good works are the 
fruit of God's gift of grace and the work of His Holy Spirit 
in and through man. 
But , (and this is what Luther fails to make explicit in 
his De Servo Arbitrio) it is only when~ lets God's Spirit 
work in him and he cooperates with that Spirit that God can 
complete His good ana gracious work in him and transform him 
from a slave of Satan into a son of Goa, who aoes God's will 
spontaneously and gladly . 
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From what has been said before, it should be clear that 
Arminius makes adequate provision for the practical priority 
of Goa 's grace in the salvation of sinful man, without allow-
ing that grace to preclude man's natural freedom. He does 
this by combining the Scriptural insight (that when man sins 
he becomes bound in sin) with a firm insistence that God 
chooses to limit His sovereignty over man . This is done by 
God making covenant with ~an and by giving him freedom to 
choose between alternatives. 
It is Arminius' insistence on man's God-given gift of 
freedom to choose to do or not to do what God commands, and 
to accept or reject God's grace, that is the key to his syner-
gistic view of salvation. Bondage in sin teaches that it is 
necessary for God's grace to free man from his spiritual bond-
age . It is sinful man's bondage in sin which makes it impos-
sible for him to earn salvation by virtue of the good which 
his free will chooses to do. But when God's grace comes, as 
it comes to all men in the proclamation of the gospel , man 
has the power to say yes and cooperate with that grace, or to 
say no and reject that grace . Thus, two factors play a part 
in man's salvation, namely, God's grace , which forgives sin 
and removes the bondage of guilt that sin brings, and man's 
free will, which accepts ana appropriates that grace . 
Such freedom does tend to limit God's absolute sovereignty 
over man and seems to undermine the certainty of God 's promises 
and decrees. If God gives true freedom to man , as Arminius' 
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teaching suggests He does, then man's will is not determined 
in any way either by God 's decrees or by His foreknowledge, 
because God has chosen to limit His sovereignty over man. 
Arminius teaches that God decreed from all eternity that all 
should be saved, but made his decree contingent upon man's 
acceptance or rejection of His grace freely offered in Christ. 
God also willed to send Christ for man's salvation from all 
eternity. Furthermore , God never predestines any particular 
persons either to salvation or to condemnation. 
God chose to limit His sovereignty over man by giving him 
a free will to choose what he prefers under the circumstances. 
The first man chose to sin, even as all men apparently choose 
to sin . ~o man sins by necessity. Therefore man, and not God, 
is responsible for sin and evil in the world. God foreknows 
who will be saved and who will be condemned because He can 
foresee who will believe and who will not believe. Yet such 
foreknowledge, which is in the mind of God , does not induce 
necessity on anyone or anythin6 • According to Arminius, how-
ever, this enables God to give His saving grace to those whom 
He foreknows will believe and withhold it from those whom He 
foreknows will not believe. How God can foresee a genuinely 
future action in anything but a contingent way is a mystery 
Arminius does not seek to solve. We must ask: If man is truly 
free, and if each moment of time is truly unique and unrepeat-
able, then would it not seem that God must foreknow things 
future only in a contingent way? Such a question goes beyond 
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the s cope of this dissertation . Suffice it to say here that 
it seems to this writer that Arminius, like Luther, apparently 
believes that man's action is not inherently unpredictable 
from God's point of view. We agree , but we would seek to es-
tablish this idea in a way different from the way Arminius 
tries to do it . 
It is quite true and in accord with Scriptures to affirm 
that the salvation of sinful man is monergistic in nature in 
the sense that it is God ' s grace , and not the merit of man's 
good works performed bJ his free will , which makes sinful man 
good in the eyes of God . l If , however , such monergism suggests, 
as it does in Luther's De Servo Arbitrio, that man ' s will seems 
to play no part at all in spiritual matters, then it is unscrip-
tural and wrong, because the exclusion of man's will also pre-
cludes man's natural freedom and moral responsibility . 
Luther is quite right and in accord with Scriptures when 
he affirms that man does not have a wholly autonomous will 
coram deo . When man makes choices in the spiritual realm with 
the power of his God-given gift of natural freedom, he auto-
matically serves God when he does His will, or Satan when he 
refuses to do God ' s will . 2 Luther ' s teaching of the will in 
bondage also makes clear the insidiousness and subleties of 
man ' s egocentric nature which seems to make sin inevitable, 
and therefore makes grace an absolute essential for the salva-
lsee above, p . 20. 
2 See above , p . 17f . 
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tion of sinful man . But when salvation by grace alone seems 
to preclude all human f r eedom, t hen a monergistic interpre-
tation of salvation becomes unscriptural, inadequate, and 
misleading. 
We would argue, therefore, that synergism is a better 
term to use in describing the interrelationship of God's 
grace and man ' s God-given gift of natural freedom in salva-
tion . The reason for this is that in the light of this 
discussion of man's freedom and bondage, we believe that the 
issue of grace versus free will is a misleading one. 1 It is 
not until the notion of merit is attached to man's freedom 
in such a way as to suggest that man by his will (natural 
freedom) without grace can do good works and so merit salva-
tion that God's grace and man's free will become antithetical . 
It has led to a great deal of confusion in the history of 
Christian thought when men like Luther and Erasmus did not 
see this fact and make it clear, that the real issue in the 
interrelationship of God and man with respect to regeneration 
and salvation is salvation by the grace of God alone, or by 
the merit of man ' s good works performed by man alone by means 
of his free will. Thus, it seems to this writer, that the 
issue which Luther raised against medieval theologians is 
similar to the one Paul raised with the Judaizers, namely, 
either salvation comes by grace or by the works of the law . 
1see above, p. l97f. 
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If man has a free will in the sense of a God-given 
capacity to make a choice between alternative courses of 
action, and the power to carry out what one wills under a 
given set of circumstances (or what we call natural freedom), 
then man obviously has power to choose either to do or not 
to do what God commands. Commands given by one agent to 
another agent who has no power at all to do what is commanded 
is nonsense , as Erasmus pointed out in his argument with Lu-
ther . But what Erasmus did not make clear is that even when 
man performs all that the law demands, he cannot merit or 
earn eternal life (Luke 17:10), because he has only done what 
is expected of him. In man's relationship with God, God de-
mands nothing less than perfection (Matt . 5:48) . Therefore, 
those who do what God commands gain, as a consequence of their 
action, the added gift of eternal life. Just as our life on 
this earth is a gift which we did not merit or earn, so also 
eternal life is a gift that cannot be merited or earned. In 
this sense Luther was certainly right in his argument with 
brasmus, when he suggested that the concept of merit simply 
does not belong in the God-man relationship. Even if sin 
never entered the picture, man could not speak of meriting 
salvation , for it, like life, is a gift of God. If, however, 
we live in accord with Goa's will, then we shall find, as a 
consequence of our correct action, that we shall enjoy the 
added blessing which God in His goodness has provided for us. 
However, once sin does enter the picture, and the Bible 
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and human experience teach us that all men do sin, then there 
is nothing man can do by virtue of freely choosing to do what 
the law demands that will enable him to make amends for his 
sin and its consequent guilt. He has lost his potential 
perfection and cannot regain it, no matter how much good 
his will chooses to do and actually performs . The absolute 
law and demand of God for man is perfection . Once this per-
fection is lost, the performance of individual laws can never 
attain that which was lost by our sin. 
As Gordon Rupp pointed out, Luther's view is basically 
correct, but it needs restating in modern language, taking 
into account a deeper understanding of human personality which 
Luther lacked in his day . It is our task, in conclusion, to 
attempt in the light of Arminius ' teaching of man's free will 
(natural freedom) in the God-man relationship, to restate 
Luther's insights in a meaningful way which avoids the pitfall 
of suggesting that God's grace and man's free will (i.e., 
man's natural freedom) are mutually exclusive. 
First, we define man's natural freedom as the God-given 
capacity to make a choice between alternative courses of 
action and the power to carry out what one prefers under the 
circumstances . Such freedom never implies the liberty to do 
anything we choose, as Luther seemed to indicate it does in 
his definition of free will. Freedom is always freedom within 
limits. Natural freedom means the powerto choose one parti-
cular course of action over against other possible courses of 
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action that are present in a given set of circumstances. For 
example, a man might will to choose his ideal candidate in a 
certain election, but in reality, his ideal does not exist. 
If he still wills to choose a candidate in this election and 
does not want others to make his choice for him, then he is 
limited in his choice to one of the two candidates who are 
actually runnin~ for office . 
Or, religiously speaking, a man might will that he be 
his own master, and not serve anyone but himself and his own 
best i n terests, but, religiously speaking, this is impossible, 
for if he chooses the good , he serves God, but if he chooses 
evil , he serves Satan . There just is no other option open to 
man coram deo . It is important, however, to remember that 
even sinful man always has the freedom to choose to do God's 
will or refuse to do it and, as Luther puts it, serve Satan. 
This freedom, we affirm, every man develops in the 
course of his life and always possesses because he is created 
in the image of God. If a man should lack or lose this 
capacity in any way, as for example might happen when a per-
son is born mentally deficient or when a person develops a 
compulsive neurosis or psychosis, then we say that such a 
person is not "normal" or not "himself . " Such a person can-
not be held wholly responsible for his actions precisely 
because he is driven or controlled by powers beyond the con-
trol or direction of his own will . Even in our courts of law, 
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such a person is not held wholly responsible for crimes he 
corrmits precisely because he is determined in some way other 
than by his own will. 
We define determinism as the belief that anyone is unable 
to will or act as one chooses when two or more alternative 
courses of action are present as live options. Such deter-
minism seems to destroy ethical freedom and the notion of man 
as a responsible creature. It tends to undermine all ideas 
of morality. All concepts of morality demand that man is free 
to choose some course of action other than the one he actually 
did choose. If he cannot, then he is not wholly responsible 
for his actions. 
To avoid this pitfall of Luther's apparently deterministic 
view in his De Servo Arbitrio, we propose to explore what it 
means, in the light of modern psychology, to be created in the 
image of God. 
To be created in God's image means, among other things, 
that man is created by God to be liKe Him in the sense that 
man is a center of consciousness--an "I." This means that man 
is capable of transcending himself and judging himself. Thus 
he can say, "I performed this particular act because I willed 
to do so, and I know that I am responsible for the consequences 
of my act." 
As a center of consciousness, man is capable of fellowship 
with God and of communicating with the Absolute Center of Con-
sciousness, vvho created man in His image. {Perhaps this is 
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part of what Luther meant when he spoke of man's free will 
as his potentiality and capacity to be caught up by Goa's 
Spirit as a creature fit for eternal life or death.) As a 
center of consciousness like God, man is also a center of 
volition, who can take a hand in determining his destiny. 
This means that m&n has the power to discern God's will and 
can choose to cooperate with God in fulfilling his destiny, 
or he may choose to refuse to cooperate with God and seek to 
fulfill his destiny apart from God. 
If man is created in the image of God, ana if he is a 
true center of consciousness, and if he can communicate with 
other centers of consciousness in an ' I' -- 'Thou' relation-
ship, sucb a relationship can never be thought of or aescribed 
in a monergistic way, i . e ., as if it can be engaged in solely 
by the activity of one agent. Thus man's relationship with 
God, if it exists in reality at all, ought to be described 
as a synergistic relationship, i . e . , one where two agents 
both will a relationship and act in such a way that such a 
relationship can be maintained. 
The Christian faith assures us that God wills such a 
relationship with man . But man , created in God ' s image, 
because he has and always possesses (unless he is abnormal) 
his God-given gift of natural freedom, can, if he so chooses, 
refuse to seek a relationship with God and "go it alone . " 
To choose this latter course is what we define as sin . 
Sin is ~an's use of his God-given freedom in such a way that 
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he refuses to acknowledge God as God, to seek out and do His 
will , and rejects His proffered grace which is necessary to 
the salvation of sinful man . Sin is man's monergistic 
attempt to fashion his destiny apart from God . Such refusal 
to seek out and do God' s will, or refusal to accept God's 
proffered grace , effectively separates man from God. This 
estrangement dooms man to ultimate destruction, because un-
like God, in whose image he is made , man is a dependent 
creature who cannot stand alone and does not have life in 
and of himself. Man cannot fulfill his destiny to become an 
eternal child of God apart from God and His grace . Cut off 
from God by sin, man is cut off from the very source of his 
life and salvation here and in eternity. 
This state or condition of unforgiven sin and guilt we 
call bondage in sin . Such bondage means the loss of spiritual 
freedom to become sons of God, but in no way implies the com-
plete loss of man's natural freedom. Even after man sins and 
becomes bound in that sin and its consequent guilt, he can 
still make free choices between alternatives. He can still 
choose to seek out and do God 1 s will, though with each sinful 
choice it becomes more and more difficult to choose and to 
do the good. This means that lack of spiritual freedom coram 
deo also diminishes man's natural freedom coram homnibus. 
Rightly oriented toward God, man is able to love and serve 
his neighbor as he ought, but when he becomes bound in sin 
and loses his spiritual freedom to serve and please God , he 
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also finds it increasingly difficult to use his natural free-
dom in the service and love of his fellow men . As sinful man 
continues to lose his thee-centricity, he continues to become 
more ego-centric and bound in his sin. 
In this state of bondage in sin and its consequent guilt, 
gooa works are of no avail as far as man's salvation is con-
cerned. Only God and His gracious offer of forgiveness in 
Christ can remove the guilt of man's sin. However, we must 
never suggest that this state of bondage destroys man 's 
natural freedom of choice, for if he loses that, he loses 
part of what we mean by the image of God in him, and is re-
duced to the level of a will-less automaton. By bondage in 
sin we mean that once man actually commits sin and refuses 
to seek out and do Goo's will, he is effectively separated 
from God, the sole source of his life and salvation . There-
fore, he is unable by his own efforts to remove the guilt of 
his sin and restore his lost relationship with God, who de-
mands perfection of him. He cannot, without the grace of 
God, which forgives sin and removes guilt, obtain his God-
given destiny to become an eternal and perfected child of 
God . vo whatever he will as a result of his natural freedom, 
which he still has and always possesses to some degree, if 
he is truly human, sinful man is powerless to get himself 
into a right relationship with God. He is bound in his sin 
until God chooses to forgive him and he accepts and appropri-
ates this proffered forgiveness, and actively seeks ~o 
238 
cooperate with God's Spirit in seeking to do Goa's will. 
Let us use this analogy: A man in a state of jealous 
anger picks up his loaded revolver and shoots, killing the 
husband and father of the family next door. It may be quite 
true that the man next door seemed to be too friendly toward 
the murderer's wife and that the murderer was a very jealous-
natured man . Yet the murderer knows that he could have acted 
other than he did and refrained from killing the man next 
aoor. Therefore, the murderer knows that he is guilty for 
letting his jealous anger drive him to commit the crime, and 
he confesses his guilt . This being so, there is absolutely 
nothing he and his wife ana children can do to make full 
reparations to their neighbors for the loss of their husband 
ana father. Even though they can and do perform many kind 
acts and try to satisfy justice and what the law demands, 
they cannot ma~e full reparations or restore the life of the 
dead man. This means that they are wholly dependent upon the 
mercy and forgiveness of their neighbors, if they are to be 
reconciled with them and their fellowship, now broken by sin, 
is to be restored. 
All their wishing that it might have been otherwise, all 
their gifts, good intentions, promises to do better, or what-
ever, can never make full reparations for the damage done to 
the neighbor's wife and children. Nothing they can do can 
bring the dead man back to life or make it as though the crime 
had never been committed. The murderer is, so to speak, bound 
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in his sin anti its consequent guilt. Thus , he is wholly 
dependent upon the mercy and forgiveness of those he has 
offended if the estrangement, which the guilt of his sin 
brought, is to be removed and genuine reconciliation effected. 
But for the sake of the analogy, let us suppose that the 
offended neighbors choose to forgive the murderer . The of-
fender still has the option of accepting or rejecting the 
proffered forgiveness. Thus, even though he is bound in the 
guilt of his sin, he still has what we call natural freedom 
to accept or reject that gift . If he accepts it, it cannot 
be said that he in any way earned or merited it, because it 
was clear from the beginning that he could not make full 
reparations for the crime through any work or effort of his 
own. If, on the other hand, he rejects the gift, then his 
sin and guilt remain as effective barriers to renewed friend-
ship and reconciliation. 
However, if the shooting had never occurred, and no sin 
had been committed, the neighbors who had been friends before 
the crime could have continued to enjoy full fellowship with 
each other as long as they mutually willed it. But once sin 
and its consequent guilt enter the picture, that freedom to 
choose open fellowship is lost until the offended party 
chooses to forgive the offender and makes it possible for him 
to restore the broken relationship. 
So, too, in man's relationship with God. Part of man's 
God-given powers is the capacity to choose between alternatives 
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and carry out what one prefers under the circumstances. Coram 
deo, man has God-given freedom to choose to do God's will or 
to refuse to do it. Though his choice is often partially 
determined by attenuating circumstances, he can, nevertheless, 
choose to sin or not to sin. To be sure, the ambiguous human 
situation makes clear lines between good and evil hard to 
draw, but coram deo, an act is either sinful or not . Further-
more, Scriptures and human experience teach us that actually 
all men do sin and experience guilt . Just why and how this 
is so is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it 
to say here that Scriptures and the common human experience 
of sin and guilt seem to be good evidence for arguing that 
actually all men do sin . 
Be that as it may, if we maintain man's God-given free -
dom to choose ££!~ deo, as Arminius does, then we cannot 
speak of man sinning oy necessity, lest we destroy man's 
responsibility for sin . The difficulty with such a contention 
is that it seems to undercut the Christian belief that all men 
actually do sin and all stand in need of God's grace in order 
to obtain salvation. Yet, atfuis point, we would inaicate 
that Pelagius argued that it was possible for man not to sin 
in order to avoid the seeming deterministic position of an 
overzealous Augustine, who suggested that man , since the fall, 
is not able not to sin . However, sin for Augustine is not 
defined as individual acts determined by man's will as Pelagius 
defines it, ·but as a state or condition in which man finds 
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himself since the fall of the first man into sin. This state 
of sin does influence man's actions, as the jealous anger 
influenced the murderer cited above, yet he must have power 
to overcome this evil tendency if he is to be held morally 
responsible for his act of murder. 
It seems that only when we affirm that man is able not 
to sin, can we also affirm the natural freedom of man and his 
genuine responsibility for sin. Furthermore we must ask: If 
Jesus was genuinely human, yet without sin {John 8:46; II Cor . 
5:21; Heb. 4:15; I Pet. 2:22), then can it not be argued that 
it is possible for man, under the conditions of human exis-
tence and temptation, not to sin, when God's Spirit and grace 
work in and through him and he chooses to submit to and do 
the will of God as Jesus did (John 4:34; 5:30; 6 : 38; 17:4)? 
Does such an idea undercut the Biblical teaching that actually 
all men do sin and fall short of fulfilling God 's commands and 
expectations for them? We think not. To argue for what is 
possible in order to avoid a deterministic position is one 
thing, as Pelagius pointed out in his quarrel with Augustine; 
to argue for what is actually the case, is another . For the 
sake of avoiding unnecessary logical confusion, and especially 
determinism which seems to undermine ethical freedom and human 
responsibility, we would argue that man's natural freedom should 
be affirmed and determinism denied in the Christian doctrines 
of sin and salvation. 
I 
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We believe that men sin by free choice and not by neces-
sity, no matter how many excuses or conditioning factors seem 
to l ead up to a sin being actually committed . The moment sin 
enters the picture , man is estranged by the guilt of his sin 
from the Holy and Righteous God who demands perfection of him. 
Sinful man still has power to choose between alternatives. 
Nevertheless , sinful man cannot extricate himself from the 
guilt of his sin in any way unless God's grace assists him. 
Thus , we believe that sinful man loses his spiritual freedom 
to do good in such a way as to be unable to make full repara-
tions for his sin and regain the righteousness he lost by his 
sin . Consequently, he loses open fellowship with the Holy 
ana Righteous God who demands perfection of man and cannot 
obtain the destiny for which he was created until God chooses 
to forgive him. 
However , God by his gracious act of forgiveness revealed 
in Jesus Christ does will to forgive sinners . When man is 
led to aamit his sinfulness through Goa's alien work of the 
law , confesses his guilt, and admits that he is powerless to 
make full reparations for his sin and guilt, and is wholly 
dependent upon God's grace and the good news of forgiveness 
in Christ which comes in the proclamation of the Word, then 
man has the option of accepting or rejecting that proffered 
grace . If he accepts it, he is freed from his bondage in sin 
by grace alone, not by any merit or worthiness on his part . 
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Yet he does have freedom to accept or reject what God gives, 
and in this sense takes a hand in determining his destiny. 
By his acceptance of God ' s grace he is freed from his guilt 
and restored to full fellowship with God . In this sense 
salvation comes by the grace of God and man's free will 
(natural freedom) , but without any merit or worthiness on 
man ' s part . Thus , two factors play a part in man's salvation, 
viz ., God ' s grace and man ' s will . It is in this sense that 
we prefer to speak of salvation as a corporate ana cooperating 
venture between God and man and argue that it is synergistic , 
not monergistic , in nature . 
It may be argued, therefore, that monergists, such as 
Luther and some of his interpreters , like Packer and Johnston, 
seem to confuse the issue of the interrelationship of God's 
grace and man's freedom in salvation, wren they seem to sug-
gest that salvation comes wholly as a result of what God 
does (i . e . , by grace alone) or by what man does (i.e ., by 
the free will of man alone) . Packer and Johnston write: 
Is our salvation wholly of God, or does it ultimately 
depend on something we do for ourselves? Those who 
say the latter (as the Arminians later did) thereby 
deny man's utter helplessness in sin, and affirm that 
a form of semi-Pelagianism is true after all . It is 
no wonder then that later Reformed theology condemned 
Armjnianism as being in principle a return to Rome 
(because in effect, it turned faith into a meritorious 
work . )l 
lJ. I . Packer and O. R. Johnston, "Historical and Theological 
Introduction" , Luther, Bondage of the Will , p . 59 . 
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Whi le later Arminianism may have distorted the position 
of Arminius concerning grace and free will, 1 there is also 
no doubt in this writer's mind that moner·gists like Packer 
and Johnston also confuse , as Luther did, the argument for 
man's free will (natural freedom) with the so-called "Pela-
gian 11 argument for merit . As we have seen, such is not the 
case . The actual case is that sinful man is saved by grace 
alone or by the merit of man's free will which performs good 
works. The Arminian argument for free will in man coram deo 
is not an argument for salvation by merit, but an argument 
for man's natural freedom which avoids determinism according 
to the will of God. It seeks to affirm that the grace of 
God in man's salvation can be resisted by the will of man , 
or with the help of God 's grace man can cooperate with God 
in his salvation . Therefore, man c&n and does, when God's 
grace assists him, take a hand in determing his destiny. This 
means that salvation is a corporate and cooperating venture 
between two agents, namely, God and man . God gives His grace 
to man and man is free to choose either to accept and cooper-
ate with that grace or to reject the same. 
Luther's teaching of the bondage of the human will in 
sin , which Arminius shares with him, is a necessary prelude 
lcarl Bangs, op . cit., p . 15ff; cf . p . l60ff . It is the 
author ' s contention that later interpreters of Arminius 
distorted his essentiallJ Calvinistic position by miscon-
struing his doctrine of free will. 
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to the Scriptural truth that the salvation of sinful man 
comes by the grace of God alone without any merit or worthi-
ness on man's part . It is for this reason that much evan-
gelical teaching is based upon Luther's idea of the will in 
bondage. The important point here is that God alone is the 
initiator of sinful man 's redemption . Until God takes the 
initiative, as He has already done in Christ, to restore man 
to the righteousness he lost through his sin, man remains 
bound in the guilt of his sin . But once that grace has been 
profferea, as it already has in Jesus Christ, then man may 
either accept and appropriate that grace by cooperating with 
it , or he may repudiate it . Hence to pose the question as 
Packer and Johnston do seems to imply, as Luther's moner-
gistic position does in his De Servo Arbitrio , that because 
man cannot merit salvation, he plays no active part at all 
in his salvation. 
The effective agent in sinful man's redemption is the 
Word of God , which conveys to man the assurance that God has 
forgiven man by His grace proffered in Christ . But the 
grace of God never treats man as an impersonal object or 
thing to be pushed irresistibly into a righteousness he does 
not want . 
"If you believe , you have it , i .e. , the Word of God 
which brings salvation . If you do not believe, you 
do not have it . " This famous sentence of Luther's 
says that the Word of God is always effective. If 
it does not work salvation through faith, it works 
condemnation through unbelief . That does not imply 
that man decides, through his belief or unbelief 
whether God succeeds or not in his saving work. 
God cannot be defeated by man. But it does imply 
that God saves through a personal Word. For that 
reason, He can save men only through their personal 
faith in that Word. He cannot save them through 
their personal disregard for His Word. For that 
would change Hfs Word of personal mercy into a 
magic formula. 
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Once a gain we see a monergist who seems to confuse the 
issue. If man cannot be saved through a personal disregard 
for God's Word, then how can it be affirmed that God cannot 
be defeated by man unless man's God-given personality and 
its inherent freedom be violated by God? Since whether or 
not man is saved is in the realm of faith and cannot be estab-
lished by empirical data, would it not be better to say we 
do not believe that God can be defeated by man? And would 
it not be better to say that it is possible for man, who has 
and always possesses natural freedom of choice, to frustrate 
God's revealed will that all men be saved? Or is it that 
some monergists, like Luther, always think of man's freedom 
coram deo as a bid for merit, and so steer clear of any im-
plications of merit by avoiding the problem of man's free 
will entirely? 
In speaking of Luther's interpretation of the atonement, 
Carlson says: 
lRegin Prenter, "Luther on Viord and Sacraments," More About 
Luther (Decorah, Iowa: Luther College Press, 1958), p. 74f. 
The victory accomplished in man is a gift of God, 
inasmuch as it is God who achieves it . Man 's part 
in t~e victory is faith . He is receptive, not 
pass~ve. 
Then in a footnote , Carlson quotes Bring , who says: 
The compulsion of God can never be thought of as 
coercion of man ' s will; for the relationship is 
one of love, and love knows of no victory save 
that which involves complete spontaneity on the 
part of its object . This is the reason that "the 
question o~ free will is entirely irrelevant to 
religion . " 
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But many Christian thinkers are not willing to say that 
the question of free will is irrelevant to religion . It might 
be irrelevant to religion if we employ the psychology of Lu-
ther and define free will as the power to do anything we will . 
But the synergistic argument of Arminius for man ' s God-given 
freedom of choice is an argument for the natural freedom of 
man, which a man must have and always possess , if he is to 
be a true human being created in the image of God . If not, 
then he is not even capable of being saved . That is why we 
believe Luther admitted in his De Servo Arbitrio that a 
proper definition of free will might be the potentiality or 
capacity of man to be saved by God's grace. 
Vernon Strempke in his dissertation suggests that men 
like Paul Johnson, Seward Hiltner, and other psychologists 
of religion insist on freedom of the will, because without 
lE .~. Carlson, op. cit . , p . 75. 
2Ragnar Bring, Dualismen hos Luther (Stockholm, 1929), p. 
182; cited by E.M. Carlson, op . cit . , p . 75fn . 
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it there can be no real personality nor striving toward the 
fulfillment of an ideal of personality.l A monergist like 
Luther makes it clear that without God's grace sinful man 
is hopelessly lost in sin, and freedom to do the good, which 
God's grace alone gives , enables man to obtain the goal of 
salvation for which he was created. Without the freedom of 
the will, hu~an personality is destroyed anc self-fulfillment 
lost. Yet without grace , there can be no salvation from sin 
or freedom to do the good which fulfills life, and human per-
sonality is destroyed. Both grace and free will are essen-
tial to sinful man's salvation and the fulfillment of human 
personality. 
It is at this point that the real issue arises between 
some monergists and some synergists. As we have seen, certain 
monergists admit that God does not treat man in an impersonal 
or magical way. They suggest that man is at least receptive 
in his salvation ana cannot be saved through a personal dis-
regard of God's Word. Others suggest that the issue of free 
will is irrelevant to religion. We must ask: Is it? In 
fact, is it not possible that because monergists seek to avoid 
the problem of man's free will coram deo, that they lead many 
synergists and semi-Pelagians to misinterpret them? Is not 
man's free will in the sense of what we define as natural 
freedom to choose what one prefers under the circumstances 
lvernon Strempke, op. cit., p . ll4f. 
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very much a part of religion and morality? If God and His 
Word of love elicits man's res ponse to it at all, then man 
must have power to accept or reject what God seeks to do in 
and through him. If we tend to ignore the problem of man's 
natural freedom, as Luther did in his De Servo Arbitrio, 
because he lacked modern psychological insights, then we will 
simply suggest as he did, that man cooperates with Goa as a 
saw cooperates with a carpenter. 
It is quite obvious what the neglect of the problem of 
human freedom does in the area of religion; it tends to nulli-
fy human personality . 
We may admit, if we wish, that we must remain skeptical 
about whether or not man has freedom coram deo, as some Luther 
scholars attempt to do . We can suggest that God cannot be 
defeated and that His will inevitably comes to pass necessarily . 
But if God in Christ wills that all be saved, and if He cannot 
save persons through a personal disregard of His Word, then 
it seems logical to affirm that if some are condemned, man 
can and does frustrate the will of God as it has been re-
vealed in Jesus Christ . If this is not so, then either God's 
Word, which reveals in Christ that all should be saved, is a 
lie, or else Goa will save some men against their will . The 
former seems contrary to the gospel which teaches that God 
wills all men to be saved. The latter seems contrary to a 
God of love who will not coerce obedience but seems to elicit 
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it in order that man may have the freedom he needs to mature 
into a child of God who does God's will gladly and freely. 
To assert a paradox of grace is one thing. To remain 
skeptical about man's freedom££!~ deo is a live option. 
But if human personality involves the capacity of man to 
choose between alternatives and power to carry out what he 
wills under the circumstances, then it seems to follow that 
either God disregards man's will entirely in matters which 
concern salvation, or else He chooses to grant man natural 
freedom and is limited by that power which He has seen fit 
to give to man. 
If man has real freedom to choose between alternatives, 
as we believe he has, then even God must respect man's right 
to say no to His grace and will. This does not mean God is 
helpless in the face of man 's sin. As Luther points out, 
God's law bankrupts the sinner's ego-centric attempt to prove 
his own goodness on the basis of good works. This is God 's 
way of preparing sinners for the reception of His gracious 
forgiveness, freely offered in Christ. This "alien work" 
of God is what we call the prevenient grace of God. If, how-
ever, man repudiates that grace and refuses to cooperate 
with God in his salvation, then the sinner is responsible for 
his continued bondage in sin and his subsequent condemnation. 
Thus it would seem that the eternal destiny of man, while 
wholly dependent upon the grace of God and the continual 
work of His Spirit, is also dependent upon the free will 
(natural freedom) of man . Therefore, only those views of 
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man's salvation which take both God's grace and man's free 
will into account and make adequate provision for each, are 
acceptable, and, we believe, commensurate with the Biblical 
revelation of God which we have in Jesus Christ, as well as 
with our understanding of human personality and its God-given 
natural freedom of choice between alternative courses of 
action and power to carry out what one wills under the cir-
cumstances. 
We agree with Tillich, when he writes: 
The humanistic ideal of personality contains as its 
depth and permanent truth the acknowledgment of the 
eternal ideal of personality . This is its greatness 
and indestructible validity. Therefore, theology 
should be more careful than it usually is in its 
manner of confronting Christianity with humanism . 
This applies especially to recent revivals of the 
struggle between Luther and Erasmus by the nee-
orthodox theology . Hut Luther's assertion that 
man's will is in bondage to demonic structures is 
meaningful only if man, in his essential nature is 
free . Luther's (as well as Paul's and Augustine's 
and Aquinas ' ) statement loses its profundity and its 
paradoxical character if it is identified with philo-
sophical determinism. Only a being that has the power 
of self-determination can have a servum arbitrium, a 
''will in bondage" , because a being without the power 
of self-determination has no arbitrium (capacity of 
decision) at all . 
Tillich makes it clear that we must keep the distinction 
clear between essential or natural man having freedom of the 
will , and estranged or unnatural man being bound in sin . We 
1Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era , abridged edition (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1957) , p . 129. 
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agree that only when this distinction is kept clearly in 
mind by both theolog ians and psychologists in their utter-
ances, can we ever hope to make sense of conversations on 
sin, bondage in sin, and freedom of the will. 
Strempke writes : 
In the ooinion of Luther, a person is ultimately 
either governed by God or the devil ••• • The 
person holds within himself the tensions resulting 
from the conflict between these two forces • ••• 
He is free to ally himself with either force, and 
thereby he discovers the true meaning of his • • • 
condition . He discovers that it is impossible to 
bring about a truce between (them) • • • and there-
fore, he surrenders to Goa . It is at this point of 
surrender, which Luther calls repentance that God 
takes the initiative in adjusting the tensions 
within the person . It is in the moment of seeming 
defeat that the agape of God breaks through self-
destructive ego- centricity and enables the pe rion 
to respond constructlvely to the grace of God. 
Here we find a good psychological explanation of Luther ' s 
concept of redemption in which the essential freedom of man 
and his bonaage in sin are maintained, and God ' s grace 
takes the initiative in saving man frorr demonic destruction. 
This in our opinion meets the require ments of an adequate 
explanation of human redemption from sin where the practical 
priority of God's grace is affirmed, without neglecting the 
part which man's natural freedom also plays in salvation . 
One final point which needs to be made concerns the 
current dialogue between Protestants and Roman Catholics . 
Is it possible to reconcile their differences over the matter 
lvernon L. Strempke , op . cit ., p . 339 . 
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of the interrelationship of God's grace and man's free will 
in salvation? Packer and Johnston point out, as Luther did 
in his discussion with Erasmus , that the semi-Pelagianism 
of Roman theologians is a more treacherous doctrine than 
out-and-out Pelagianism because it allows sinful man to pur-
chase grace at a cut-rate price from Goa . l It seems to this 
writer that Luther and his interpreters tend to see salvation 
as something God alone does or something the free will of man 
alone does . The Roman position, on the other hand, seeks to 
affirm that Goa's grace empowers man to do good works and 
merit salvation . However, aside from the belief in free will 
doing good works which merit salvation, which is opposed to 
the Biblical te ching that salvation comes by God's grace 
alone without any merit or worthiness on man's part, such an 
accusation which PacKer and Johnston level a~ainst Roman 
theology is hard to defend and prove . Some modern Roman 
Catholics point out that accoraing to t he official teachings 
of the Church, God's grace is always prior to any 600d which 
sinful man can do . For example , Richter in his recent book 
states that Luther wron~ly ascribes Pelagianism, or at least 
semi-Pelagianism, to the Church . In 418 A. D., at the Council 
of Carthage, the Church condemned Pela3ianism in all its 
forms . 
lJ . I . Packer and O. R. Johnston, "Historical and Theological 
Introauction", Luther, Bondace of the Will, p . 50; cf. p . 
293 and see above p . 116 fn . 2 . 
Whoever says that t he grace of justification is 
given us, to the end that we can fulfill more 
easily by the power of grace wbat we are com-
manded to fulfill by the power of our will , as 
if we could fulfill the divine commands, even 
though less easy, wifhout the help of grace, 
let him be anathema . 
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Richter also points out that the Council of Orange in 
529 also condemned Pelagianism in all its forms . Then he 
commen ts : 
According to the Catholic faith , we profess that 
all of those who are baptized can, witt the grace 
received in Baptism, fulfi l l all that is necessary 
for the salvation of their souls under the assis-
tance and help of Christ, if they earnestly will 
to strive . 2 
It would seem from this , that part of what the Roman posi-
tion concerninc grace and the striving of man's will seeks 
to establish is what we call man's natural freedom coram 
deo . Yet their insistence upon man's free will and striving 
does not seek to preclude the grace of God in man ' s salvation . 
As the Council of Trent puts it : 
Christ precedes man ' s good wor~s , accompanies them, 
and follows after •••• Without Him our works would 
not be good or merit salvation . Our justification 
is not our own, as coming from ourselv5s, but is 
infused in us by the merlts of Christ . 
If man cannot justify himself before God, but is depen-
dent on the merits of Christ and the grace of God, then one 
1Friedrich Richter, Martin Luther and I natius Lo ola, trans . 
Leonard F . Zwinger Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 
1960) , p. 81. 
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wonders how Roman Catholics can continue to talk of a treasury 
of merit earned by the saints who perform works of superero-
gation. If it is possible for some men to do more than God 
demands, even though it is done with the aid of God's grace, 
then one must ask of what value is Christ's death upon the 
cross and the grace of God which comes through that act? Are 
not salvation by grace, or by the merits of Christ, and sal-
vation by the merit of man's work mutually exclusive? Or is 
Christ just one of the saints whose merits the Church of Rome 
may transfer or refuse to bestow upon certain persons as it 
chooses? Be that as it may, it is Roman doctrine which is 
merit oriented that Protestants find impossible to reconcile 
with the Biblical doctrine of salvation by grace alone with-
out any merit or worthiness of man's part . 
However, Rome's firm insistence upon the priority of God 
and His grace in Christ, which precedes all the good works of 
man, seems to indicate that if the legalistic orientation 
and overtones of works and merit might be stripped from these 
statements, they might be reconciled with the Reformation 
doctrine of salvation by grace alone, without any merit on 
man ' s part, provided the Reformation doctrine made provision 
for the natural freedom of man . 
While the Reformed orientation of salvation by grace 
alone without merit on man's part is hard to reconcile with 
salvation by grace which empowers man to do good and merit 
salvation by the striving of his will, nevertheless, Protestant s 
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and Boman Catholics seem to agree that sinful man without 
grace can do no good thinb that will merit salvation. There-
fore the problem seems to center around the part good works 
play in man's salvation. Reformed theology teaches that 
good works are only the fruits of justification which comes 
by grace alone and do not in any way merit salvation. Roman 
Catholics tend to teach that grace justifies , but good works 
elicited by grace sanctify sinful man and earn salvation. 
But much of the difference which separates Protestants and 
Roman Catholics also centers on the problem of what part 
man ' s free will pla~in salvation . 
Perhaps Gustave Weigel sums it up best for the Roman 
Catholics when he writes: 
No Reformer denied that man could physically and 
psychologically choose between alternatives . Calvin 
says that this is too obvious and too irrelevant 
for discussion . What the Reformers were saying 
was that an ungraced will could not perform salvific 
good. This no Catholic denied or denies. But the 
rhetoric of the Reforffiers was so shocking . They 
preached the Catholic truth in so exaggerated a way, 
that it was easy to be led to think that man was 
not truly a responsible agent. 
If this is so, then the issue of salvation by grace or 
by the merits of man 's works performed without grace is a 
false one . If some agreement may be reached between Protes-
tants and Roman Catholics on the real issue of salvation by 
grace a lone or by the merit of the wor~s man's free will 
lR .M. Brown and Gustave ~eigel , An American Dialogue (Garden 
City, New Jersey: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p . 178. 
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a lone performs, and both agree that without grace sinful man 
can do no good thing, then rapproachement between Protestants 
and Roman Catholics on the interrelationship between salva-
tion by grace and the free will of llian seems possible. Pro-
testant talk of salvation by grace alone seems to preclude 
man's natural freedom. Thus, striving to do good works is 
neglec ted, and this leads Roman Catholics to misunderstand 
the Protestant position. Such "cheap grace" , which ignores 
man's obligation to strive to do the whole will and law of 
God, and which fails to seek to obtain real righteousness, 
seems to undermine the Biblical concept that God demands 
moral perfection and actual righteousness of all men . 
On the other hand, it seems to be Roman Cattolic talk 
of merit that accrues to the work of man's free will that 
tends to confuse Protestants . Talk of meriting righteousness 
and salvation, works of supererogation, a treasury of merit, 
and the like , tend to undermine the Biblical concept of sal-
vation by grace . 
If we can agree that salvation comes to sinful man by 
the grace of God alone, without any merit or worthiness on 
man's part , and that man has his God-given gift of natural 
freedom to accept or reject God's work in and through him, 
which preserves man's moral responsibility before God, and 
the Divine Spirit leads us to do good and righteous works , 
then rapproachement on this age old problem of grace and 
free will in man's salvation is feasible. 
CHAP'I'ER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
1 . Luther' s teaching in his De Servo Arbitrio of the uncon-
ditional sovereignty of God, coupled with the belief that 
man's free will does nothing but sin, and his denial of 
all free will in man coram deo , gives the false impression 
that his view of the Goa- man relationship is deterrrined 
in such a way as to preclude all human freedom in spiri-
tual matters . 
2 . Arminius ' insistence on God's self-imposed limitations 
and the free will {natural freedom) of man provides a 
necessary safeguard against Luther's apparently determin-
istic view of the God-man relationship in his De Servo 
Arbitrio . 
3. Both Luther ana Arminius agree that man enjoys some kind 
of God-given freedom coram deo. For Luther, free will 
coram deo is the potentiality of man to be grasped by 
God's Spirit , transformed, and be made fit by God ' s grace 
for eternal life or death. For Arminius, it is man's 
free will , in the sense of his God-given power to choose 
between alternatives, which precludes determinism of any 
kind . Free will is man's God-given power to resist God ' s 
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grace or to accept and cooperate with it in his salvation. 
4. Luther ana Arminius both teach that the sinful will of man 
is in bondage to sin ana that he lacks spiritual freedom 
to do the kina of good which can merit salvation. Such a 
doctrine is a necessary prelude to the Biblical teaching 
of salvation by the grace of God alone, which excludes all 
concepts of merit in the salvation of sinful man. 
5. Luther's denial of all free will in man coram deo, in his 
De Servo Arbitrio , is a denial of man's spiritual freedom, 
but not a aenial of all freedom in man in spiritual mat-
ters. 
6. Luther's failure to affirm in a specific way the free will 
(natural freedom) of man who is bouna in sin , in his De 
Servo Arbitrio, sets up in his interpreters minds a false 
antithesis between grace and free will, when the actual 
antithesis is betwe n salvation by the grace of God and 
the merit of man attained by the right use of his free 
will. 
?. Luther's concept of salvation by grace alone without any 
merit or worthiness on man's part in his De Servo Arbitrio 
is monergistic in nature. However, because Luther's con-
cept makes provision for man 's natural freedom by a para-
dox of grace , it is not inherently incompatible with Armini-
us' synergistic concept of salvation which affirms that 
God ' ~ grace and man's free will cooperate in salvation. 
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8 . Luther's teaching of the freedom of the Christian man in 
his Treatise on Christian Liberty is an affirmation of 
redeemed man ' s spiritual freedom to do good works and 
become perfect as God is perfect . God ' s grace frees man 
from sin, death, and the devil , and most important of 
all , it frees man from the sinful egocentricity of seek-
ing self- salvation by the merit of works . Freed from 
the necessity of seeking salvation via the merit of his 
works, man can become good as God is good because he does 
good for the sake of the neighbor who is in need . 
9 . Arminius ' teacblng of the bondage of man's will in sin, 
coupled with an affirmation of man's God-given gift of 
freedom of choice and his concept of the conditional or 
limited sovereignty of God, avoids determinism according 
to the wil l of God , ano yet makes adequate provision for 
the practical priority of God ' s grace in the salvation of 
sinful man . 
10 . The key to Arminius ' synergistic view of the God-man re-
lationship with respect to salvation is the God-given 
power which man has to accept and cooperate with God ' s 
grace or to reject and resist the same. Thus, two factors 
play a part in man ' s sa l vation, namely, God's grace and 
man ' s free will . 
11 . Arminius' doctrine that the sovereignty of God, predes-
tination, and the foreknowledge of God do not impose a 
necessity on everythin3 that happens , coupled with the 
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belief that God predestines all to salvation and none to 
reprobation, but only gives His saving grace to whosoever 
will believe, shows that God imposes limits upon His own 
sovereignty and makes adequate provision for man's free 
will (natural freedom). 
12. The synergism of Arminius, which teaches that salvation 
is a corporate and cooperating venture between God's grace 
and man's free will (natural freedom), is a less confusing 
and more accurate description of the God-man relationship 
with respect to sinful man 's salvation, than is monergism; 
provided man's use of his Goa- given gift of natural freedom 
does not convey the notion that man merits grace or earns 
salvation in any way. 
13. If the absolute need of God's grace and man's free will 
in the salvation of sinful man were clearly stated by both 
Protestants and Roman Catholics, then one more important 
step could be taken toward rapproachement between them. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to compare the con-
cepts of human freedom and bondage and the interrelationship 
of God's grace and man's free will in regeneration and sal-
vation in the writings of Martin Luther and James Arminius. 
Luther seems to deny all free will to man in his salvation 
and insists that salvation comes by grace alone. Arminius 
affirms man's free will to accept or reject God's grace and 
believes that salvation is the product of God's grace and 
man's free will cooperating . 
Luther and Arminius agree that all men sin and become 
bound in sin in such a way that they are unable to obtain 
salvation without grace. Both agree that sinful man lacks 
spiritual freedom to do good which will merit salvation . 
Both allow that man enjoys some freedom coram deo. However 
Arminius clearly affirms man's freedom to accept or reject 
Goa's grace, while Luther makes room for such freedom through 
the paradox of grace, although he denies that man has a free 
will coram deo. 
The problem of man's freedom and bondage is traced 
through the history of Christian thought. The anthropolo-
gies of Luther and Arminius are then compared. Luther's 
principles of Sola Gratia et Soli Deo Gloria are explored. 
They make God and His Spirit the active agent in salvation 
and man becomes but the passive recipient of God's work in 
him. Arminius with his principle of man's free will affirms 
~2 
that there are two active agents i n man ' s salvation, God ' s 
grace and man's free will . Then an attempt is made to re-
solve these apparent differences by comparin~ the monergistic 
idea of a paradox of grace with the synergistic argument for 
free will . Finally, problems posed by these two views are 
summarized and criticised and a reconstruction of Luther's 
teaching of the will in bondage is attempted. 
Conclusions: 
1 . Luther in his De Servo Arbitrio , by denying free will , 
gives the false impression that all human freedom is pre-
cluded in regeneration and salvation. 
2. Arminius' insistence on free will avoias the ambiguity 
of Luther's position without aenying that regeneration and 
salvation come by grace . 
3 . Luther ana Arminius agree that man enjoys some kind of 
freedom coram deo, though they disagree in their description 
of this freedom . 
4 . Luther and Arminius agree that all men sin, become 
bound in sin, and lack the spiritual freedom necessary to 
obtain salvation without grace . 
5 . Luther's denial of all free will in man coram deo is 
a denial of man's spiritual freedom, but not a denial of all 
freedom in man coram deo . 
6 . Luther's teaching on human freedom and bondage sets 
up a false antithesis between grace and free will, when the 
actual antithesis is between salvation by grace alone and 
merit alone . 
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7 . Luther ' s teaching makes provision for man's natural 
freedom by a paradox of grace and need not be incompatible 
with Arminius' view of free will . 
8 . Arminius 1 teaching avoids de t erminism according to the 
will of God without denying man's absolute need for grace in 
salvation. 
9 . The key to Arminius ' synergistic view of salvation is 
man ' s God-given power to accept or reject God ' s proffered 
grace . 
10 . Arminius seeks to teach that God limits His sovereignty 
over man i n a way that Luther does not, in order to make 
adequate provision for man's natural freedom. Luther ' s posi-
tion does not deny such freedom. 
11 . The synergism of Arminius is a more accurate and less 
ambiguous description of man ' s salvation than is the moner-
gism of Luther . 
12 . If the absolute need of God ' s grace and man's free will 
were clearly stated by both Protestants and Roman Catholics, 
then one more important step could be taken toward rapproache-
ment between them. 
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